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How do political responses to ecological problems shift once we take seriously the 
powers of natural forces to alter collective conditions and identities? What if the land was 
understood to be a co-creator of social life, and not simply an economic resource or 
material context for human action? Would not what counts as economy also change? This 
dissertation addresses these questions by examining pivotal thinkers in Western political 
thought, including Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Deleuze, in relation to the life-world of the 
Gurensi people of Ghana. It also explores the vital role that work in the visual arts and 
architecture can play in enhancing our sensitivities and forging negotiations between 
Western and African thought. The comparative project uses a blend of interpretive and 
ethnographic methods. It highlights interdependencies between human identities and 
natural processes and connects environmental political theory to a set of already existing 
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 In the smoldering heat of the afternoon sun, I walked slowly down the narrow 
footpath winding through fields of overgrown guinea corn. I was on my way to Gowrie to 
meet Christopher Anabila Azaare. Like many African elders, Christopher Azaare was 
renowned for his command of a rich body of traditional knowledge. I arrived just in time 
to catch the tail end of a house tour Chris was giving to three European visitors, including 
a German NGO volunteer at a nearby school. Chris was dressed in navy gray, muddy 
sweat-shorts and a blue shirt that was discolored by the sun. He walked with a noticeable 
limp from an old injury. While showing me around the house, he would occasionally 
burst into hearty and enthusiastic laughter that interspersed his engaging stories and 
teachings. Chris introduced himself as a retired schoolteacher who was still teaching part-
time in two local schools and serving in the Parent-Teacher Association. It soon became 
apparent, however, that he was a man of multiple talents: Chris was also a well-known 
public intellectual, a trained meteorologist, a professional soccer referee, a long-term 
custodian of his family gods, a sculptor, a devoted reader, a prolific writer, and a 
researcher. Since 1976 Chris Azaare has been recording the histories, genealogies, 
technologies, and socio-cultural practices of the Gurensi and Boosi people of the Upper 
East region of Ghana.
1
 Chris sleeps very little and sometimes writes until 3:30 a.m., 
staying awake with kola nuts, coffee, and Milo. He has crafted elaborate genealogical 
maps of whole villages and clans. His old, dusty desk is covered with piles of multi-
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animals and taboos, village and clan histories, as well as a number of studies of Gurensi 
oral traditions. 
       
 
             Writer and sculptor Chris Azaare                     Chris Azaare’s museum in Gowrie   
                        
 For years Chris Azaare has been building the house where we met with the idea of 
turning it into a museum of Gurensi history and culture. He has created beautiful cement 
sculptures scattered around the maze of rooms and courtyards. These include a life-size 
installation of his mother; a tindaana (earth custodian) performing a sacrifice to the 
tingane (earth gods); a senior wife cooking the family meal; and an elderly woman 
smoking a “peace pipe.” Others represent savanna animals such as lions and birds. The 
museum includes a miniature Gurensi earthen compound built out of a mix of local and 
imported materials. The mud and grass for the house come directly from the pit and grass 
fields adjacent to the house. The walls are plastered with cement. Chris looks particularly 
eager to show me the denya’aƞa, the flat-roofed female room found in every Gurensi 
compound: “Nya’aηa means ‘female.’ Deo means ‘room.’ But deo can be used in several 
contexts. We are from one family, one house—that is deo...If you are the landlord or the 
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[and] delivers, she is sent to that room, the denya’aƞa. It is the sacred room of the house, 
the room that is never let out in building.”
2
 As Chris and I visited house after house 
during our subsequent research trips, I realized that a compound is more than a material 
structure or a set of facilities: it grows and changes in accordance with the rhythms and 
lifecycles of the earth, the weather, and those who reside within its confines. It is a living 
body that intertwines the lifecycles of the living, the unborn, and the dead into a web of 
interdependences.  
 According to Chris Azaare, it is such interdependencies that make one’s house or 
village a home. Social identities are shaped by people’s rootedness in the ancestral land 
(tiηa) and their connections to sacred localities and shrines (tingana), to totemic animals 
and trees, and to preceding generations: 
I am called Azaare…I was named after my dead father. In certain situations they would 
not call me by Azaare, they would say yaaba [ancestor]…The people of Zaare, they 
worship, the whole community worships one god: Azaare…the Azaare is the big baba 
tree…it is not an ordinary tree you are named after. It is your ancestor that is in it and that 
is how your name is derived. So you do not allow anyone to cut the branches or the roots 
or whatnot. So those trees are usually guarded heavily…You are named after the tingane. 
And your tingane is the inhabiting place for your ancestor or your grandfather…There 
are other trees—you see the bats that gather, the doves coming to inhabit in those 
things—it is your ancestor, it is your yaaba that is inhabiting those…you cannot just go 
and cut. Because that is your life. That’s why I said the earth is just like a womb. All 
people are buried in it…we are all buried just like a child is in the mother’s womb…And 




Like Chris Azaare, many people identify themselves with tingana, the abodes of the 
yaabas (deceased elders or ancestors) of Northern Ghanaian communities who return to 
live with their living kin as baobab trees, pythons, or sacred groves. The oldest abode of 
the ancestors is the earth (tiηa), and the womb of the tiηa is where the farmer sows his 
seed and the dead are buried. It is also the life-generating force that gives birth both to 
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presences within and across human and natural bodies and the earth. To cut the branches 
of a tingane or build a quarry that punctures the delicate skin of the earth means 
extinguishing one’s vibrant source of life, history, and identity. Socio-cultural life is not 
separate from but interdependent with and transfused by ecological processes and forces 
of degradation and renewal of the earth. 
 In a world of rapid ecological change—where the communion between people, 
ancestors, and nature is becoming increasingly fragile—it seems particularly important to 
bring to light such existing forms of indigenous ecological thought and lived experience. 
These practices extend human subjectivity and experience deep into the natural world. 
They reveal modalities of human-environment interactions that do not fit easily into the 
living/non-living and nature/culture divisions that organize much of our contemporary 
political thinking. My discussions and travels with Chris Azaare in Ghana have had a 
profound influence on my work as a political theorist, perhaps enhancing my sense of 
belonging to the earth. By sharing my ethnographic observations in the pages to follow, it 
is my hope that you, the reader, may too become more alert to the various 
interdependencies between humans and nature. Together we may follow the advice of the 
elders to tread softly on the earth.   
********************** 
Spring 1845 
 “Near the end of March, 1845, I borrowed an axe and went down to the woods by 
Walden Pond, nearest to where I intended to build my house, and began to cut down 
some tall arrowy white pines, still in their youth, for timber. It is difficult to begin 
without borrowing.”
4
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a new beginning. The pond covered sixty-one acres of a densely wooded area south and 
just a little east of Concord, Massachusetts, bounded by the railroad at one end and 
Walden Road at the other. Thoreau’s stay at the pond was a remarkably productive 
experience. Besides twelve bushels of beans and eighteen bushels of potatoes, he 
produced more writings of exceptional quality than at any other period of his life. In two 
years and two months he wrote two full drafts of Week, a complete draft of Walden, two 
lectures, and the “Ktaadn” essay in The Maine Woods.
5
  
 Like Chris Azaare, Thoreau was not only a prolific writer and house-builder but 
also a sculptor of a nonconformist, earth-bound body. The Walden experiment is not a 
retreat from society but a process of ethical self-formation and awakening to what is 
important in socio-cultural life: “I went to the woods because I wished to live 
deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it 
had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived.”
6
 Thoreau 
questions the competitive tendencies of American society, the industrial mode of 
production, and the waste and extravagance in shelter, clothing, and food. Walden is an 
experiment in small-scale micropolitical reformation, reduced to the simplest constituent 
unit, the self.
 7
 Thoreau is aware that the self is a socio-cultural construct, with layerings 
that become sedimented into bodily dispositions, political sensibilities, and institutional 
commitments. And, this construct often exceeds the powers of control of its architects. 
Bodies are composed of materials that have a vitality of their own: “Every man is the 
builder of a temple, called his body, to the god he worships, after a style purely his own, 
nor can he get off by hammering marble instead. We are all sculptors and painters, and 
our material is our own flesh and blood and bones.”
8




                                                                                               
6 
with versatile media: flesh, blood, bones, memories, rocks, sounds, imagination, 
scripture, canoes, words, twigs, and constellations. His sculpture is a self-fashioning and 
responsive body whose limits, interior or exterior, are ambiguous and extensive. This 
body no longer serves to center or stabilize an exclusively human image. Any encounter 
with natural forces such as climate and mountain air can enliven the self and extend it 
into natural forces and processes: “For I believe that climate does thus react on man,—as 
there is something in the mountain air that feeds the spirit and inspires. Will not man 
grow to greater perfection intellectually as well as physically under these influences?”
9
 
This transformative relationship with earthly forces is at the same time a relationship with 
oneself: “Shall I not have intelligence with the earth? Am I not partly leaves and 
vegetable mould myself?”
10
 Thoreau sensitizes his body to its own constitution as partly 
earth. The power of his body to affect other bodies involves a corresponding capacity to 
be affected or to respond to the vitality that runs through all earthly existence. 
 In searching for an answer to the question of how one should live one’s life, both 
Henry Thoreau and Chris Azaare turn to the earth, rather than to the state or a central 
authority. While Thoreau refuses to identify the good life with God or society, for Chris 
Azaare, the pivotal role of the ancestors and the gods in society’s well-being can only be 
known through the earth. However, for both writers, nature expresses and makes 
thinkable the variations and undulations of the underlying laws of the world.
11
 They seem 
to concur that sensitivity and practical, lived experience are related modes of thinking 
that offer a counterpoint to abstract ways of theorizing. Thinking should follow and grow 
out of the lived experiences of the relationships between people and the earth. This 
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change who illuminate the complex relationship between transnational processes and 
individual lives. The Walden experiment chronicled everyday life in Concord during a 
time when the influence of land speculators and big agribusiness was growing, 
undermining the Jeffersonian ideal of subsistence farming.
12
 Thoreau’s systematic record 
of when and where plants flowered in Concord allows researchers today to discern 
patterns of plant abundance and decline in the area—and by extension in New England—
and to link those patterns to climate change.
13
 Chris Azaare’s oral histories of “heavily 
guarded” tingana, in turn, provide a living record of pre-colonial biodiversity and 
primary forest cover that enables us to register increasing rates of deforestation and 
desertification in Northern Ghana. He describes transforming ramifications between 
subsistence farmers and a life-generating earth that today compete with Western-inspired 
forms of land management and ownership. In both cases, the business of the scholar is to 





This dissertation explores how contemporary political responses to ecological 
problems would shift if land were to be understood as a co-creator of social life and not 
only an economic resource. This concern with living well without undermining the 
natural systems on which we depend is the impetus for my research. It is based on the 
observation that environmentalists and political economists have neglected the centrality 
of lived experience to ecological imaginaries of the good life. The dissertation seeks to 
remedy this gap: I stage encounters between pivotal, albeit minor (with regard to the 
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Deleuze and Guattari, and the life-world of the Gurensi people of Ghana. The 
comparative project uses a blend of interpretive and ethnographic methods. It views 
natural processes and ecological problems as intertwined with social practices of identity 
formation. I complement textual analysis with ethnographic methods to render visible 
within the orbit of political theory a long tradition of environmental thought in Africa.  
My fieldwork in Ghana was conducted during two trips that took place between 
December 2011 and January 2012 and from July 2012 to January 2013. My focus on the 
Gurensi institution of earth custody (tindaanaship) and its encounters with the market 
economy highlights alternative ways of structuring the relations between what are often 
seen as distinct spheres of the “economic,” the “ecological,” and the “cultural.” Such 
alternatives, I argue, do not only deepen philosophical analyses of interdependencies 
between collective identities and natural forces; they also enrich scholarly understanding 
of how environmental thought becomes anchored in, rather than abstracted from, the 
diversity of lived experiences in a scaled-up, globalizing world. I show how people draw 
upon such interdependencies to “model” their own economies and modalities of property 
and production. Localities such as Northern Ghana—commonly defined as insufficiently 
developed or modernized—might now be acknowledged as sites of surplus possibility 
and alternative ecological imaginaries. By including oral histories and story-telling as 
ways of practicing economics that contrast with quantitative approaches, I also aim to 
reassess the analytical resources available for the study and teaching of political 
economy. 
The project advances both multi-economism and multi-culturalism in the study of 
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property, and wealth as beliefs rather than as methods for ascertaining truth (which is 
typically reserved for Western political economy). These latter tendencies create 
profound inequalities concerning who is (and is not) authorized to produce knowledge 
about globalization and the environment, and therefore, profoundly affect how global 
environmental changes come to be understood and addressed. 
Questions concerning the survivability of species and the integrity of natural 
processes cross both national and disciplinary boundaries. By linking ethnography to a 
series of pressing philosophical debates about economy, nature, ethics, and politics, 
however, I also aim to negotiate the tension between “global” and “local” that 
characterizes much of the work in environmental studies and international political 
economy. I explore practices of sustainable living that are already at work in specific 
geographical regions (the U.S. and Ghana), but do so in the context of broad, 
philosophical concerns about the health of the planet. A focus on consumption brings to 
light geographical and cultural distances between consumers and the ecological 
consequences of their consumption practices. This consumption lens connects my 
research to the major contemporary debates about sustainability: What constitutes 
sustainable consumption practices? What is being sustained: development itself or the 
integrity of ecosystems and livelihoods? My ethnography of the Gurensi people’s 
relationship to the land furnishes chronicles of lived experience that complicate both the 
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ECOLOGY, ECONOMY, AND ART  
 
I start with the intuition that philosophical reflection profits from being combined 
with ethnography. By exposing philosophical ideas about nature, community, and 
economy to ethnographies that reveal ecological and cultural difference, I aim to forge a 
new dialogue between Euro-American political thought and African lived experience. I 
am not saying that ethnography provides the base to which Western philosophy must be 
anchored. I am exploring a two-way street in which a “minor” literature in Euro-
American traditions and the thought of the Gurensi can inform one another. The former 
minor movement in Euro-American thought is embodied by Thoreau and Nietzsche, who 
each challenge the majority culture in their renderings of ecology, the Wild, pan-
perspectivism, and gratitude for the abundance of being. Gurensi thought can be also 
understood as a minor literature as it tries to push back against a modernizing culture, 
which shares with the West a model of economy that I challenge in chapter 2. The idea is 
not to place a minor tradition into relation to a major one, but to explore what happens 
when two minor traditions are put into communication with one another. Perhaps, this 
puts even more pressure on the major traditions in each place. The mutuality of such 
cross-cultural encounters may transform both Western and African perspectives and 
diversify the available resources for contemporary environmental action. 
The goal is to cultivate an ecological sensibility capable of closer discernment of 
the interconnectedness of living and non-living creatures and a more subtle awareness of 
the presence of multiple degrees of agency and creativity, distributed along a continuum 
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within recent trends in political theory that challenge understandings of politics as an 
exclusively human domain, both by taking account of the body as a relay point for 
ecopolitical mobilization and by re-thinking political contestation as including influences 
from nonhuman bodies. Contemporary thinkers such as Jane Bennett, William Connolly, 
Karen Barad, Bruno Latour, Diana Coole, and Samantha Frost have advanced such 
trends.
16
 I seek to provide three contributions to existing scholarship: 1) cultivation of a 
mode of political theorizing that brings micropolitics and African everyday life into 
dialogue; 2) a re-figuring of economy as an ethical practice; and 3) a focus on the 
political efficacy of earthworks. 
 
Micropolitics and Everyday Life  
I share the aims of a long tradition of environmentalism that contests 
anthropocentrism or all too human-centered ethical thinking, which lie at the root of 
current practices of ecological destruction.
17
 Anthropocentrism refers both to (1) the 
structure of concepts and beliefs that consider humans either to “constitute” or to be 
superior to all other nonhumans, whether species or ecosystems; and (2) to the related 
sets of attitudes and practices that lead to treating these ecosystems and beings in ways 
that give singular privilege to human interests, narrowly defined.
18
 One dominant strand 
here—thinkers such as Arne Naess, Robyn Eckersley, Peter Singer, and Paul Taylor—
sees ethics as a subfield of analytic philosophy and relies upon Kantian categories of 
duties, rights, values, and obligations.
19
 While rich in insights, this model of ethics gives 
short shrift to the role of the human body and to the way the human body’s powers are 
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biosciences as well as by practical wisdom. I argue that a non-anthropocentric ecopolitics 
requires more than an extension of rights and value to nonhumans. I emphasize the 
importance of bodily comportment and receptivity to “Nature.” But I also defend the 
view that nature is itself an actant or a set of ethico-political practices, rather than merely 
raw material for use or conceptualization.
20
 Here I draw on nature writers such as Barry 
Lopez, Annie Dillard, William Wordsworth, and David Abram, who eschew rights- and 
value-talk and focus on the interface between the human body and natural bodies without 
explicitly theorizing it.
21
 I highlight the need for a notion of politics that extends beyond 
the realms of macro-level political institutions, socio-economic structures, or explicit 
deliberations among human participants (i.e., macropolitics). It is also essential to 
examine anthropocentrism through a micropolitical lens, a dimension of politics that 
attends to the myriad processes that shape our political sensibilities, moods, and 
identities.  
Micropolitics allows me to explore how certain images—of the body, 
productivity, etc.—shape our sense of self and of being human. Some environmentalists 
have tended to explain life on the basis of images treated implicitly as transcendental; for 
example, the image of humans as enclosed organisms or bodies bounded by skin. 
Anthropocentrism, I contend, operates through regimes that stabilize such images. 
Treatment of bodies as self-enclosed individuals, sovereign consumers, or rights-bearers 
do not exhaust what it means to be human; they understate the complexity of 
entanglements between human minds, bodies, and natural forces. This is why I turn to a 
school of political theory known as “immanent naturalism,” which views changes in body 
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specify the exact shape and extent of these changes in advance.
 22
 I seek to advance an 
eco-ethical strategy informed by immanent naturalism that draws on the insights of 
thinkers such as Spinoza, Thoreau, Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett, 
and Connolly. This strategy emphasizes less how we ought to live and more how we could 
enrich experience in ways that increase awareness of our embeddedness within a larger 
system of forces and flows that congeal into the earth’s heterogeneous assemblages of 
bodies. It involves inventing techniques that act upon the body/brain network so as to 
alter future patterns of thought, action, and feeling. The goal is to explore an ethic of 
living well within the earth’s capacities through a set of experimental tactics that enrich 
sensation and help recraft anthropocentric sensibilities. Nietzsche speaks here of “self-
overcoming,” Foucault–of “arts of existence,” Thoreau – of “sculpting” a self.  
Of course, this approach stands in some tension with, say, the eco-sensibilities of 
the Gurensi. So I try to move back and forth to explore these tensions and sometimes to 
mediate them. I pursue this strategy through a blend of textual analysis and ethnography 
that seeks to maintain a fine balance between concept formation and thick description. 
My commitment to engage both political theory and ethnography was originally 
prompted by debates within the anthropology of modernity, which investigates Western 
modernity as a culturally and historically specific phenomenon that enters into processes 
of hybridization with competing modernities.
23
 My use of ethnography highlights ethical 
and ecological imaginaries that remain largely invisible within Euro-American theory. In 
particular, I reveal the extent to which some of the practices of ethical cultivation 
articulated by immanent naturalists are already lived by large numbers of people outside 
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growing field of comparative political theory.
24
 I also build on interpretive methodologies 
in political science, which view knowledge as historically entangled in power relations.
25
 
I emphasize the cultivation of a mode of political theorizing that does not, say, privilege 
Deleuze and Guattari’s knowledge over that of the Gurensi people. Such a dialogue 
between theory and ethnography invites African lived experience to broaden Euro-
American philosophical imaginaries. It adds to studies of African micropolitics that focus 
on the intersection of shifting African identities and people’s everyday tactics to cope 
with market or state disciplines.
26
 By making body images a topic of ecopolitical 
research, my project moves political theory closer to the concerns of the human sciences 
and the anthropology of material culture, which have expanded our understanding of 
lived bodies as assemblages of practices, sensory-affective-motor conducts, or 
discourses.
27
     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Economy as an Ethical Practice  
A related goal is to develop a notion of the economy as itself a set of ethical 
practices with ecological and political efficacy. Here I draw inspiration from, among 
others, the geographers J.K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink.
28
 They reclaim 
economy as a site of everyday ethical practices; they seek to enact new “body-
economies” that acknowledge the interdependence of humans and nonhumans. I also 
build on the insights of ecological economics and Buddhist economics. Herman Daly’s 
ecological economics offers a picture of the economy as an open subsystem of a larger 
ecosystem and recognizes biophysical limits to economic growth: since the earth as a 
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adapt to the earth’s dynamic equilibrium.
29
 Daly emphasizes the embeddedness of the 
economy within larger ecological processes and the central role of consumption in 
environmental degradation. E.F. Schumacher’s Buddhist economics, in turn, is centered 




Following Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, Daly, and Schumacher, I explore 
economy as a crucial dimension of ethical formation and as a process enacted by the 
conjoint action of human and nonhuman “economy-makers.” I seek to enrich Daly’s and 
Schumacher’s ecological understandings of the economy by accentuating the aesthetic 
dimension of economic life and by further exposing the limits of human-centered 
economic thinking. I question the presumption that at the heart of any economic practice 
lies a human agency that has been projected into modes of production and consumption. 
This anthropocentric bias is expressed in the ideas that nature is a set of “economic 
resources,” that matter is inert or potentially pliable, and that plants are stockpiles of 
genes that can be traded according to supply and demand. 
This idea of the economy as an ethical practice also raises anew the questions of 
the fundamental purpose of economic activity and the structure of human needs. It 
reveals production as consumption: consumption occurs all along the production chain as 
raw-material extraction and manufacturing consume human and ecological capital.
31
 This 
consumption angle allows us to imagine a society that prospers with much less stuff. 
Chapters 2 and 3, for example, suggest that in the age of the Anthropocene it may 
become essential to link the concept of “wealth” to the sensory enrichment derived from 
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exchange, Thoreau’s economy of simplicity, and Zarathustra’s economy of gift-giving all 
refer to such non-utilitarian assemblages of humans, earth, and machines. 
 
The Political Efficacy of Earthworks 
Eventually, it becomes imperative to stage encounters between art, ethnography, 
and political theory in order to highlight interdependencies between human subjectivity 
and earthly processes. I ask to what extent, and in what ways, public art can inflect 
perceptions and eco-sensibilities today. I am particularly interested in art that takes the 
form of earthworks, such as Robert Smithson's “Spiral Jetty,” Richard Serra’s 
installations, and the earthen architecture of Northern Ghana. I focus on the power of the 
materials of artwork and not only the designs of human artists. Through earthworks, I 
argue, the earth itself can be appreciated as a co-creator of social events, rather than 
merely an economic resource or material context for human action. Such arts of 
existence, in turn, might attune our bodies to these creative powers and reveal our own 
make-up as partly earth; they may enable us to perceive economy as itself, in part, an art 
practice with an ecological and political efficacy.  
I also explore how the abstract categories of political theory speak to artistic 
practices that are not usually recognized as “art.” Is the political efficacy of earthworks 
limited by the tendency to see landscape art as work produced by artists and for the sake 
of consumption? I put political theory into dialogue with ethnography in order to render 
visible to theory a long tradition of earthen architecture in Africa. African practices of 
earth-building, repair, and maintenance link the question of the efficacy of earthworks to 
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sustainability and its central question of what is to be sustained. My immersion in the 
everyday life of Gurensi earthen compounds as living bodies could also enrich analyses 
of interdependencies between human subjectivity and earthly forces. The act of sharing 
such ethnographic observations becomes a political act. It highlights the potential of 
everyday arts to modify habits of perception, producing occasions to suspend earth-
destroying tendencies of consumption. 
 
A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
 
The dissertation, as already stated, blends interpretive and ethnographic methods. 
First, I use a mode of textual analysis that draws on hermeneutics and classical rhetoric. I 
follow Thoreau, Nietzsche, and others who offer both arguments and modes of 
persuasion through narrative and story telling. I examine artistically crafted texts such as 
Walden and Thus Spoke Zarathustra in relation to ethnographic material and works in the 
visual arts, sculpture, and earthen architecture, which are also designed to touch upon the 
visceral register of socio-cultural life. To conduct such examinations, I deploy Michael 
Shapiro’s “writing-as-method,” a post-hermeneutic approach designed to re-fashion 
readers as aesthetic subjects. Writing-as-method activates an epistemology hospitable to 
those arts that challenge hierarchies of sense-making.
32
 The method involves a shift from 
theory building and hypothesis testing to literary enactments that mobilize ethical 
sensibilities, and to a practice of theory as a creative process of concept invention that co-
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informed by “writing-as-method,” is designed to produce textual effects that sensitize the 
reader to interdependencies between human subjectivity and earthly processes.         
Second, during my fieldwork in Ghana I adopted participant observation and 
immersion in the life-world of the Gurensi people. As a method, ethnography is best 
suited to meet the research objectives of this project and to complement textual analysis. 
Ethnography enables me to explore practices of sustainable living that remain largely 
invisible in the Euro-American literature on sustainability. It allows me to render visible 
subjugated knowledges and “minor literatures” that can enrich analyses.
33
 Ethnography 
also fits the project’s key theme of the power of bodies: it draws on the physical presence 
of the researcher to highlight the co-generation of knowledge and to make it available to 
a wider audience. Thus, ethnography allows me to negotiate competing constructions of 
knowledge that issue from political theory and ordinary life.  
Gurensi earthen compounds (yɛa) and sacred groves (tingana) were taken as key 
field sites, as sites offering windows into broader interdependencies between social 
identities and natural processes. I explore how sacred groves wield power over humans 
and how the lifecycles of earthen houses interact with the lifecycles of their inhabitants. 
Here my fieldwork is indebted to Joao Biehl and Peter Locke’s ethnographic approach to 
subjectivity. Biehl and Locke advance a vision of ethnography as an art of bricolage 
(bricolage is what researchers “do with theory and what people do with their lives”) that 
recognizes that everything we learn, we learn through our own embodied experience.
34
 I 
complement Biehl and Locke’s bricolage with Kirsten Hastrup’s topographic approach to 
field methods, which is attuned to non-cognitive modes of learning and field 
experience.
35
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research is continually being shaped by the materiality of earthen compounds and shrines. 
It helps me to register the affectivity of the earth in its relations with my Gurensi 
informants. 
I have also focused on the Gurensi institution of earth custody (tindaanaship) and 
its contemporary encounters with the modern market economy. The office of the earth 
custodian (tindaana) is widely spread over Northern Ghana and is bound up with the 
powers of ancestors and earth shrines. Today, state claims to absolute rights over land, 
concessions made to businesses, and Western-inspired land tenure systems and 
privatization collide with customary forms of authority such as the chieftaincy and earth 
custody. The analysis of these collisions enriches my understanding of economy as a set 
of everyday practices with an ecological and political cast. While remaining mindful of 
the degree to which ideas of “tradition” have been historically constructed in Ghana, I 
explore how the Gurensi people draw on available resources such as the transforming 
office of the earth custodian. Can such practices be perceived as a form of art, as “life 
bricolage?”  
In addition to participant observation, I conducted open-ended interviews with 
earth priests (tindaanduuma), chiefs (naduma), healers (bagenaduma), sectional heads 
(yizukεεma), land commissioners, and residents of selected Gurensi households. I 
approached people through “snowball sampling,” whereby initial contacts generated new 
ones. The interviews collected oral narratives of people’s experiences with the land, 
totemic animals, and various taboos. They covered a wide range of topics: the role of 
earthen compounds (yɛa), earth shrines (tingana), and earth custody in everyday life; 
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productivity of households and communities; how earth custodians (tindaanas), chiefs 
(nabas), and elders understand their obligations; why some people pay respect to the 
shrines and others do not. The interviews were conducted both in English and Gurene, the 
language of the Gurensi. I continue to study Gurene under the supervision of a Gurensi 
instructor.  
  
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter 2 pursues the theme of economy as an ethical practice in a more robust 
way. What is the fundamental purpose of economic activity? What do we mean by a 
“good life?” Is it to accumulate commodities or to create the prerequisites for a good life, 
one that includes many things that markets cannot provide? I stage a dialogue between 
Thoreau and the Gurensi earth priest, and rework key concepts of the anthropocentric 
repertoire of mainstream political economy—property, production, labor, and wealth—as 
a web of socio-ecological relationships between humans and the land. I argue that such a 
conversation might not only deepen Western ecopolitical imaginaries but also enrich the 
practice of political theory as such. Even Thoreau relies on abstract conceptual binaries 
such as nature/culture, subject/object, and domesticated/wild to perform an economy of 
simple living, wherein natural processes intertwine with social practices. Gurensi 
thought, on the other hand, is tied to practices and experiences that continually escape the 
categories of Western philosophy. Ethical life is an expression of life to the Gurensi. The 
dialogue between Thoreau and the earth priest outlines a practice of political theory that 
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ethnography, economy can be perceived as an ethical practice: a process enacted by 
various assemblages of earthen bodies and forces. Thoreau’s model in Walden focuses on 
micro-practices of the self, and the Gurensi earth priest helps us to see how such arts of 
existence apply to groups of people. The life of the marketplace is revealed as one among 
many contemporary forms of life rather than the terminal stage of social evolution.  
Chapter 3 stages another encounter between political theory and ethnography, this 
time between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and African animism. The goal is to enable us to 
see sustainable living not as an amended “lifestyle” but as a web of long-term interactions 
with the land. Building on the revision of economy as a more-than-human domain, I 
explore Zarathustra’s economy of gift-giving in relation to the economies of reciprocity 
of the Gurensi people of Ghana. In contrast to ethnocentric representations of 
“subsistence” economies, I show that these are economies characterized by an 
ecologically balanced ratio of production to need. Such models treat the environment as 
giving. Economic dispositions—at least, at their best—are predicated upon trust in 
abundance, in contrast to Western preoccupations with scarcity and high consumption. In 
place of a political economy of control, we have the socio-ecological control of economy: 
society inhibits accumulation and ensures sustainability through redistribution and 
sharing of the surplus that the land bestows upon humans. Zarathustra and the Gurensi 
earth priest together reveal how such relations of reciprocity are power relations. For the 
Gurensi, power relations take the form of a debt that humans pay back to the earth, which 
is filled with reciprocating ancestors.  
Nietzsche’s emphasis on agon and struggle, in turn, presents the exchange 
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Gurensi earth priest, to know means to personify more than to objectify. Knowledge 
becomes not a set of specifications to “pass down” from generation to generation but 
rather a heightened perceptual sensitivity that reveals the earth as an animate knowledge-
holder or locus of wisdom. This understanding of knowledge troubles familiar 
philosophical demarcations between epistemology and ontology.  
Chapter 4 examines the role that visual arts, sculpture, and earthen architecture 
can play in enhancing our sensitivities and in forging negotiations between Western and 
African thought. The first sections explore a notion of art as modes of bodily 
intensification whose power lie not first and foremost in meanings but in the sensations 
elicited and intensified. I show how encounters with earthworks such as Robert 
Smithson’s Spiral Jetty could enable our bodies and perceptions—always acting 
conjointly with other bodies—to evolve in new ecological directions. The aesthetic 
experience of earthworks can trigger perceptions that may interrupt anthropocentric 
habits. Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, for example, mobilizes intersecting tiers of duration, 
some of which are human, and others not; it heightens sensitivity to cycles of ecological 
degradation and regeneration. As a corollary, I explore how Richard Serra’s installations 
alter received notions of human agency. The act of human creativity now becomes 
merely one mode of the distributive agency of human-nonhuman assemblages. However, 
my research identifies a significant limit to the political efficacy of earthworks: works 
such as Smithson’s and Serra’s tend to be detached from everyday life and are often 
consumed as land art. This is why in the last section I turn to the study of African earthen 
architecture, which intertwines earthly processes with the everyday lifecycles of people 
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Chapter 5 draws political theory and ethnography into an engagement with 
orature. The term “orature” was coined by the Ugandan linguist Pio Zirimu to counter the 
tendency to treat the oral traditions of African thought as an inferior stage in a linear 
evolution towards modern literature and writing. The chapter puts Gurensi orature into 
dialogue with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of “minor literature,” which refers to a way of 
appropriating language as a “collective utterance” to call forth new political identities and 
sensitivities. Minor literature does not occur “apart from” a major literature but, on the 
contrary, operates from within, making dominant anthropocentric orientations of 
language “stutter.” Likewise, orature makes perceptible what has not or cannot be heard 
or perceived otherwise: how land speaks. By sensitizing us to the expressivity of the land 
as reciprocating ancestors, I argue that orature might effect a “stutter” in the majoritarian 
orientations of Euro-American environmental political theory. It might give voice to the 
“subjugated” knowledges and earthen languages of African people that trouble the dual 
colonization of the aural-oral by the literary and of nonhumans by humans. Together, 
orature and minor literature highlight the irreducible moment of independence possessed 
by the materiality of socio-ecological landscapes vis-à-vis narrative constructions of 
collective conditions and history. I show that in Northern Ghana the collective 
enunciations of orature are not confined to human bodies alone. They include lively 
socio-cultural landscapes that narrate and record events in their own right.
                                                 
1
 The Gurensi live in the Bolgatanga Municipal and Bongo districts in the Upper East Region of Ghana. In 
the Bongo area they live together with the Boosi, a related group with different founding ancestors. The 
term “Gurensi” is a common but controversial ethnic identification, as some of the Gurensi’s neighbors use 
the term in a derogatory sense. In English-speaking conversations, and in conversations with Ghanaians 
unfamiliar with the Upper East, one often hears “Frafra,” a colonial term derived from a local greeting, 
which lumps the Gurensi and the Boosi together alongside the Nabnam and the Tallensi (and their 
respective languages as “Farafara”). In spite of the lack of consensus, most of the elders and knowledge-
holders in the communities I interacted with insisted on the use of the name “Gurensi.” Both Gurene (the 
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group. It is not uncommon, however, for every community or cluster of communities in the Bongo and 
Bolgatanga area to identify themselves by their local speech—for instance, the Zoko communities as 
speakers of Zagene. Many of the earth-bound practices described in this essay apply also to the Boosi. 
However, since most of my discussions refer to the areas around Bolgatanga, Gowrie, and Zoko, I have 
decided to use the term Gurensi unless specifically referring to the residents of the Bongo Township. For a 
study that illuminates the distinctive historical trajectory of clan genealogies and relationships, political 
authority, language, and belonging among the Gurensi and the Boosi see Christopher Azaare, A History of 
the Bongo District (forthcoming).          
2
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Thoreau Goes to Ghana: On the Wild and the Tingane 
 
 
…in Wildness is the preservation of the World. Every tree sends its fibres forth in search 
of the Wild…Men plow and sail for it. From the forest and wilderness come the tonics 
and barks which brace mankind.        
  
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walking 
 
The founder might have been a strong farmer and when he was farming he met 
something extraordinary, for example, maybe a ring or an extraordinary stone. So he was 
afraid of this stone…he would carry it home and keep it somewhere, and he would 
consult his elders in the village…the soothsayer will come and tell them: “Oh, this is your 
great grandmother…She loves her great grandchildren so much that she has come back in 
the form of this particular, extraordinary stone to live with you.” So they did not just 
choose a place where to make sacrifices but something extraordinary, something beyond 
their knowledge must have been seen there. 
      ELDER, In discussion with the author 
 
WHICH OR WHO IS THAT STONE? 
 
A pile of stones marks the abode of the poet from Concord, Massachusetts who 
sought refuge from a society that dulls, commodifies, and domesticates. Today, the urge 
to build a hut in the woods and simplify our lives—to front “only the essential facts of 
life” and the Wild that enchants and lures us into communion with Nature—remains 
strong.
1
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The shrine memorializes a way of living that revealed that there is more to “Economy”—
the title of the opening chapter of Walden—than markets and humans. The stones have 
become totems of the various conservationist, back-to-nature, anti-industry, non-
conformist, voluntary simplicity, DIY, and homesteading communities who continue to 
act upon Thoreau’s intuitions.  
A pile of stones also marks the tingane, the abode of the earth gods of the Gurensi 
people of Northern Ghana. Gurensiland is mapped out into a network of tingana (pl.)—
sacred groves, rocks, rivers, caves, grasslands—in which the spirits of the ancestors come 
back to live with the clan or the village. Other trees, rivers, and rocks mark the boundary 
from tingane to tingane. Seasonal sacrifices are performed to each tingane by indigenous 
clans presided over by the tindaana (earth priest or land owner). The tindaana mediates 
between the earth gods, the ancestors, and the community. He wears animal skins and a 
black twined cap or a calabash as the insignia of his office of the custodian of the land 
(tiƞa). He allocates land for settlement, building, farming, animal rearing, market- and 
graveyard-sites and various development projects. The tingane is propitiated by the 
tindaana’s offerings of millet flour, local beer (daamolega) and animals. It is on the pile 
of stones that the blood of fowls and animals is poured and the feathers of the fowls 
placed. The tingane, in turn, assists the community with good harvests, fertility and 
procreation, warding off droughts and diseases. Most tingana are habitats both for the 
community spirits and for various medicinal plants, trees, birds’ nests, bats, larger reptiles 
and mammals, and reservoirs of water. As the stones demarcate tiƞa as a sacred 
enclosure, they trouble demarcations between subject and object, nature and culture, 




                                                                                               
29 
signs. Humans are the extended kin and family of tiƞa who manifests her presence in 
stones. 
What happens if Thoreau goes to Ghana? What happens if we read Walden on 
nature and economy after talking to a Gurensi earth priest? This chapter stages 
encounters between Thoreau’s Wild and the Gurensi tingane. The goal is to explore an 
ethic of living well within the earth’s capacities through a set of experimental tactics that 
enrich sensation and help recraft anthropocentric sensibilities. Nietzsche describes such 
tactics of self-artistry as “self-overcoming”; Foucault, as “arts of existence.”
3
 I will use 
these ideas to explore how political responses to the ecological crisis shift once we take 
seriously the powers of earthly forces to shape our identities. This will expand on recent 
trends in political theory—such as Bennett’s “New Materialism”—which challenge 
understandings of politics as an exclusively human domain by re-thinking political 
contestation as including influences from nonhuman bodies.
4
 
 Both Thoreau and the Gurensi earth priest engage in human-nonhuman 
assemblage-making at the crossroads of market and community economies. Both prompt 
us to re-experience economy as one such assemblage that distributes multiple degrees of 
agency and creativity along a continuum of human and more-than-human bodies and 
forces. Such cross-cultural encounters might even help us to reconnect what we now see 
as distinct spheres: the “economic,” the “ecological,” and the “spiritual.” They might 
make visible politico-economic relations as ecological relations; ecological relations as 
kinship relations, intertwining humans, other species, gods, and the earth (tiƞa). 
However, this chapter does not merely ask whether Thoreau’s ideas about economy and 
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to highlight what productive engagements can be forged at the point where such ideas are 
no longer transferable and the limits of familiar concepts such as agency, economy, and 
subjectivity become evident.  
There is another reason to take political theory to “the field”: to address an 
anticipated chorus of skeptics about the plausibility of projects like Bennett’s New 
Materialism or Thoreau’s life of frugal living. “Who would do this today? Who would 
practice such tactics of self-artistry that sensitize us to human embeddedness within a 
world that swarms with vital forces, agencies, and bodies?” How would our experiences 
of “economy” and “property” change? Ethnography is too rarely used as a mode of 
inquiry within political theory, which relies heavily upon textual analysis. The 
commitment to textual analysis blocks our ability to explore the ways in which 
philosophy intersects with everyday life. Theory and ethnography could strengthen each 
other: if a fine-tuned ethnography can uncover the subtle workings of everyday life and 
their entwinement with questions of the earth’s agency, theory can help to develop the 
conceptual specificity of those dynamics. Such exchanges could reveal certain aspects of 
our humanity that we are not able to recognize easily as our own.
5
 As an ethnographer I 
became a participant in a privileged experience that sensitized me to the ways in which 
Gurensi tindaanas, chiefs, and elders body forth and interact with a lively earth that, in 
turn, interacts with and nurtures them. As a theorist I came to appreciate the worth of 
such lived experiences of “ourselves,” in which I was bestowed new lifeworlds and 
identities.
6
 Ethnography allows me to show that the ethical practices described by the 
New Materialist or Thoreau are already approximated and lived elsewhere by large 
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existing ethical universes and brings to light newly available resources for contemporary 
ecopolitical action.  
 Such a conversation might not only deepen Western ecopolitical imaginaries but 
also enrich the practice of theory as such. Thoreau relies on abstract conceptual 
distinctions such as nature/culture, subject/object, and domesticated/wild to perform an 
economy of simple living, which intertwines natural processes with social practices of 
ethical subject formation. The Gurensi people, on the other hand, invite us to partake in a 
multiplicity of lived experiences that continually escape the categories through which 
Western philosophy has tended to order such multiplicities. Ethical life is known as lived 
by the Gurensi. This does not mean, however, that this conversation draws together 
intrinsically different techniques. The earth priest also theorizes as he locates spiritual 
power in stones. In Walden Thoreau conducts a radical ethnography of Concord’s 
everyday life. The idea is to start in the middle by putting thought and lived experience 
on a par. The dialogue to be staged between Thoreau and the earth priest suggests the 
outlines of a practice of political theory that is less concept-centric. We can now alternate 
between theory and ethnography as two overlapping registers or distributions of emphasis 
within political thinking. 
As we “front” together the Wild and the tingane, and shift back and forth between 
these two registers, economy itself can be perceived as an ethical practice with an 
ecological and political cast: a process enacted by various assemblages of earthen bodies 
and forces. In the pages to follow I show how a dialogue between Thoreau and the 
Gurensi tindaana prompts us to refigure key concepts of the anthropocentric repertoire of 
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of the material conditions of human life and the common good rather than an economic 
resource; 2) Wealth: becomes the capacity to mobilize ancestral assistance and mutually 
supportive networks of aid and reciprocity between humans and nonhumans rather than 
an immense accumulation of commodities; 3) Property: poetic/spiritual enclosures that 
reveal ways of apprehending the land without possessing it as enclosed commons; 4) 
Work: practices of negotiated interdependence with other economy-makers rather than 
monotonous, alienated labor.
7
 The life of the marketplace is revealed as one among many 
contemporary forms of life rather than the terminal stage of social evolution. To highlight 
the key points of contact and contrast between Thoreau’s and the tindaana’s practices of 
economy-making, the next two sections examine how each set of practices is woven into 
the land and into habits of perception, place, and the body. Whereas Thoreau’s model in 
Walden focuses on micro-practices of the self, the Gurensi earth priest helps us to see 
how such arts of existence apply in the first instance to groups of people. If it is 
Thoreau’s solitary communing with Walden that extends his body into natural processes 
and forces, it is the experience of being a part of a farming community bound together by 
the earth gods that enables the Gurensi to come to terms with nature so that everyday 
activities can take place. I end by putting Thoreau and the Gurensi into a direct dialogue 
in the aim of mobilizing a practice of theory as a creative process of concept invention 
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“ENJOY THE LAND, BUT OWN IT NOT”: FROM POSSESSIONS TO POETIC 
ENCLOSURES   
 
 
Thoreau’s own body-economy is entangled with a variety of nonhuman bodies 
and processes. The act of distancing himself from society—including from his inner 
conventionality—allows him to move closer to the earth as the perennial source of life, 
and to a community whose members are not exclusively human. At Walden Thoreau was 
“no more lonely than the Mill Brook, or a weathercock, or the northstar, or the south 
wind, or an April shower, or a January thaw, or the first spider in a new house.”
8
 Various 
tempos and durations conjoin inside Thoreau’s house, which itself becomes a porous 
extension of Thoreau’s individual body. This compound body mixes human subjectivity, 
cosmic and earthly processes. It is nested within larger cosmological processes, putting 
Thoreau’s everyday arts of existence into contact with the remote and unexplored regions 
of a universe that is “wider than our views of it.”
9
 Thoreau says that ideally, the poet 
would “live in the open air” and spend his nights without any obstruction between him 
and the celestial bodies.
10
  
An open-air abode nurtures the poetic imagination and troubles received 
anthropocentric regimes of perception. So does the porous frame of Thoreau’s 
unplastered cabin: “This frame, so slightly clad, was a sort of crystallization around me, 
and reacted on the builder.”
11
 The frame reacts on the builder and imbues him with a 
bodily understanding of the shared materiality of the house as an earthly actant.
12
 Built 
from a mix of easily available, reused, man-made and Nature-furnished materials, the 
house is a living monument to Thoreau’s friendship and collaboration with the pine 
tree.
13
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thrilling songsters of the forest…the wood-thrush, the veery, the scarlet tanager, the field-
sparrow, the whippoorwill.”
14
 The cabin is furnished with fresh mountain air: it is “a sort 
of porch at the entrance of a burrow” to the earth.
15
 To move to the shore of the pond 
means to settle into the larger household (oikos) of the earth. The earth is the body and 
the milieu, which provides Thoreau with the “equable temperature” and resources to re-
construct his “shell” and transform himself corporally. Like a skin, the house is an 
extension of the body: “The most interesting dwellings in this country, as the painter 
knows, are the most unpretending, humble log huts and cottages of the poor commonly; it 
is the life of the inhabitants whose shells they are, and not any peculiarity in their 
surfaces merely, which makes them picturesque.”
16
 
A house is not an object or a commodity so much as the name of the intimate 
relationship between humans, other species and the earth. The beauty of a house inheres 
not in architectural ornament or luxurious furniture but in the density of its relationships 
and in the way that density is given architectural expression. Here the best method is to 
construct “their dwellings with their own hands,” as birds make their own nests. Then, 
“the poetic faculty would be universally developed, as birds universally sing when they 
are so engaged.”
17
 Practices of construction, maintenance, and repair, like the task of 
providing “food for themselves and families simply and honestly enough” yield not only 
economic independence but also a more poetic imagination.
18
 The latter is crucial to 
building a healthy economy, in which humans can live well while living within the 
earth’s capacities, “for a man is rich in proportion to the number of things which he can 
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Thoreau’s house is a “seat” for his flesh and blood and bones, just as the earth 
provides such an accommodation for Thoreau’s house, which is “seated by the shore of 
Walden pond.”
20
 Thoreau thus presents a literal oikos (household economy) as 
profoundly dependent upon a larger ecosystem whose processes are governed by the 
interplay of permanence and impermanence. Houses can be built, maintained, and rebuilt 
multiple times but ultimately they decay and die, merging back with the lively materiality 
of the earth. The lifecycle and rhythm of Thoreau’s poetic dwelling interact with the 
lifecycles of Thoreau and the earth as intertwined rhythms, making visible the fleeting 
character of private property and the impossibility of “enclosing” the living processes of 
the earth.  
Thoreau comes to terms with this impossibility by translating his own acquisitive 
tendencies into poetic modes of satisfying needs and wants. His imagination is a trustee, 
not an owner, of other people’s possessions, such as orchard woodlots and pastures. This 
poetic trusteeship is designed to provide a way not only to confront the will to possess 
and the tendency to overconsume, but also to transition to an economy of simplicity 
without forcibly expropriating goods from the wealthy.
21
 The modern economy is 
focused on the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. Thoreau’s 
economy is based upon the accumulation of rich experiences, memories, lifestyle 
adaptations, and other noncommodity modes of satisfaction.  
The closest Thoreau comes to having his fingers “burned by actual possession” is 
when he buys the Hollowell farm.
22
 Even before he obtains the deed for it, the owner’s 
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experience renders Thoreau wealthier as he “retains” the landscape and “encloses” the 
farm in a rhyme: 
I have frequently seen a poet withdraw, having enjoyed the most valuable part of 
a farm, while the crusty farmer supposed that he had got a few wild apples only. 
Why, the owner does not know it for many years when a poet has put his farm in 
rhyme, the most admirable kind of invisible fence, has fairly impounded it, 
milked it, skimmed it, and got all the cream, and left the farmer only the skimmed 
milk. The real attractions of the Hollowell farm, to me, were; its complete 
retirement, being about two miles from the village, half a mile from the nearest 
neighbor, and separated from the highway by a broad field…the gray color and 
ruinous state of the house and barn, and the dilapidated fences, which put such an 
interval between me and the last occupant; the hollow and lichen-covered apple 
trees, gnawed by rabbits, showing what kind of neighbors I should have; but 
above all, the recollection I had of it from my earliest voyages up the river, when 
the house was concealed behind a dense grove of red maples, through which I 
heard the house-dog bark
23
        
 
Thoreau advances an alternative mode of land use and appropriation—a poetic 
enclosure—that provides access to multiple kinds of non-material wealth and limits the 
earth-destroying tendencies of consumption. Unlike the farmer who “deforms” the 
landscape, treats the soil as a property, and “knows Nature but as a robber,” the poet 
retains the landscape and rejoices in the sight of “dilapidated fences” and other traces of 
the loss of consummate human agency and control.
24
 The poet’s enclosure of the land 
enlivens without destroying and uses only renewable energy sources; it lacks utility for a 
market with winners and losers. Thoreau’s poetic enclosure draws on processes of earthly 
excess and regeneration, childhood recollections, and the enfolded nature of time in order 
to produce the good life. It allows the influx of experience to make its impact on the 
sensorium. Need-reduction and contemplation replace consumption, as the quality of 
relationships between human, rabbit, lake, and bird neighbors increases. This can be 
considered a poetic economy of bodily comportment, sensory intensification, and 
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approximates the poet’s experiential self-artistry without locating it in subject-object 
relationships as Thoreau does. 
Thoreau reclaims economy as a site of everyday ethical practices, enacting new 
“body-economies” at the core of which is the negotiation of interdependence between 
humans and nonhumans.
25
 Such an economy is based on satisfying a small set of modest 
needs, which are intertwined with the needs of birds, trees, soils, and lakes. Thoreau’s 
concerns about the exploitative interdependence between producers and non-producers 
are linked to a concern for the unaccounted-for exploitation of the nonhuman world. In 
Walden, our beds are recognized as our “night-clothes” and more-than-human extended 
skin, “robbing the nests and breasts of birds to prepare this shelter within shelter.”
26
 
When Thoreau looks at the car-loads of pine, spruce, Manilla hemp, and palm leaf 
headed to cover “flaxen New England heads,” he does not see timber or commodities for 
sale. He sees “proof-sheets” of nature’s contribution to the economy and lists the multiple 
ecological and anthropological uses these bodies served before they acquired the status of 
“goods.”
27
 In Thoreau’s economy, goods are never fully uprooted from the productive 
economy of nature. His economic imaginary respects the qualitative distinction between 
primary (nature-made) and secondary (man-made) goods, according to which the latter 
presuppose the availability of the former. This is a distinction that markets do not 
recognize. With Thoreau, production is revealed to be consumption: consumption occurs 
all along the commodity chain as raw-material extraction and manufacturing consume 
both human and ecological wealth. Rather than a uniquely human capacity, production 
becomes a conjoint human-nonhuman endeavor that highlights the role of humans as co-
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encourages the production of relational goods such as cross-species kinship and 
neighborliness, the consumption of which do not reduce the available stock.
28
  
 In A Winter Walk Thoreau calls forth from the potentials of his body-economy a 
series of such affinities with winter’s productive economy. During his winter stroll, the 
poet draws on the “slumbering subterranean fire in nature which never goes out” and 
which courses through the materiality of all earthly existence, including Thoreau’s own 
breast.
29
 Rather than a harsh winter environment in which a petrovorous economy would 
be brought to a halt without an immense waste of energy, walking in the thick snow 
enables the poet to discern vital, thriving natural productivity at work all year round.
30
 
This intensification of perception of the interdependencies between human subjectivity 
and earthly processes renders economy a more-than-human domain. Aspirations of the 
good life become recast in ecological terms: humans are now positioned not as masters 
but as co-participants in a vibrant earthly economy: “We fancy ourselves in the interior of 
a larger house. The surface of the pond is our deal table or sanded floor, and the woods 
rise abruptly from its edge, like the walls of a cottage.”
31
 Thoreau’s winter walk enables 
the experience of becoming a “piece of forest furniture” and a member of the “natural 
family of man.”
32
 Such descriptions register the agency of a powerful and infinitely 
patient earth in contrast to recent environmentalist representations of the earth as a fragile 
body perturbed by human interference. Just as “the snow falls on every wood and field, 
and no crevice is forgotten,” with “so little effort does nature reassert her rule, and blot 
out the traces of men.”
33
 Nature rules by default. 
 For all his celebration of the powers of Nature, Thoreau’s practice of walking also 
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back into the human. Thoreau is also a Western pioneer. His essay “Walking” is a case in 
point. Early in the essay Thoreau tells us that he walks at least four hours a day. Walking 
is not merely an exercise or a stroll but Thoreau’s “enterprise of the day,” which requires 
relinquishing all familial and social attachments: “If you are ready to leave father and 
mother, and brother and sister, and wife and child and friends, and never see them 
again,—if you have paid your debts, and made your will, and settled all your affairs, and 
are a free man, then you are ready for a walk.”
34
 According to Thoreau, any space of 
politics has an outside: all one needs to do in order to opt out is to walk away, or better, 
walk outdoors.
35
 The saunterer produces his own rules and regulations, defying authority 
and social convention. Walking runs on one’s bodily energy and becomes an expression 
of self-sufficiency and trust in the body’s capacities.    
Ironically, as the essay progresses, Thoreau, the proponent of setting one’s own 
route, portrays himself as waiting for an invitation to walk into Nature: “with regard to 
Nature I live a sort of border life, on the confines of a world into which I make occasional 
and transient forays only…Unto a life which I call natural I would gladly follow even a 
will-o’-the wisp through bogs and sloughs unimaginable, but no moon nor fire-fly has 
shown me the causeway to it.”
36
  The walker travels a shifting boundary between nature 
and civilization, without finding a home in either domain. Each walk redistributes the 
balance between domestication and wildness, identity and excess across Thoreau’s body. 
Here wildness is experienced as transcendent, as that which is different or recalcitrant in 
the continuum of inner and outer worlds—of nature and culture—that Thoreau’s travel 
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Thoreau’s transcendence is not so much vertical as it is horizontal, spatial, 
earthbound.
37
 Rather than invoking the otherworldly, transcendence here marks the 
excess of perception and incompleteness of Thoreau’s encounters with Nature. Despite 
all of his attempts to walk over to the Wild, Thoreau remains distanced from Nature’s 
mysteries, partly because of his complicated relationship with the march of Western 
progress.  On the one hand, going west means fronting the Wild in response to Nature’s 
guiding call. The sunset inspires Thoreau “with the desire to go to a West as distant and 
as fair as that into which the sun goes down.”
38
 Walking west horizontalizes encounters 
between humans and nonhumans. As the companion of the sun whose rays bathe all 
equally, the saunterer suspends the tendency to rank order the bodies he confederates 
with. On the other hand, such companionship means that Thoreau can never settle on one 
place and literally seeks to encompass the earth. The walker is revealed to be a “Great 
Western Pioneer” who follows in the footsteps of the white settlers and conquistadors, 
including Columbus, who “felt the westward tendency more strongly than any before. He 
obeyed it and found a New World for Castile and Leon.”
39
 Thoreau advocates leaving the 
established society of the “Old World and its institutions” in order to recreate that society 
in the new “wilder” setting of Oregon. The pioneers tap into wildness to revitalize the 
Europeans who follow in their wake. He praises the Indian for having closer ties to 
Nature, and yet he also needs the Indian to disappear (or at least would render this 
outcome “natural”) in order to make way for Western progress: “I think that the farmer 
displaces the Indian even because he redeems the meadow, and so makes himself 
stronger and in some respect more natural.”
40
 To “go native” requires the disappearance 
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conquest and destruction of nature. At Walden, this ambivalence becomes apparent in the 
bean field which sensitizes Thoreau to a swirl of violences and memories of previous 
cultivation: “I disturbed the ashes of unchronicled nations who in primeval years lived 
under these heavens…They lay mingled with other natural stones, some of which bore 
the marks of having been burned by Indian fires, and some by the sun, and also bits of 
pottery and glass brought hither by the recent cultivators of the soil.”
41
 Thoreau is both a 
chronicler and a benefactor in a forest humanized by conquest. He learns how to farm 
without sharing the doom of those who had cultivated the earth before him to make way 
for his poetic trusteeship of the land.
42
            
If Thoreau’s walks—with all their contradictions—trouble the default regime of 
anthropocentric perception, so does his practice of hoeing beans. While the beans are 
growing, Thoreau hoes from “five o’clock in the morning till noon,” a labor that is 
repetitive, even monotonous, but still different from the alienated labor of Concord 
businessmen and farmers.
43
 Diligent hoeing, on the other hand, is a part of an assemblage 
where the human co-acts with a range of other economy-makers: “My auxiliaries are the 
dews and rains which water this dry soil, and what fertility is in the soil itself…My 
enemies are worms, cool days, and most of all woodchucks…But what right had I 
to…break up their ancient herb garden?”
44
 The task of his daily toil is to persuade “the 
earth to say beans instead of grass” and to “make this portion of the earth’s surface, 
which has yielded cinquefoil, blackberries…sweet wild fruits and pleasant flowers, 
produce instead this pulse.”
45
 This experience of work as an orchestrated activity, located 
in the mutually cooperative relationship between human and nonhuman participants, 
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The relation between Thoreau and the earth is characterized by mutuality and intimacy, 
though not equality.  
Cultivation is conventionally conceived as production that adds “value.” Hoeing 
beans alerts us, instead, to the value subtraction that accompanies disturbing the 
ecosystem that preceded the cultivation.
46
 In the case of fossil fuel-based industrial 
agriculture, the intensive use of waste sink capacity and energy to better exploit forests 
and grasslands might entail permanent depletion. Finally, Thoreau’s “war” with the 
beans’ “enemies”—Roman wormwood, pigweed, sorrel, and piper-grass—sensitizes us 
to the anthropocentrism of our default vocabulary. Bodies that are of instrumental use to 
humans become “crops” and plants and insects that compete with them are stigmatized as 
“weeds” or “pests.”
47
 But why, after all, “Shall I not rejoice also at the abundance of the 
weeds whose seeds are the granary of the birds?”
48
 Thoreau folds a degree of 
spiritualization of enmity into bean cultivation that involves forbearance and recognition 
of the right of worms and woodchucks to their “ancient herb garden.” Here Connolly’s 
understanding of “spiritualization of enmity” can be extended to Thoreau’s labor in the 
bean-field, which becomes an ethical process of building and maintaining agonistic 
relationships between friends and adversaries across species divides. The aim of these 
relationships is to live respectfully with each other through the mutual recognition of the 
contestable position from which each species proceeds.
 49
 Another lesson to draw from 
Thoreau’s bean-field is that agency is distributed and negotiated.
50
 
Of course, one might object to Thoreau on several grounds: How can this model 
be applied to large groups of people? Should this Thoreauvian ethic of living well with 
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we turn to the Gurensi people to address these questions. They alert us to the 
politicization of the traditionally marginalized domain of families and households where 
human life is generated and socialization reproduced, a theme undertheorized in 
Thoreau’s writings.
51
 One could, however, extend Thoreau’s practices of concept-
invention to view writing itself as a reproductive economy. The move back and forth 
between argument and narrative produces bodily effects that may encourage gratitude 
toward nonhumans and awareness of the interdependencies between human subjectivity 
and earthly processes. The reader becomes Thoreau’s walking companion, lodged 
comfortably within the earth’s household. Would such companionship co-opt or exclude 
politics? As Thoreau goes to Ghana, will Nature remain “wild?” We have seen that the 
traveler can encounter the land both as a frontier of Western progress and as poetic 
commons that temper such drives toward mastery. Apprehending and degrading the earth 
can become mixed up with yielding to its lively agencies. It may be that in the contrast 
with the Gurensi earth priest the poet becomes scrubbed of the pioneer. At the same time, 
certain things that the Gurensi feel ambivalent about may become apparent too.  
 




…tiηa is like a skin. Tiηa means earth…the earth is a womb, the womb of a woman and 
you see how delicate the womb of a woman is. So we are all buried in that like a child 
lies in the mother’s womb. 
        CHRISTOPHER AZAARE 
  
 Unlike Thoreau’s Nature, nature in Gurensiland is experienced as the visible 
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of nature express themselves as spirits and vice versa. This is how the earth gods, wind 
gods, rain gods, and sky gods, which together express the turbulent materiality of tiƞa, 
arose. Tiƞa (literally “earth” or “land” in the local Gurene language) is the irreplaceable 
biophysical foundation of community life.
52
 Gurensi tiƞa lies within the Northern 
Savanna Ecological Zone, which is shaped by the interplay between a wet season from 
May to October and a long, dry season from October to April. The Gurensi clock 
registers this interplay: it is “a sort of ‘earth clock’ regulated by weather, either that 
which is occurring or, in some instances, was expected to occur.”
53
 The vegetation is dry 
Guinea-Savanna woodland interspersed with grass, low shrubs, and rocky outcrops. The 
most common trees are the shea nut, dawadawa, baobab, and acacia. Most family 
compounds and the things found inside them are made from mud, clay, grass, fibers, and 
trees.  Gurensi compounds rise out of the oikos of the earth as assemblages of humans, 
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The gate of each compound faces west: “You don’t leave the gate towards the sun…You 
are not of the same position as the sun.”
54
 Such reverence for the sun contrasts with the 
poet-sun companionship in Thoreau’s Walking. The humility not to compete with god—
the sun—is expressed in an architecture that makes the Gurensi compound impervious to 
the heavy rainstorms that come from the east during the rainy season. Rivers and streams 
vanish during the dry season. Amidst this grassy and seasonally changing landscape 
certain majestic baobab trees or clusters of trees and shrubs, streams, rocky ranges, or 
heaps of stones persevere and exert powerful presences. They are almost inevitably 
tingana. 
 A tingane might mark the location of settlement of the first ancestor—the pioneer 
settler and key ancestor of a village—or a powerful place identified by a soothsayer. 
Most of my informants described the tindaana—a Gurene shorthand for tiηa daana i.e. 
“custodian” or “owner of the earth”—as the “original settler” of the land and emphasized 
the prominent role of his family in community life. The areas identified by the “original” 
settlers as places of sacrifice to the earth gods became the abodes for the spirits of the 
whole community. Three different types of earth gods can bear the name tingane: yaaba-
tia (ancestral trees); tingane proper; and tinkugere (land stones or land spirits). The main 
god that serves the whole community is the tinkugere, a circle of stones arranged on the 
ground, usually without any trees around it. 
The tindaana (earth custodian) holds custody of the tinkugere. In Bolgatanga, 
everyone who approaches the land spirits removes their shoes and upper body clothes. 
The removal zone can range from a radius of as little as ten to as many as forty or fifty 
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nature”: when their ancestors were alive, they were naked. This is why you take your 
shoes off—it is an “abomination” to keep them on.
55
 In this same area, all articles of the 
tindaana’s regalia have to be made of nature-made materials such as sheep and goat skins 
and locally sourced plant fibers. The totality of these articles is vested with special 
powers; individual articles like bracelets might be where the spirit of a tindaana’s father 
resides. In some villages, horses and guns are prohibited from entering the domain of the 
tinkugere and the tindaana’s compound. 
 
Gurensi Tinkugere 
Clothing and bodily adornment can be seen as ecopolitical practices that reenact 
the resilience of community identities in contexts that increasingly include the influence 
of transnational forces, centralization, and commodity circulation. Struggles over the 
ways in which Northern Ghanaian bodies are dressed and presented are not new to 
Gurensiland. Early accounts of the encounters between local authorities and exotic 
commodities describe shreds of Mossi and European cloth hanging from trees on the 
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identified with predatory slave-raiders—that embodied the hostile economies of the 
invader. 
56
 Today, throughout Northern Ghana, animal skins are the key political attribute 
of chiefs, a relatively new “traditional” office consolidated by the British colonial 
administration. Skins become the materials that re-distribute political and spiritual 
powers. Wrapping skins around a tindaana’s body connects him spiritually and 
materially to the hunting bodies of the ancestors and to the land. Every time an ensemble 
of skins is laid down for a chief’s cushions to be placed on it, the history of assimilation 
of such powers by new ruling elites is reiterated and reproduced.
57
  
A body adorned only with animal skins also emphasizes the importance of bodily 
comportment and receptivity to tiƞa, itself conceived as a set of spiritual practices rather 
than as raw material for conceptualization or land development. The skins always 
generated lively debates during my discussions with Gurensi elders. Tingane is derived 
from tiƞa (land or earth) and ganɛ (skin), insisted some elders, the latter being a reference 
to the earth priest’s bodily adornment. Others interpreted ganɛ as a reference to “the skin 
of the earth,” the delicate womb of a woman in which we are all buried. Taking your 
shoes off ensures that you tread gently on tiƞa’s delicate skin, signaling a posture of 
humility and respect for the earth. Such respect is also manifest in the taboo against 
lighting a fire on the tiƞa. The earth does not belong to humans but humans belong to the 
earth. It is to her womb that everyone returns upon death, dissolving lived hierarchies: 
“You may have an ancestor, I might have an ancestor, he may have his ancestors, they 
are all contained in the womb of the woman. That is the tiƞa…We are all within the same 
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The tingane becomes an image of the earth’s productivity, fertility, and 
regenerative powers. The womb of the earth is where the seeds co-sown by the earth gods 
and the Gurensi farmer sprout to life:  
When a man sleeps with a woman it is their belief that the woman didn’t just 
drink water to get pregnant. The man slept with the woman but the gods also 
intervened. If it doesn’t rain, the crops would not fruit…if he doesn’t sleep with 
her she won’t give birth and tiƞa would not go well (tiƞa ka maale). If it doesn’t 





Fertility comes “when a man sleeps with a woman,” when the sky god gives rain to the 
earth and the earth gives birth to the trees that spring in the tingane. “The woman is a 
womb. If you bury a human being in the grave it means a child in the woman’s womb. It 
is very important that the womb contains the dead.”
60
 The intimate intercourse between 
living, dead, and unborn, between the organic and the inorganic, binds together human 
fertility, health, and rainfall in a web that is more than metaphorical. The tinkugere 
ensures that the community partakes in the earth’s capacities to regenerate life. It re-
activates deceased matter into the ecological becoming of the earth: the decomposition of 
a living body is simultaneously the composition of a life, the assembling of the dead 
body’s parts into new vegetal and mineral relations.  
“Yes,” the elders concur, “the tinkugere is a woman in the Zoko and Sirigu 
areas.”
61
 But here tingane comes from tiƞa and gaƞe (literally “exceed” or “surpass, be 
more than something”). The tingane is a god; it “sends the sacrifice to god because that is 
the one which is nearer to the supreme, to the creator.”
62
 The tiƞa surpasses all others.
63
 
The tingane takes blood because blood is life and that is what the ancestors do not have. 
You want the ancestors to know that you have sacrificed a whole animal and what color 
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avert a serious problem, a white fowl to give thanks, a black fowl to deal with something 
hidden or gloomy. The community needs fowls of all colors to respond to unanticipated 
events and seasonal changes. This can be also understood as a way to eat a variety of 
foods, conserve resources, and protect biodiversity. 
 Biodiversity and regeneration are also stimulated through a series of taboos. 
Cutting or gathering wood for fuel is either prohibited or restricted to certain species of 
trees and time of the year. Planting exotic trees or hunting the animals living there—“the 
children of the tingane”—is also forbidden and offenders face strong punishments. Such 
taboos extend beyond the confines of the tingane and organize relations of extended 
families and clans with totemic animals, plants, and objects. Some such relations involve 
the return of the ancestors into trees, animals, and objects: into pythons, spiders, domestic 
dogs, foot rings, anklets, bracelets, or even articles of the regalia of chiefs and tindaanas. 
In Zoko-Kadare and Zoko-Tarongo killing or hunting crocodiles is taboo: when someone 
dies he or she turns into a crocodile. Other totems concern long-term family relationships 
with animals that saved an ancestor.
64
 Such totemic relationships exceed Thoreau’s 
relational goods of kindredship or “proof-sheets” of nature’s contribution to economy, 
though they too function to connect people to eco-systems. Clans and extended families 
share responsibility for the spiritual and physical well-being of all co-inhabitants of the 
tiƞa. These are relations of co-dependency and alliances forged through the recognition 
that the survivability of species is intertwined.  
 The key feature of this community economy is the non-market system of 
exchange. This is sometimes a ritual exchange of animal blood and human life: “the 
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person’s blood, just that we humans do not see it with our eyes but the spirits do. So this 
is why the spirit too takes blood of the animals in exchange to save the person’s soul.”
65
 
Other forms of exchange include: daily exchange of greetings, courtesies, entertainment, 
and music; “exchange of seeds, exchange of food, exchange of children, even in 
marriage…strengthening the bond between two families by creating a marriage between 
their children”; labor-pooling processes that involve setting aside days when people go to 
work on each others’ farms or assist each other with building a new compound.
66
 It is not 
only individuals but groups—families, clans, gods, and spirits—that carry on such 
exchanges, often mediated by the tindaana, the soothsayer (baga), the chief of medicine 
(bagenabasɔ), or the chief (naba). The things that are exchanged are not exclusively 
goods, property, or objects of economic value.
 67
 Neither is the purpose “mere 
subsistence,” for the act of giving creates social relationships and re-distributes the 
surplus that has been co-produced by gods, spirits, and humans. This is an economy of 
relationships and sufficiency, in which “wealth can be identified, not in objects or in 
purchasing power but in the level of integration of people in their natural and spiritual 
environment, in the quality of their relationships with the society around them.”
68
 A 
farmer’s family is rich if it has a large network of mutual aid, ancestral support, and 
reciprocity on which family members can count. Within such relational economies, 
“profitability includes the long term, the creation of relationships, exchange, and the 
conservation of the environment.”
69
 These economies resonate with Thoreau’s poetic 
economy, in which wealth is also derived from the richness of human entanglements with 
kindred earthly bodies and forces: “Love your life, poor as it is…The setting sun is 
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abode…Money is not required to buy one necessary of the soul.”
70
 For Thoreau, wealth 
lies in the bodily intensification and poetic amplification of the productivity and wealth 
already present in nature. Wealth is not generated first and foremost through the “goods” 
of Thoreau’s labor in the bean-field but through the sensations that such labor elicits and 
intensifies within the rich mix of the poet’s “inner nature.”  
It is, in contrast, the non-living—the ancestors and the earth gods—who are the 
real sources and owners of wealth in Gurensiland. While Thoreau’s poetic custody 
privileges individuality, earth priests are land trustees in the sense that they are 
responsible for addressing the spiritual needs of the land and the community spirits. In 
many parts of Gurensiland earth priests are “nature-chosen”: the tindaana is selected by 
the spirits of the ancestors and not by his age, wisdom, wealth, or status. It is the “skin,” 
the shrine itself, that serves as the repository of ownership of the land, not the person of 
the tindaana. The tinkugere’s heap of stones entails a particular form of ordering and 
enclosing the tiƞa—spiritual or ritual enclosure—bound up with ancestral presences, a 
cluster of clans and natural forces. Like Thoreau’s poem, a spiritual enclosure is 
relational and non-possessive in the narrow economic sense. Unlike the poem, which has 
“fenced,” “impounded” and “milked” the land, Gurensi enclosure is a two-way reciprocal 
street. It is essential to take care of the earth’s spiritual needs so that the earth continues 
to nurture her inhabitants. For Thoreau, apprehension of the land amounts to a set of lived 
strategies that reside most fully within the human domain. For the Gurensi, humans 
constitute merely one node in a field of apprehension and transformation of landscapes; 
the ancestors (i.e. the earth) embody this apprehension for reasons that humans can only 
try to interpret.
71
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tiƞa: “everything comes from the ground. Our crops, the deceased are buried there, 
everything is contained in the tiƞa.”
72
 The ancestors have a vested interest in the land and 
their consent has to be obtained by the tindaana before land is given to a land seeker or a 
deceased person is buried. Thoreau, on the other hand, does not seek such consent from 
the escaped slaves, Irish workers, and deceased Native Americans who continue to haunt 
his cabin at Walden and the local woods. He attempts to live less as his European 
ancestors and more through “the Indian” example that mediates his relationship to the 
land.
73
 The substitution of one set of ancestors for another loosens up his appropriative 
tendencies but hardly alters his pioneering sense of entitlement to settle there. In contrast, 
clearance from the Gurensi tingane is needed for development, even if building a new 
school or a hospital means that the earth gods themselves have to move to another abode 
within the tiƞa.  
 The centrality of this economy of non-market exchange to Gurensi everyday life 
does not mean that it ever existed in a pure or uncontaminated state. Markets have been 
known to people for centuries and this familiarity is incorporated into a different type of 
clock—the “market” clock—which is used to reckon time according to the three-day 
market cycle in Gurensiland. A visit to the bustling Bolga market on market day (daa 
daare) highlights how market exchange has been refashioned by and, in turn, shapes the 
community economy. Price considerations and economic calculus co-exist and compete 
with barter and relationship-based transactions. Early encounters between communities 
and commodity circulation were recorded onto the skin of the tiƞa, shaping the earthen 
designs of compounds and the birth of some tingana. The construction of a low entrance 
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Dagomba and Mossi slave-raids, and later British invaders. During such slave-raids and 
wars, victims’ bodies were dumped in thick forests, rivers, and caves, some of which 
would be later identified as tingana. Sometimes a tree may be petitioned for assistance 
against the raiders: “We are going to war. If you are able to help us and we win and 
defeat our enemies then we will give you this.’ So that tree is able to help them. So that 
can form a tingane.”
74
  
Such encounters with predatory markets for Northern Ghanaian bodies have 
transformed social lives, identities, and the stories of founding ancestors. They have 
generated flows of bodily movements within and across the tiƞa: “Now the key difficulty 
we need to unravel is: who was there first? And has that been disturbed by the slave 
raiding?...who came first is what determines who has control over the land.”
75
 The 
question of land haunts people’s lives today as climate change re-sets local clocks and 
dries up spiritually powerful rivers, as zinc replaces grass for roofing and Christianity 
advances a “cheaper” form of worship than traditional sacrifice (“when you are praying 
direct to God you don’t pay anything”), relocating the source of spiritual power away 
from the natural world.
76
 The spiritual enclosures of the earth custody resonate and 
interpenetrate with the enclosed commons of modern leasehold, now a common means of 
transferring land: “we are trying to match unlike things—pouring water into petrol and 
thinking that the mix can be good. You know, it won’t work. We do not have a pure 
market system economy…Go to the village and you’ll see that although there is some 
level of penetration by the market, there are those informal arrangements which still exist 
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As land appreciates, some chiefs have rushed to endorse transfers of land interest, 
resolve land disputes, and lay claim to the ground rent, which accrues constitutionally to 
the allodial owner of the land.
78
 In contrast to earth priests’ privileged relationship with 
the spirits of the land, chiefs have tended to base such claims upon their authority to 
“administer the people” who inhabit that land. These practices interact with customary 
tenancies, licenses, and the use of land for farming and residential building by 
landowning clans and families who hold the customary right to pass that land to the next 
generation.
79
 Land boundary demarcations using trees, rivers, and rocks compete with 
site plans. Some trees such as shea nut become “economic” trees while others remain 
communal resources. Taboos against cutting the trees in the tingane become relaxed by 
Christian converts who have been told in church that nothing will happen if they 
encroach upon the earth gods. In Bolgatanga, earth priests have formed an association to 
address such challenges to their office, whose survival can only be ensured if people 
continue to feel bound together by the local ethos of earth spirituality. The association 
has embraced Western terminologies of land titles, individuals, and ownership in an 
attempt to master the art of “pouring water into petrol,” aiming to render the tindaana-
ship legible and amenable to the fiscal, legal, and cadastral terms of neoliberal 
development. This might eventually shift power differentials in favor of markets, 
humans, and the living. In the meantime, modern leasehold and the “purchase of land” 
continue to be treated as “kola money,” and such transfers are equated with customary 
forms of compensation that do not alienate the land from its original custodian no matter 
the amount involved. Gurensi tiƞa continues to absorb Western vectors even as the 








 Everything becomes contained in the tiƞa, be it land markets 
or local economies of living together in extended families of spirits, humans, gods, 
plants, animals, and minerals. 
Can political theory enrich our understanding of the changing role of the 
tindaanas in the face of politico-economic transformations in Ghana? My emphasis on 
bodily comportment has sought to highlight the actual use of beliefs in contexts where 
familiar distinctions such as religious/secular and living/dead become untenable. Is it 
even appropriate to reduce the rich chronicles of Gurensi lived experience to “beliefs?” 
What is at stake in the distinction between experiences of the earth as a supernatural 
being and as ancestors/elders? Should we employ the abstract category of “agents” for 
the ancestors, as if they were autonomous entities “within” nature?
81
 The conversation 
between Thoreau and the earth priest highlights the limits and dangers of an enduring 
tendency to import Western models of economy, politics, religion, and personhood in 
order to comprehend the lifeworlds of others. It makes a difference whether the food 
given to the tingane is described in terms of “paying tribute” and “respect” to the eldest 
“elders” or in terms of “ancestor worship.” The former description situates the ancestors 
(i.e. the earth) within politics and within a continuum of intergenerational eldership that 
forms the foundations of Gurensi political authority. The latter removes them from 
politics and re-locates them within religion and cult because we, Westerners, find these 
domains more appropriate to our own dealings with the dead.
82
 Honoring the ways in 
which the Gurensi people “model” their livelihoods requires that we recognize both the 
authority of the earth in politico-economic life and the role of the tindaana-ship as a 
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than treating the it as a loose network of fetish priests or religious functionaries). The 
tindaana-ship ensures that development proceeds in accord with the ever-changing 
spiritual needs and “invisible governances” of the earth. Religion in places like Northern 
Ghana can be also understood as a set of political experimentations within people’s 
spiritual, economic, and social lifeworlds.
83
  
The idea that the “ancestors” must be separated from the living “elders” belongs 
to a medley of ethnocentric convictions that shape neocolonial representations of 
indigenous peoples’ relationships to the land as mere subsistence or occupancy rather 
than as competing—albeit different—forms of property and ownership. African farmers 
are assumed to have no prior “investment” in the land—especially in conservation 
practices such as rotation of fallows—because African practices do not approximate 
those of their Western counterparts in the cornfields of Iowa or the greenhouses of the 
Netherlands. The former produce to live; the latter live to produce.
84
 The absence of 
physical marking or signs of transformation of the land through “improvement”—like 
Thoreau’s Indian who was not fully able to “redeem the meadow”—renders such lands 
“unused” and ready to be grabbed by contemporary pioneers. The dialogue between 
Thoreau and the Gurensi exposes familiar Western imaginaries of economy as culturally 
specific phenomena that enter into processes of contestation and hybridization with 
competing imaginaries. According to the latter, “land” can be felt as something more than 
a durable surface over which generation after generation transfer communal rights. Such 
commons can be experienced as a web of socio-ecological relationships between humans 
and the earth; and they are nonetheless relationships of property. In Thoreau’s America, 
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from it. In Gurensiland, economy as such hardly exists: a political continuum of eldership 
continues to draw ecology, economy, and theology together, making it difficult to clearly 
demarcate one “sphere” from the others.           
 
THE EARTH PRIEST AND THE POET 
 
These collisions and resonances bring to light the ways in which Gurensi eco-
theology and Thoreau’s ecopolitical imaginary might enrich each other. Thoreau 
constructs a carefully modulated relation to the Wild, and the Gurensi to the tingane. 
Both involve a heightened sense of receptivity to the powers of the earth over processes 
of ethical will formation. Thoreau seeks experiences that enchant the senses anew, 
disrupting the habitual order of perception. One begins to experience familiar entities in 
new ways: “Life consists with wildness…One who pressed forward incessantly and never 
rested from his labors, who grew fast and made infinite demands on life, would always 
find himself in a new country or wilderness, and surrounded by the raw material of 
life.”
85
 For Thoreau, each walk outside is also a journey inward through the fecund mix 
of the wild and the familiar that forms one’s personal interior. The Wild is de-placed and 
is more portable than the tingane, which is attached to a specific, multi-dimensional 
territory and is bound to the non-linear history of the clan or the village.  
In the Gurensi tiƞa, there is hardly room for Thoreau’s Wild. Tiƞa refers to: 1) 
land, ground, earth, the physical world; 2) country, town, settlement.
86
 Tiƞa is the whole 
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and “in which we bury.”
87
 You cannot have “wild” Nature without the settlement or vice 
versa.  
The tingane illustrates the translatability of any mode of existence into any other 
within the tiƞa, which is to say that humans, bats, stones, and gods perpetually transform. 
A human turned into a baobab tree and a god who resides in a stone bear the same name: 
my grandfather, my ancestor, my yaaba. The time someone spent as a tree and the time 
someone spent as a human belong to the same lineage, a relation that takes the form of an 
identity between what might be considered two dissimilar species of things. The tingane 
is a web of lived relationships with the earth that provides people with good harvests, 
food, and more people and which, in turn, is given food, protection, and respect. The 
tingane is not a god prior to those relationships but through those relationships in a world 
of multiple gods and becoming that is not separate from humans. Only the sky god (wine) 
is outside tiƞa, but he cannot be worshipped directly; the Creator can be only petitioned 
through tiƞa’s intercourse with the sky, which brings forth rain, fertility, and new 
tingana.  
This web of immanent lived relationships contrasts with Thoreau’s as if stance of 
transcendence that prompts him to re-experience himself as if he is “part and parcel of 
Nature.” Through a series of everyday economic practices, Thoreau becomes enchanted 
by the earthly forces and wild elements that course around and through his body-
economy. Rather than seeking to tame these elements in order to consolidate himself as a 
consummate human agent, Thoreau valorizes the disruptive effects of these encounters 
upon the normal, default self: “We need the tonic of wildness,-to wade sometimes in 
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transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wander.”
88
 The sensuous 
attractiveness and unruliness of these forces serves as a counterforce to human habits, and 
as an impetus to transcend, to go beyond, and to enact “higher laws.” Thoreau’s 
transgressive transcendence is about lines of flight, about crossings over to a heteroverse 
of the Wild: “If the day and the night are such that you greet them with joy, and life emits 
a fragrance like flowers and sweet-scented herbs, is more elastic, more starry, more 
immortal,-that is your success. All nature is your congratulation, and you have cause 
momentarily to bless yourself.”
89
 This practice of transcending carries with it a certain 
enchantment and momentum that resonate with Gurensi sacrifice and ritual, which also 
opens access to a different, uncanny state of knowing and encountering nature. Not 
everyone in Gurensiland has the tindaana’s or soothsayer’s privileged access to the 
sacred. Not everyone in Concord shares Thoreau’s impetus to recraft a body through 
metaphors such as the high, the immortal, the starry, and the transcendental.  
However, most farmers in Gurensiland are connected to this spiritual realm of 
nature through lived experience, worship, and various taboos. Ritual also affords an 
interruption and slowing down of Chrono-time that resonates with Thoreau’s morning 
exercises: “Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my accustomed bath, I sat in 
my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in a revery, amidst the pines and hickories 
and sumachs, in undisturbed solitude and stillness…My days were not days of the week, 
bearing the stamp of any heathen deity, nor were they minced into hours and fretted by 
the ticking of a clock.”
90
 The suspension of Chronos tunes human bodies in to an earth 
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are experienced as ecological actions in relation to other events, moving and transforming 
energies, blood, nutrients, sound refrains, sensibilities, and sunrays.        
Besides such shared moments of dwelling in uncanny experiences that puncture 
linear time, Thoreau and the earth priest front the Wild and the tingane differently. While 
Thoreau transcends, the earth priest petitions. Each practice of an eco-economy involves 
shifting back and forth between different registers of passivity and activity. However, it 
makes a difference whether the site where agency is re-distributed between human and 
earthen economy-makers lies in the soil marked by a circle of stones or in a poem.  
The poet is both cultivated and wild, given and made, and his cultivation depends 
on his ability to construct himself as an object, which is then subjected to various tactics 
of experimentation. By a “conscious effort of the mind” we can become “spectators” of 
our bodies, which allows us to negotiate our capacities for experience and observation, 
our roles as both subjects and objects.
91
 Here, being both subject and object or the 
“scene” of thoughts and affections is not quite the same as being the site of various earth 
forces. This doubleness “makes us poor neighbors and friends sometimes” as it 
encourages us to see Thoreau’s rabbit, lake, and bird neighbors as potentially 
instrumentalizable. However, it is this “spectator” quality that enables Thoreau to keep 
the Wild at bay in order to maintain a proper relation between our instinct for wildness 
and our “higher” instincts: “As I came home through the woods…I caught a glimpse of a 
woodchuck stealing across my path, and felt a strange thrill of savage delight, and was 
strongly tempted to seize and devour him raw…I found in myself, and still find, an 
instinct toward a higher, or, as it is named, spiritual life, as do most men, and another 
toward a primitive rank and savage one, and I reverence them both."
92
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renders Thoreau more agentic so that he loosens up the will to mastery over the earthen 
forces that his body draws in. Ironically, Thoreau’s “higher” instinct is employed in the 
service of greater cooperation with nonhumans rather than for the purposes of rank-
ordering. This self-conscious chronicler of data and of a heightened degree of human 
agency constitutes only one dimension of the (inter-)subjectivity through which Thoreau 
engages the rest of the world. Multiple modes of subjectivity extend from natural and 
cosmic processes to Thoreau’s body and vice versa: “What is man but a mass of thawing 
clay?...The fingers and toes flow to their extent from the thawing mass of the body. Who 
knows what the human body would expand and flow out to under a more genial 
heaven?”
93
 Self-making (auto-poiesis) is a project of producing a fine-tuned earthbound 
body out of two, interwoven sets of materials: the first are the dull, conventional 
tendencies that have settled into one’s bones and habits, and the second are the more 
lively processes of nonhuman nature. Both sets are operative within the individual.  
In the context of ecological degradation that affects Gurensiland today, can 
Thoreau’s “doubleness” and his use of the nature/culture problematic equip the Gurensi 
people with new crisis-coping mechanisms? The “spectator” could allow the Gurensi to 
distance themselves from the immediacy of lived experience so that they can register as 
earth-degrading certain everyday practices whose ecological consequences are deferred 
in time. In this way, the sea of black polythene bags that engulf the land or the use of 
pesticides such as DDT or Aldrin could be perceived as things that puncture the womb of 
the earth rather than as modern-day enhancements of people’s ongoing relationship with 
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contradicting or undermining each other rather than as part and parcel of tiƞa’s 
productive economy. 
On the other hand, as the Gurensi learn from Thoreau, what Thoreau felt 
ambivalent about becomes more conspicuous. For Thoreau, a self-governing body-
economy cannot be actualized without establishing a proper relationship to the Wild. This 
relationship tends to be one of ability, activity, sauntering. In Walking he walks west 
along with the pioneers, and the border of the Wild keeps receding back. The way the 
poet harmonizes human existence with nature in part renders natural the conquest of 
nature. This poetic crusade is productively troubled by a certain passivity, non-power and 
humility at the heart of the experience of tingane’s power. The tindaana’s role is to 
register the spiritual needs of the land and make them known to the whole community. 
He is a key intermediary between the living and the non-living: “the yaabas or the 
ancestors are scattered everywhere in the tinga…He will go around, consult the 
soothsayer to find out their needs…he does not own that land. He takes care of the bush 
land.”
94
 The possibility of sharing the non-power afforded by ritual with others becomes 
subjectivity-forming. It locates village residents within the womb of a woman rather than 
within the wild embrace of Nature or the domain of higher laws. Gurensi ethical 
formation involves a series of conversations and exchanges between extended families of 
humans, gods, earthen bodies, and spirits that affect each other through reciprocal (and 
asymmetrical) relationships rather than subject/object dynamics. These subjectivities are 
collective more-than-human assemblages: they transform into animals, plants, natural 
bodies such as rocks and ponds, and even cultural artifacts such as ancestral horns and 
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In poetic enclosures, ownership is vested in a poem. In spiritual enclosures, 
ownership is vested in a shrine, in a mineral body. Can the tinkugere be like the poem? I 
suspect not quite. The tinkugere is less a reference to the incorporation of the earth into 
the human ethical order and human thinking and more a set of living, negotiated practices 
that aim to attune this order and thinking to nature: “Our food is gotten from the tiƞa, our 
water is gotten from the tiƞa, our buildings are gotten from the tiƞa, almost everything 
that is made to make life comfortable is gotten from the tiƞa. And our ancestors are from 
the tiƞa…They are from the tiƞa because all the earth gods are on the tiƞa…Our life 
depends on the tiƞa, spiritually, socially, whatsoever.”
95
 The earth does not have to be 
incorporated into the human, as these are already felt as inseparable. The earth 
simultaneously has a social, legal, economic, political, and spiritual authority that entitles 
her to rule Gurensiland by default: “everything that is done on this earth is done on the 
tiƞa.”
96
 Thoreau also wants to say that Nature rules by default. However, his concept-
mediated practices of active self-fashioning do not equip him with sufficient resources to 
relinquish the “human” as one who is never “wholly involved in Nature.”
97
 The best he 
can do is to command that human part of the self to register Nature’s rule without 
submitting fully to it. But would full submission always mean submission to a human 
idea of nature? This is less clear. Perhaps the difficulty lies in another submission: that of 
philosophy to the influence of concepts such as agency and property that fail to capture 
the diversity and complexity of lived encounters between human bodies and a non-
appropriable, life-generating earth.  
While Thoreau privileges solitude above other competing modes of econo-
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ethical life. The dialogue between the two highlights the radically incomplete nature of 
the modern image of the human body as a self-enclosed “individual.” This image does 
not exhaust what it means to be human and its incompleteness prompts one to seek 
alliances with other bodies, be it ponds, spirits, human neighbors, crocodiles, or 
extraordinary stones. Thoreau acts as if he can exempt himself from public life, at least as 
long as such a polity does not include hawks, squirrels, ponds, etc. In Gurensiland such 
exemptions are neither feasible nor even grammatically possible. The dialogue between 
the poet and the earth priest reveals that a body or a person is always more than itself: it 
is a composite of relations, events, and affections that bind humans and nonhumans into 
webs of kinship, solidarity, and reciprocity.  
Theory and ethnography are two related modes of artistic production of effects 
upon such bodies or persons. The sensibilities and moods created by these practices of 
political thinking flow into one another. The idea is to allow the thick chronicles of lived 
experience that ethnography makes visible to affect us without recuperating them as 
Western philosophy. The earth priest’s supplicating can scrub Thoreau of his troubled 
(and troubling) relationship to Western progress. It can transform him into a poet who has 
given up on the romantic fantasy of the “Wild” and has embraced an ongoing and 
inescapable relationship to nature. Thoreau’s “doubleness” and nature/culture 
problematic, in turn, might help the Gurensi emerge as a fully complex ethical universe 
that is not in perfect harmony with nature either.  
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Chapter 3 





Ancestral tree (tingane) 
 
Why they perform sacrifices to those trees? Probably, you are sitting under the 
tree…maybe without the tree knowing or without you knowing…you are seeking for help 
and you are thinking: “how do I get this? How do I get this?” And when you get it you 
may think, you may be aware that it is the tree that has given you that assistance. Maybe, 
after a consultation the soothsayer says that the tree you sat has given you that thing. You 
come and tell the blessings that the tree has given you…“let me also give it a gift.” That’s 
where the gift normally starts: performing sacrifices to some of the trees. 
                                                           GURENSI CHIEF, In Discussion with Author  
 
The figs fall from the trees, they are good and sweet; and as they fall, their red skin 
ruptures. I am a north wind to ripe figs. 
Thus, like figs, these teachings fall to you, my friends: now drink their juice and their 
sweet flesh! It is autumn all around and pure sky and afternoon. 
See what fullness is around us! And from such superabundance it is beautiful to look out 
upon distant seas. 
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Not you yourselves perhaps, my brothers! But you could recreate yourselves into fathers 
and forefathers of the overman: and this shall be your best creating! 
                                                           FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 
THE TREE AND THE GIFT  
      
The elder led us to a lonely baobab tree by the entrance of the chief’s compound. 
This tree, the elder explained, is one of the ancestors (yaaba). See the strip of cloth 
draped around the tree? The yaaba requested a smock—a traditional hand-woven dress 
worn by men in Northern Ghana—as a gift for the tree’s assistance and blessings. How 
does one know what the tree wants? By asking the soothsayer: “the tree is saying that you 
have to perform sacrifices to it. Give me a goat or a cow…give me a shirt or a smock. So 
you have to…You know, you cannot buy a big smock to put on so you have to give 
something that signifies that that is the smock.”
1
 When the Gurensi make such offerings, 
the ancestors, in return, deliver prosperity, riches, children, and good harvests. When the 
ancestors are disgruntled, however, the signs of their adversity become visible 
everywhere: crop blights, droughts, soil infertility, and diseases. Ancestral performance 
propels a community economy in which production is best understood as co-production 
or as a set of social relationships with the land organized around gift exchange. The tree 
gives to the farmers, the farmers to the earth priest, and the earth priest to the tingane. 
The land’s abundance and fertility reflect the moods, sensibilities, and strategies of the 
yaabas: society is healthy when the yaabas are well-disposed.
2
 The giving earth, trees, 
animals, and minerals are forefathers—elders with extraordinary powers—who 
reciprocate with humans as kin. Nature’s abundance and biodiversity are responses to the 
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 Whether by talking with trees or merging cycles of gift giving with the cycles of 
nature, Gurensi practices of exchange resonate with many of the intuitions of Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra. After a ten-year stay in the mountains Zarathustra re-enters the human world 
in response to the crisis of nihilism and the inability of human beings to “overcome 
themselves.” Full of love, friendship, and a spirit of gift-giving sensibilities, the young 
Zarathustra brings to the world the overflow of wisdom gained in the mountains. He 
wants to share it with all, just as nature does: “like figs, these teachings fall to you, my 
friends: now drink their juice and their sweet flesh!” Zarathustra performs a gift-giving 
economy that draws on nature’s excess: “See what fullness is around us! And from such 
superabundance it is beautiful to look out upon distant seas”
3
 This is a “steady-state” gift 
economy in the sense in which Herman Daly uses the term: an economy that at some 
point must cease growing and adapt itself to the dynamic equilibrium of natural 
processes.
4
 Zarathustra’s generosity echoes and reiterates nature’s generosity, and the 
outflow of his teachings is adapted to the metabolic flow of the gift-giving earth.  
Zarathustra is a “north wind to ripe figs.” Like the fertile womb of the Gurensi 
tiƞa (earth), ripe figs contain the seeds of wisdom and intergenerational change that the 
wind bestows upon the “fathers and forefathers of the overman.” Zarathustra acts 
simultaneously as an ancestral and natural force. As the “north wind” he impersonates 
Wotan, the continental Germanic god of madness, intoxication, vegetation, oracles, and 
secret knowledge. Wotan has only one eye and carries a spear. The other eye was given 
up at the base of the World Ash Tree so that Wotan could drink from the stream of 
wisdom and break a branch from the tree to make his spear.
5
 Wotan is the turbulent 
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after a century-long accumulation of greenhouse gases, Wotan’s powers become manifest 
when things reach scorching one-sidedness.
6
 Thus Zarathustra’s gifts are often threshold 
gifts, gifts that mark the passage from one state of equilibrium to another and that bestow 
new identities.
7
 Like the Gurensi earth priest and soothsayer, Zarathustra straddles 
multiple worlds at once. He communes with trees, snakes, and eagles. He crosses species 
boundaries and seeks to shift back and forth between the perspectives of people, animals, 
plants, and natural forces in order to forge new ecological relationships.   
What if the earth were understood as a turbulent, gift-giving ancestor, and not 
only a material context for human action? In this chapter I stage another encounter 
between political theory and ethnography, this time between Nietzsche’s perspectivism 
and a particular expression of “African animism.” The goal is to present sustainable 
living not as an amended “lifestyle” but as a web of long-term interactions with the land. 
The mutuality of such cross-cultural encounters may transform both Western and African 
perspectives and diversify the resources available for contemporary environmental action. 
It may illuminate the question of living well within the earth’s means. This question 
looms large today as Zarathustra’s most powerful companions—the eagle and the lion—
struggle to rebound from the endangered species list and the Gurensi tingana are being 
fenced in to become sites of biodiversity conservation. 
 Building on the treatment of economy as a more-than-human domain pursued in 
chapter 2, I explore Zarathustra’s economy of gift giving in relation to the economies of 
reciprocity of the Gurensi people of Ghana. In contrast to ethnocentric representations of 
“subsistence” economies, I show that these economies are characterized by an 
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the environment as engaged in the activity of giving. Economic dispositions are 
predicated upon trust in nature’s abundance, in contrast to the Western preoccupation 
with scarcity. In the place of a political economy of scarcity and control, we have socio-
ecological infusions into economy: society eschews accumulation and ensures 
sustainability through redistribution and sharing of the surplus that the land itself bestows 
upon humans.  
Zarathustra and the Gurensi earth priest together reveal how such relations of 
exchange are also power relations. For the Gurensi, this takes the form of a debt that 
humans have to pay to the earth, which is conceived as reciprocating ancestors. For 
Nietzsche the exchange of gifts is understood as more contentious and agonistic, rather 
than reciprocal. Whereas Zarathustra’s self-mastery aims at re-crafting modern 
anthropocentric habits of perception in pursuit of new ecological identities and 
sensitivities, the earth priest helps us to see how such tactics of existence are already 
approximated by large groups of people. If it is Zarathustra’s movements between 
solitude and sociality, between peaks and valleys, between going up and going under that 
enable him to shift perspectives between humans and nonhumans, it is the everyday 
strategies of coping of Northern Ghanaian communities that allow people to “re-enchant” 
human existence and harmonize it with the vicissitudes of a continuously changing 
environment. Whereas Zarathustra adopts perspectivism as active intersections between 
different processes, within an open universe that has not, ultimately, been predesigned for 
the human species, the earth priest tends toward an image of world that would head 
toward beneficent harmony if we would only lighten our ecological footprint. These two 
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together. In the contrast with the earth priest and his elders Nietzsche becomes scrubbed 
of some of the dominating and rank-ordering tendencies of his pro-mastery rhetoric. At 
the same time, Nietzsche’s emphasis on agonism draws attention to the ever-present 
possibility of ancestral adversity in Gurensiland. It reveals that full harmonization 
between people and nature may not be ever possible. Where the earth priest sometimes 
sees ancestral punishment, Zarathustra sees an innocence of worldly becoming that “we” 
often interpret in ways that demand scapegoats to punish.       
For both Zarathustra and the earth priest, however, to know the environment 
means to personify and acknowledge rather than to objectify it. Knowledge becomes less 
a set of specifications to “pass down” from generation to generation, and more a 
heightened perceptual sensitivity to the earth as an animate knowledge-holder and locus 
of intergenerational wisdom. Such understanding of knowledge troubles familiar 
philosophical demarcations between epistemology and ontology. It inheres in mutually 
transformative relationships of “we-ness” between people and the environment, rather 
than “otherness,” which exacerbates differences and obscures togetherness. By ascribing 
a material aspect or existence to what are often understood as only “ideas” or “states of 
mind,” perspectivism and animism rework received notions of what counts as 
environmentalism and environmental political theory.  
In the pages to follow I blend ethnography and textual analysis to invite the rich 
chronicles of lived experience in Northern Ghana to converse with and transform the 
abstract categories of Euro-American political theory. This blend not only highlights how 
philosophy intersects with everyday life but also reveals ecological relations as 
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animals, and cultural practices can be understood as themselves social. These relations 
entail inter-species communicative experiences and an ethics that eschews abstract 
philosophical frameworks. Instead, they negotiate the multidimensional and complex 
interdependencies between humans and a variety of nonhumans, including the demands 
by the land, trees, and animals for specific ethical relationships and responses from 
humans.           
 




Tindaana: If I die I will turn to a crocodile. So all of us here are crocodiles and therefore 
we taboo it…The python snake is our mother, and that is the ancestral god Awubugᴐ the 
Tingana. 
A: What happens if someone violates the rules? 
T: When one disobeys the rules you will get boils all over your body and you will end up 
dying a very bad death. 
A: Are there still a lot of crocodiles or pythons snakes around here? 
T: They used to be there but because people try catching them, they move to far places in 
the bush where people cannot get them. Sometimes they come around but not many. If I 
die and turn to a python I will have to come around for my people to see me before I go 
far to the bush. 
    GURENSI TINDAANA, In Discussion with Author 
 
…my teaching is in danger, weeds want to be wheat! My enemies have become powerful 
and have distorted the image of my teaching, so that those dearest to me must be ashamed 
of the gifts I gave them…With these words Zarathustra leaped to his feet, but not like a 
frightened person fighting for air, but instead more like a seer and a singer on whom the 
spirit has descended. In amazement his eagle and his snake looked at him, for like the 
dawn an impending happiness lay upon his face. What just happened to me, my animals? 
– said Zarathustra. Am I not transformed? Did bliss not come to me like a storm wind? 
    FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 
In contemporary ecological thought, conversing with crocodiles, pythons, and 
eagles is not an ordinary occurrence. Most environmentalists would have nothing to say 
to a snake.
8
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closer inspection, to be calls for the preservation of an industrial way of life, reducing 
ecology to a set of managerial strategies aimed at resource efficiency and risk 
management.
9
 Likewise, many “deeper” approaches that aim to extend duties, rights, and 
obligations to nonhumans inadvertently reduce the environment either to raw material for 
conceptualization or to a passive context for human action. By portraying the 
environment and its processes as objects of technical management or ethical 
consideration, the agency and subjectivity to manage or assign value are always located 
in the human, while other forms of existence become, at best, passive recipients of 
ecological concern. Animals, plants, and the land have no reciprocal obligations towards 
humans. Some even act as if the earth would return to a set of organic harmonies if the 
human imprint were lightened, rather than oscillating between periods of stability and 
rapid phase transitions.      
Both Zarathustra and the Gurensi tindaana substitute for such human-nonhuman 
disparities an ecological understanding that proceeds from the mutuality and sociability 
of people and the environment. Pythons and the savanna are human in the same way that 
dead ancestors are the living environment. People and environment are experienced as 
part of each other, and as reciprocally enmeshed in a web of active, sometimes 
whimsical, agencies that they are obliged to interpret and negotiate together. Humans do 
not work on or against the environment, but with it in continuous, albeit not always 
harmonious, intercourse.
10
 In such conversations, both Zarathustra and the tindaana 
acknowledge nonhuman beings as kin, adversaries, or allies who hold distinct points of 
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and communication, in which animals, plants, and the land nourish and nurture humans in 
return for respect and proper conduct.
11
  
 I seek to explore Gurensi animism and Nietzschean perspectivism as two related 
forms of experiential environmentalism, in which humans receive ethical and practical 
cues from a lively communicating environment. Such environmentalism treats ecological 
threats as a set of lived risks shared by a community of beings rather than as planetary 
abstractions. Climate change, deforestation, disease, and species loss become perceived 
not merely as ecological degradation, but as ethical hazards and as the erosion of specific 
relationships, for people have imperiled the ethico-spiritual protection and respect 
afforded by a reciprocating and nurturing environment. A rupture in the body of nature 
implies a breakdown of ethical order. The sickness of an individual is symptomatic of the 
sickness of the world around him; human fertility is bound to the regenerative capacities 
of the earth.      
 Environmentalism can be also understood here as a set of ethico-political 
strategies to intensify human perception of the interconnectedness of living and non-
living beings. It becomes a means of receiving messages from the environment.  For the 
Gurensi, this awareness of living within ecologies of beings—the communion of 
experience that lies at the heart of animist sociality—is generated through direct 
perceptual involvement in conjoint action and cohabitation of the same locality.
12
 For 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it requires the discipline of cultivation, of forging a sensibility 
capable of closer discernment of the presence of multiple degrees of agency distributed 
along a continuum of humans and nonhumans that approximates an animist federation of 
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the basis of observable processes of transition—rain and drought, life and death, the 
setting and rising of the sun, planting and harvest—the “good life” is that which supports 
the flourishing of diverse forms of existence, and not only humans. Such an ethic of the 
“good life” anchors Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas in the diversity of African lived 
experiences in a scaled-up, globalizing world. This is a largely pragmatic and down-to-
earth ethic, restricted to particular contexts of relational activity, such as the encounters 
between snakes and humans. It draws attention not only to Zarathustra as a profoundly 
ecological thinker but also to the wealth of existing other-than-modern ways of being 
human that resonate with his teachings.  
Animism has enjoyed a contemporary revival within the social sciences under an 
umbrella of academic approaches that have come to be known as “new animisms.” New 
animisms eschew previous scholarly attempts to identify animism as either a metaphoric 
projection of human society onto nature, as in the sociological tradition of Emile 
Durkheim, or as a manifestation of “primitive” man’s inability to distinguish dreams 
from reality, as in the anthropological tradition of Edward Tylor. Thinkers such as 
Philippe Descola, Nurit Bird-David, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Tim Ingold, Graham 
Harvey, and Laura Rival have reexamined animism by denying the primacy of Western 
metaphysics over indigenous understandings. Instead, they attempt to privilege 
indigenous “relational ontologies” and what the animists themselves say about spirits, 
souls, and animals.
13
 Harvey, for instance, describes animism as practices of living well 
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In this section, I build on such understandings of animism as a set of alternative 
existential orientations and dispositions.
15
 Both animism and perspectivism are more than 
systems of “beliefs” that some humans embrace in order to act upon the environment; 
they are also immanent to the very activity of forming relationships with other shapes, 
forces, and beings. Both Zarathustra and the Gurensi earth priest relate to the 
environment not as inanimate “nature” but as worlds gathered within a web of 
personalized relationships. These relationships are built and maintained through 
conversation, quarrel, exchange, and a continuous process of investing and dis-investing 
with gifts that carry new perspectives and identities. Let’s start with Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism first. 
 
Nietzsche and Viveiros de Castro: Exchanging Perspectives 
For Nietzsche, the entire world, and not only humans, is engaged in interpretation: 
Physicists believe in a “true world” in their own fashion, a firm systematization of 
atoms in necessary motion, the same for all beings...But they are in error. The 
atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of perspectivism of 
consciousness and is therefore a subjective fiction. This world picture that they 
sketch differs in no essential way from the subjective world picture: it is only 
construed with more extended senses [with microscopes, etc.] but with our senses 
nonetheless—And in any case they left something out of the constellation without 
knowing it: precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center 
of force—and not only man—construes all the rest of the world from its own 
viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force- They forgot to 





Perspectivism involves an intensified sensitivity to specificity. It is bound to our sensory 
participation in a world composed of multiple forces with differential degrees of 
experience; these forces interpret the environment upon which they act. Perspectivism is 
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among others interacting to foment a world that exceeds all.
17
 Humans are not the 
pinnacle of existence, but rather an outgrowth of the creative flux of organic life: “The 
world seen, felt, interpreted as thus and thus so that organic life may preserve itself in this 
perspective of interpretation. Man is not only a single individual but one particular line of 
the total living organic world. That he endures proves that a species of interpretation 
(even though accretions are still being added) has also endured.”
18
 Man is one vector 
through which life proliferates itself.  
In Nietzsche’s lexicon, life is “not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer 
ones, but will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and subdues more and 
more of that which is ‘outside.’”
19
 Or, rather, life is “a multiplicity of forces, connected 
by a common mode of nutrition.”
20
 To say that life is Will to Power is not to assert a 
theme of human domination over other humans and mastery over nature. It is to advance 
a conception of life as affirmation and upsurge. This does not mean that all life aims to 
assimilate the other, that it struggles to appropriate the non-self in Hegelian fashion. 
Interpretation always takes place within a field of forces exercised against other forces. 
The will is the differential aspect of force that affirms itself not in self-identity but in 
difference: “there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value 
of whatever else wants to grow.”
21
 Life cannot be conceived in and for itself, but only in 
contention with other lives and powers. It is not an inner principle of unity emerging from 
a transcendental ego, but instead a force that marks a difference within a field of forces: 
“it is affected by the forces of that field, and it exists due to them as much as due to itself. 
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is this pathos of distance—the feeling of connection and distinction—that is the 
fundamental affect of power.
23
  
If power is always will to more power and growth, then each mode of 
interpretation exists not in self-identical being but rather in the transformation and 
discharge of force (i.e. in the surpassing of itself in dynamic engagements with other 
forces, some of which are in affinity with it and others in opposition). Thus Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism extends the inter-human subjectivity through which we engage the rest of 
the world: different modes of subjectivity extend from natural and cosmic processes to 
humanity. Subjectivity is not only ineliminable to a certain degree but also finds 
differential degrees of expression in nonhuman processes and forces that are entangled 
with cultural and social forces. The limits of subjectivity can be stretched through techno-
artistic devices and aesthetic experiences that sensitize us to different modes of 
interpretation in the universe. 
Nietzsche’s point of view here is bound to evoke what Viveiros de Castro has also 
called “perspectivism,” the term he uses in his description of the relational ontologies of 
Amerindian societies. According to Viveiros de Castro, many indigenous people of the 
Americas “world” in the following way:  
One of the implications of the Amerindian animic-perspectival ontology is, 
indeed, that there are no autonomous, natural facts, for what we see as “nature” is 
seen by other species as “culture,” i.e., as institutional facts—what we see as 
blood, a natural substance, is seen by jaguars as manioc beer, an artefact; our mud 
is the hammock of the tapirs and so on…We have here a case of cultural 
universalism, which has as its counterpart what could be called natural relativism. 
It is this inversion of our pairing of nature to the universal and culture to the 
particular that I have labelled “perspectivism”…For Amerindians, lions, or rather 
jaguars, not only can talk, but we are perfectly able to understand what they say—
they “speak of” exactly the same things as we do—although what they mean 
(what they are “talking about”) is another matter…(Multi)cultural relativism 
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grasp an external and unified nature, which remains perfectly indifferent to those 
representations. Amerindian thought proposes the opposite: a representational or 
phenomenological unity which is purely pronominal or deictic, indifferently 
applied to a radically objective diversity. One single “culture,” multiple 
“natures”—one epistemology, multiple ontologies. Perspectivism implies 




In Amerindian perspectivism, individuated beings and forces—animals, spirits, the dead, 
plants, and objects—apprehend reality from distinct points of view. It is not because 
these beings and forces are endowed with humanity that they are subjects: to the contrary, 
it is the point of view that creates a subject rather than an object.
25
 A “point of view” 
entails an inside from which an outside can appear, and it is in the carving out of this 
inward space or interiority that a “subject” is born. As such, perspectivism cannot be 
understood as a multiplicity of representations of the same world. What varies is the 
world construed. 
 Nietzsche’s pan-perspectivism has significant resonances with that of Viveiros de 
Castro. Both agree that no single perspective can exhaust the abundance of reality: 
“There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes—and consequently there are 
many kinds of ‘truths,’ and consequently there is no truth.”
26
 Once human beings or 
jaguars are situated within a larger web of socio-ecological processes, the perspective of 
each is revealed to be finite and tangled with other perspectives. By affirming nature as 
intersecting cultures, both Nietzsche and Viveiros de Castro advance ontological 
pluralism. To the extent to which a perspective refers to a specific way of organizing 
reality according to the needs and will of a particular form of life, existence reveals itself 
according to a plurality of viewpoints.  
However, only Nietzsche’s perspectivism effectively troubles the metaphysical 
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perspectivism does not mean that appearances are profiles of an essential cultural variant 
like Viveiros de Castro’s “soul.” Viveiros de Castro writes that “animals have a human, 
sociocultural inner aspect that is ‘disguised’ by an ostensibly bestial bodily form.”
27
 In 
contrast, Nietzsche retorts that there is no essence—soul, spirit, or innate intentionality 
identical to human consciousness—to be sought behind the differentiation of 
appearances. If interpreting is understood as the upsurge of life and perspectives as 
powers that generate other perspectives by continual differentiation, then it follows that 
there are no pre-given persons, selves, egos, subjects, or facts. There are only 
interpretations and interpretations of interpretations:   
The “subject” is not something given, it is something added and invented and 
projected behind what there is.- Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter 
behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis. In so far as the word 
“knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable 
otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.- “Perspectivism.” 




Once we see that drives are not innate forces but culturally imbued searching 
processes below consciousness, it becomes clear that all existence is essentially 
“interpretation,” the expression of a fundamental ontological dispersion and 
differentiation. Interpretation is not a mental process added to life processes or an 
exercise of a sovereign mind transmitted onto passive matter. It is a life force that is 
always plural and relational; it is always exercised on another will. To exist is to 
interpret: the subject becomes as she interprets.
29
 Interpretation involves a positive 
struggle with others to annex reality by extending the mastery of one form of life over the 
antecedent forces against which it struggles: “whatever exists, having somehow come 
into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and 
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becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, 
an adaptation through which any previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ are necessarily 
obscured or even obliterated.”
30
 And yet, out of these clashes, new unions sometimes 
emerge.  
Interpretation thus proceeds not by some sovereign operation carried out by a 
subject, but by the ruse and dissimulation that govern life.
31
 The meanings and purposes 
that interpretation places on appearances are manifestations of the Will to Power that 
orders them in relation to one another. To interpret the meaning of a particular being is to 
determine the quality of the forces which command it or with which this being is in 
contention with. The ego or the subject—as a factor of unity—is a product of such 
contention, not its origin. Each appearance is itself generative, proliferating new 
appearances, divergent from itself. Existence, as a plurality of intersecting perspectives, 
is not predicated on an original unity or identity. Difference is primary, while identity, 
whether “natural” or “cultural,” is something become.
32
 
At first glance, Viveiros de Castro concurs with Nietzsche that perspectivism does 
not involve a world peopled by a multiplicity of predefined subjects: “the point of view 
creates the subject; whatever is activated or ‘agented’ by the point of view will be a 
subject.”
33
 Like Nietzsche, he seems to suggest that there are no pre-existing persons or 
selves. There are only perspectives and exchanges of perspectives: “there is no dialectics 
of ‘self’ and ‘other’ intended, for there is no synthesis and co-production, but rather 
alternation and disjunction, that is, exchange (of perspectives).”
34
 Wherever there is a 
point of view, there is a subject. Subjecthood is understood as the capacity to occupy a 




                                                                                               
85 
an animal in its human, reflexive form—or else understood as related to a subject.”
35
 The 
Amerindian model presupposes that the other of the subject is another subject, not an 
object, and that an object can be approached as “an incompletely interpreted subject.”
36
 
However, this multiplicity of perspectives revolves around humanity as the universal 
model of subjecthood. Whether human or animal, whatever possesses a human soul is a 
subject, and whatever has a soul is capable of having a point of view.
37
 What we have is a 
reversal—and not a refusal—of the Western logic of metaphysical unities and binaries. 
Animals can be humans because they are regarded as persons with a soul and granted 
capacities identical to those of humans. The position of the human subject is generalized 
to the entire web of life while its materiality is relativized so that each subject can 
perceive the world from her own position. Nature is not opposed to culture but instead 
becomes an extension of culture in a cosmos organized according to the order of human 
subjectivity.
38
    
This is a proposition that Nietzsche would resist. The human self or the subject as 
metaphysical unity, says Nietzsche, is a fiction: “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, 
effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed-the deed is 
everything.”
39
 What there is is the body as a multiplicity of interacting, purposive forces; 
a chaos amidst which arises a commanding force that comes to impose a perspective (“I 
say to you: one must still have chaos in oneself in order to give birth to a dancing star. I 
say to you: you still have chaos in you”).
40
 The body, as an organization of competing or 
coexisting drives/wills, interprets itself as a unity each time one will or another attains 
temporary dominion. All life interprets and orders whatever it encounters into different 
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multiple wills interpreting and organizing one another. Each mode of interpretation can 
be seen as a function of the particular order of searching drives and relations of which a 
body is composed. By defining being as chaos, Nietzsche liberates nature from the 
hegemony of human subjectivity that characterizes Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism. 
“Nature” is culturized at the same time as “culture” is naturalized. 
On the other hand, Nietzsche and Viveiros de Castro share a number of affinities 
across their differences. Both concur that perspectives are located in the body. According 
to Nietzsche, “every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend 
its force (–its will to power:)…it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of 
other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (a “union”) with those of them that 
are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process 
goes on.”
41
 Here Nietzsche moves closer to the Spinozist model of conative bodies 
according to which bodies strive to enhance their power by composing alliances with 
other bodies. The power of each body to affect other bodies involves a corresponding 
capacity to be affected. What this tendency of bodies to increase their power in or as 
heterogeneous “unions” suggests is that perspectival agency becomes distributed across a 
heterogeneous field, rather than being a capacity localized in a human body or in a 
collective produced only by human efforts.
42
 The earth and all existence—human as well 
as plant, animal, and mineral—are understood as interdependent material processes and 
dynamic constellations of Will to Power. 
For Viveiros de Castro, in turn, “bodies are the way in which alterity is 
apprehended as such…if ‘culture’ is a reflexive perspective of the subject, objectified 
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takes of other body-affects; if culture is the subject’s nature, then nature is the form of the 
other as body, that is, as the object for a subject.”
43
 The body is understood as a bundle of 
affects and capacities or ways of being that constitute an interpretive habitus. It becomes 
essential what the body eats, how it grows and moves, how it communicates, how it 
inhabits, whether it is gregarious like the Gurensi earth priest or solitary like Thoreau. 
The body differentiates.
44
 Interpreting is a question of percepts, not concepts.   
Thus Nietzschean and Amerindian perspectivism agree that it is bodies that 
interpret and determine what is interpreted. Interpretations can be described as actions, or 
more accurately, as interactions and exchanges between bodies that have their own wills 
and drive-trajectories. Exchanging perspectives involves a degree of mutuality of 
embodiment and relatedness. The world cannot be transformed through a change of 
mental orientations or by alternative social constructions alone. Transformation always 
entails altered body conditions. Perspectives are at once bodily conditions and socio-
cultural orientations.
45
 Rather than being self-referential unique “contexts” for human 
action, viewpoints refer to the shared potential to coexist with a multiplicity of nonhuman 
bodies.  
This is not to suggest that the same kind of body/soul (or percept/concept) 
dualism characterizes both forms of perspectivism. Viveiros de Castro mobilizes such 
dualist frames in order to show that the relations between nature and society are 
themselves social. Nietzsche, on the other hand, refers to such categories only in order to 
foreground them as an anthropocentric metaphysics that his perspectivism rejects. In 
Nietzsche, perspectivism is often synonymous with interpretation, imparting a 
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new and divergent interpretations is also continual logos and assembling of bodies that 
interpret.
46
 To say that perspectives are interpretations is to rule out the mechanical 
reproduction of any one perspective in favor of a world swarming with periodic creativity 
and novelty.        
 
African Animism and the Continuous Re-Enchantment of the World 
Like Nietzsche’s perspectivism, African animism troubles the boundaries and 
binaries—body/soul, nature/culture, and human/nonhuman—that permeate 
anthropocentric thinking. Animals, plants, and ordinary objects are endowed with 
capacities that Euro-American rationality identifies exclusively with humans. According 
to Harry Garuba, the most important characteristic of animist thought—in contrast to the 
major monotheistic religions and Western philosophical traditions—is its almost total 
refusal to allow for “unlocalized, unembodied, and unphysicalized” gods and spirits: 
Animism is often simply seen as belief in objects such as stones or trees or rivers 
for the simple reason that animist gods and spirits are located and embodied in 
objects: the objects are the physical and material manifestations of the gods and 
spirits. Instead of erecting graven images to symbolize the spiritual being, animist 
thought spiritualizes the object world, thereby giving the spirit a local 
habitation…nature and its objects are endowed with a spiritual life both 
simultaneous and coterminous with their natural properties. The objects thus 
acquire a social and spiritual meaning within the culture far in excess of their 
natural properties and their use value. Rivers, for example, not only become 
natural sources of water but are prized for various other reasons…the social and 
cultural meanings that become attached to the objects often break off from the 
purely religious and acquire an existence of their own as part of the general 




Amidst the grassy and seasonally changing landscape of the Northern Ghanaian savanna, 
for example, certain baobab trees, groves, streams, rocky ranges, and other natural bodies 
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tingane usually marks the location of settlement of the first ancestor—the pioneer settler 
and key ancestor of a village—or a powerful place identified by a soothsayer. The areas 
identified by the “original” settlers as places of sacrifice to the earth gods become abodes 
for the spirits of the whole community (tinkugere). Unlike the gods of Judaism, Islam, 
and Christianity, the earth gods are both physicalized in nature and historicized in 
society. Their close ties to specific clan and family genealogies make it impossible for 
them to escape history. 
 In addition to bearing an irreducible sociality and historicity, African animism 
actively resists “the goal of Weberian rationalization and secularization” by continually 
spiritualizing the object world
 
, thereby anticipating some recent Western images of pan-
psychism.
48
 The discourses and practices usually associated with modernity and a 
rationalization of nature lead instead to a continual re-enchantment rather than a 
disenchantment of the world. We will see that animism’s encounters with Western 
modernity are governed by logic of inclusion rather than exclusion: its assimilative reach 
elides binaries and contradictions in our usual sense of these words. Upon arrival in 
Accra, Toyotas are “baptized” and “tropicalized,” and then receive the blessings of the 
Ga priest or the elders’ prayers. In the Upper East of Ghana, Western medicine, clinical 
expertise, and blood transfusions are hailed by the spirits as welcome complements to the 
chief of medicine’s diagnostic portfolio. Climate change has become increasingly 
harmonized with tindaanas’ strategies to expound and address famine and disasters at the 
same time that chiefs integrate modernization and development into their “traditional” 
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That this predilection to continual re-enchantment is not simply a matter of 
religiosity has been underscored by the Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka, who describes 
animist thought as “an attitude of philosophical accommodation” that emerges out of the 
code on which many African worldviews are based: 
an attitude of philosophical accommodation is constantly demonstrated in the 
attributes accorded most African deities, attributes which deny the existence of 
impurities or “foreign” matter, in the god’s digestive system. Experiences which, 
until the event, lie outside the tribe’s cognition are absorbed through the god’s 
agency, are converted into yet another piece of social armoury in its struggle for 
existence, and enter into the lore of the tribe. This principle creates for society a 
non-doctrinaire mould of constant awareness, one which stays outside the 
monopolistic orbit of the priesthood, outside any claims to gnostic secrets by 
special cults. Interpretation, as it does universally, rests mostly in the hands of 





Soyinka observes that European scholars frequently miss the “the continuing evolution of 
tribal wisdom through an acceptance of the elastic nature of knowledge.” He highlights 
the key role of priests and elders in reinforcing—through observances, rituals, and 
sacrifices—the existing awareness of ecological and cosmic entanglement in African 
communities.
50
 The assimilative wisdom of African animism recognizes the conjunction 
of the worlds of various beings, where the mystical and the nonliving are concomitant 
areas of reality like any others. Animism affirms a constantly revolving and iterative 
relationship between humans, natural phenomena, and chthonic presences, a process that 
it depicts as self-regulating.
51
            
To put African animism into the context of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, we may 
say that it endows non-humans with species- and “thing”-specific perspectives on a 
multi-faceted reality. Animism is not a narcissistic projection of humanity onto nature but 
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are refigured as socio-ecological relations: the earth may be regarded by a Gurensi 
community as life-generating ancestors (yaabas); baobab trees and crocodiles may 
approach and, in turn, may be approached by clan members as kin and blood relatives; 
plants, air and, water may act as the chief of medicine’s (bagenabasɔ) key associates and 
vultures as his guardians.  
In the “perspective-setting” jargon of Nietzsche’s physicist, these relations 
approximate subject-subject relations. They reveal each interpretation as the mutual 
animation and meeting of the sometimes reciprocal and sometimes confrontational 
perspectives of other beings and forces. We will see in the next section that gift exchange 
can be also understood as an exchange of perspectives. Interpretations always encounter 
counter-interpretations: to see the ancestral potency of the land as being revealed in an 
abundant harvest becomes simultaneously an interpretation of the concatenation of 
certain events and evidence that one is also the recipient of ancestral attention.
52
 What to 
living humans is blood is food to the earth gods; what to the living is a grave for the dead 
or a fertile womb of a woman becomes an ancestral residence.  
The differences between viewpoints are a function of the specificity of bodies. 
When humans lose their bodies, as in death, they cease to appear as human beings to 
others.
53
 Instead, they may return to live with their kin as baobab trees, pythons, or 
crocodiles. Although animals, trees, and spirits interpret just as living people do, without 
the same type of body they perceive differently. As a deceased elder, the ancestral baobab 
tree must be approached appropriately. The tree receives the blood and feathers of a 
sacrificed animal rather than its meat. It is draped in a strip of cloth rather than in a full-
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wear the smock as the living would do. Although a son’s relationship with a deceased 
father or grandfather continues, the method of interaction becomes different when the 
latter is dead.
54
 When the tindaana performs a sacrifice, it is not merely a matter of 
knowledge or of shifting perspectives in the sense of mentally putting oneself in 
another’s shoes. In order to straddle coexisting worlds, the tindaana (earth priest) has to 
don animal skins (tankoloɔɔ), a calabash cap (bagere wula), a goatskin handbag (talaηa), 
a black triangular loin-cloth (lebere), a knife (sua), and a walking stick (tindaan-doore) 
cut from the stock of a guinea-corn plant or okro plant. He has to activate the powers of a 
different body.
55
 The skins are a borrowed body endowed with the affects and capacities 





Just like the earth priest who enlists the assistance of animal and plant bodies 
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between humans and nonhumans. Such exchangeability of perspectives and body 
metamorphoses enable Zarathustra to pursue an ethic of living that remains true to “the 
meaning of the earth.”
57
 Zarathustra shows that to think ecologically means not only to 
think about nature in a certain way but also to allow thinking to unfold and play itself out 
in the materiality of the earth. The earth is the body and the milieu in which the animal 
“human being” transforms corporally and learns how to experience herself as being 
terrestrial: “It is time that mankind set themselves a goal. It is time that mankind plant the 
seed of their highest hope. Their soil is still rich enough for this. But one day this soil will 
be poor and tame, and no tall tree will be able to grow from it anymore.”
58
 Zarathustra’s 
self-overcoming is defined in terms of natural forces, bodies, and changes: soil 
preparation and seed sowing; transplanting of trees, tending of gardens, and crop 
harvesting; breeding and herding of animals; rolling thunderstorms and ripening fruit.
59
 
The role of the earth in his cultivation as an ethical subject is pervasive.  
The success of Zarathustra’s self-overcoming is linked to proper relationships and 
interactions with other beings and forces. If what defines and sustains the human species 
are habitual interpretations and bodily dispositions, the task of Zarathustra’s self-
overcoming involves overcoming both the human habitus and habituation itself.  Human 
are means, not ends: “What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not 
a purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a 
going under. I love those who do not know how to live unless by going under, for they 
are the ones who cross over.”
60
 Like the web of cosmic entanglements of African 
animism, human life cannot be conceived as an isolated and self-sufficient form of 
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of life. In Zarathustra’s Prologue the future of humanity depends on affirming the 
“bridge” that connects human, animal, and overman. In contrast to Western traditions of 
humanism and Enlightenment, which identify the “good life” with emancipation of the 
human from the animal, Nietzsche highlights the key role played both by human 
animality and by other animals in the formation of ethical life. The “good life” arises 
from friendship and companionship with animals and various natural forces, and from an 
attitude of presumptive openness to nonhuman perspectives, rather than from the exercise 
of mastery over them.
61
 It requires Zarathustra’s cultivation of gift-giving virtue by 
assuming the perspective of the sun, which is turned outwards and reaches out to the 
other.         
 
THE GIVING ENVIRONMENT: ON BESTOWING VIRTUE AND RAIN 
 
This section puts pan-perspectivism and animism into conversation in order to 
explore the practice of gift giving as an exchange of perspectives between people and the 
environment. I show how both Zarathustra and the Gurensi draw upon the 
interdependencies between people and a giving environment to “model” their own 
economies and modalities of exchange. Such economic models of abundance not only 
provide ecological alternatives to market exchange but also reveal human-nonhuman 
interdependencies as power relations. Whereas unprecedented events such as climate 
change become harmonized with the Gurensi model of nature as reciprocating ancestors, 
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differentials and the absence of a natural tendency toward equilibrium or self-
harmonization.  
Questions of gift giving, exchange, and reciprocity are central to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. If we read the title of the book carefully, we find a 
few prompts. Conventionally, a gift is understood to be something that we do not obtain 
by our own efforts. It cannot be bought or acquired through an act of coercion or will: it 
is something bestowed upon us. A gift that cannot be given is no longer a gift.
62
 With 
Zarathustra, explains Nietzsche in the preface of Ecce Homo, “I have given mankind the 
greatest present that has ever been made to it so far.”
63
 The book is a gift “for all and 
none:” Nietzsche’s gift is put into circulation and is meant to keep circulating without 
becoming anyone’s permanent possession. The gift must keep moving: it must be given 
forward rather than spent on oneself or converted into another’s capital.
64
 
 The same logic of continuous circulation governs Zarathustra’s gifts. Zarathustra 
is a speaker, and what he bestows upon others—humans as well as nonhumans—are his 
speeches, his teachings.
65
 According to Heidegger, Zarathustra is an advocate, a 
Fűrsprecher (where fűr means „for the benefit of, or in behalf, of“). The Fűrsprecher 
advocates and serves as a “mouthpiece.” He interprets. He explains that for which he 
speaks: “I, Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the 
circle.”
66
 Zarathustra advocates on behalf of life, suffering, and the circle. This triplet—
“life, suffering, circle”—belongs together: “all Being is Will to Power, which suffers as 
creative, colliding will and thus wills itself in the eternal recurrence of the same.”
67
 
Zarathustra interprets in a field of forces by suffering to maintain a line of difference in 
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is different from it. It is through the back-and-forth exchange of gifts between Zarathustra 
and his followers that the teacher seeks to teach his students how to cultivate such 
sensitivities.  
In “On Free Death” Zarathustra initiates one such exchange. On his way to meet 
his “free” death, undertaken as a gift to the living, Zarathustra passes a golden ball to his 
disciples: “Zarathustra had a goal, he threw his ball. Now you my friends are the heirs of 
my goal, to you I throw the golden ball. More than anything I like to see you, my friends, 
throwing the golden ball!”
68
 Yet, before he can die, leaving his disciples indebted to the 
continual circulation of his gift, they return the golden ball, drawing their teacher into a 
series of exchanges that postpone his death:   
In parting, however, his disciples presented him with a staff upon whose golden 
knob a snake encircled the sun. Zarathustra was delighted with the staff and 
leaned on it; then he spoke thus to his disciples. “Tell me now: how did gold 
come to have the highest value? Because it is uncommon and useless and 
gleaming and mild in its luster; it bestows itself always…This is your thirst: to 
become sacrifices and gifts yourselves, and therefore you thirst to amass all riches 
in your soul. Insatiably your soul strives for treasures and gems, because your 
virtue is insatiable in wanting to bestow. You compel all things to and into 
yourselves, so that they may gush back from your well as the gifts of your love. 




The staff is a suitable gift for Zarathustra, the wanderer and the advocate of the circle as 
spiral. Its design may be a reference to the sun god Mithra.
70
 As the god of contract and 
mutual obligation, Mithra appears both as a “friend” and as “contract.”
71
 Contracts and 
covenants make friends in the same way in which Zarathustra’s gifts create bonds and 
relationships of reciprocal obligations with his disciples. Mithra is commonly represented 
as encircled by a serpent, a personification of the earth, the cyclicality of time, and the 
continual renewal of life. As a farewell gift, the staff also stands for the powers of being 
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The disciples interpret Zarathustra’s gift as advocacy of a simple model of reciprocity, 
through which a series of mutually binding obligations and exchanges are produced and 
maintained.  
 Bestowing virtue differs from the disciples’ theory of reciprocal giving in several 
ways, according to Zarathustra’s counter-interpretation. In reciprocal giving the gift goes 
back and forth between givers and receivers. In bestowing virtue, on the other hand, the 
gift moves in a non-linear way—in a spiral—to ensure that no one ever receives it from 
the same person that he gives it to. The smaller the circle is, the more closely its 
movement can be monitored and the more likely it is that one will start thinking as a 
salesman.
72
 Gold came to have the highest value, explains Zarathustra, because it is 
“uncommon and useless and gleaming and mild in its luster.” In other words, gift giving 
cannot be understood either from the perspective of the price calculus of market 
exchange or from the viewpoint of utilitarian and contractual obligations. Gold, like the 
sun, is a radiant body that “bestows itself always.” The sun is taken as a model of an 
economy of immense expenditure and excess: “I learned this from the sun when it goes 
down, the super-rich one: it pours gold into the sea from its inexhaustible wealth – such 
that even the poorest fisherman rows with golden oars!”
73
 Like the sun, Zarathustra’s 
body is open outward, bestowing his outflows evenly without ranking people, animals, 
and places. This is a model of giving as squandering that provokes responses from the 
earth in the form of growth, flowering, and energy.  
Unlike market exchange, gift giving is not an exchange of objects or possessions. 
To give, for Zarathustra, means to give who one is and the stability of entrenched 
identities rather than what one possesses.
74
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correspondingly, as a growth of spiritual dispositions, and not merely a distribution of 
material goods: “Insatiably your soul strives for treasures and gems, because your virtue 
is insatiable in wanting to bestow.” Rather than being a form of unrestricted and 
disinterested giving without any return, squandering entails its own inflows of renewed 
sensibility: “You compel all things to and into yourselves, so that they may gush back 
from your well as the gifts of your love.” One has to allow the influx of experience to 
become organized unconsciously in the human sensorium until a new sensitivity emerges 
and a reserve of energy can be drawn upon to bestow gifts of generosity and gratitude 
upon the earth and other humans. When the gift is used, it is not used up: as long as it is 
passed along it remains abundant.
75
 This is an excess of energy that takes the form of an 
invitation to engage in the spiritualization of enmity. When Zarathustra bids his disciples 
to “lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to 
you,” he advocates a squandering and dispersal of disciples. Gift giving entails a pathos 
of distance between teacher and disciples, which rules out the latter’s self-identification 
as Zarathustra’s intellectual progeny. Only when the gift moves out of sight can its 
circulation remain beyond the control of an individual giver or a pair of gift partners. 
Squandering is compared to the force of an overflowing river—“a blessing and a danger 




The connections or “contracts” established by such circulation differ from the ties 
that bind groups organized through centralized power and top-down authority.
 77
 It is not 
when a part of oneself is transferred to another, but when it is expended through another 
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mastery rhetoric in a new light: gifts are empowering only if they teach others how to 
empower themselves and practice active reciprocity. In his conversation with the saint, 
Zarathustra distinguishes bestowing virtue from giving alms: “I do not give alms. For that 
I am not poor enough.”
78
 By giving alms one places the object of charity in a state of 
indebtedness that reinforces power asymmetries. Such asymmetries are themselves forms 
of poverty and privation.
79
  The idea is not to become dependent upon those whose gifts 
you have received, but to tap into an affective economy of abundance as a resource for 
remaking one’s own virtue and livelihood: “Physician, help yourself: Let that be his best 
help, that he sees with his own eyes the one who heals himself.”
80
 The receiver of the gift 
is well understood as a self-healing physician, identified with the transient experience of 
defeating illness, rather than with the stability of an enduring health state. The giver of 
the gift approaches the receiver at a distance, showing respect for the other’s 
distinctiveness and singularity. Such distance should remain sufficient to ensure that the 
giver sometimes remains unrecognized, and that gift exchange does not become 
formalized as such: “Gladly I bestow as friend to friends. But strangers and poor people 
may pluck the fruit from my tree themselves: that way there is less shame.”
81
 Shame sets 
a precondition for ressentiment.   
 Bestowing virtue is an expression of an ecological insight as much as of gift 
exchange: “Let your bestowing love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the 
earth!...Do not let it fly away from earthly things and beat against eternal walls with its 
wings! Like me, guide the virtue that has flown away back to the earth – yes, back to the 
body and life.”
82
 What does Zarathustra mean by insisting that bestowing virtue has to 
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between human ethical conduct and larger processes of the sun’s overflowing 
expenditure and the circulation of energy on earth. Zarathustra’s view can be conceived 
as a biocentric outlook that recognizes the superiority of solar energy as inexhaustible 
and nonpolluting. Everything in the biosphere is already preadapted to solar energy by 
millions of years of evolutionary history.
83
 If the social world is a complex system that 
has evolved with reference to solar flows, then political, economic, and ethical 




 On the other hand, to remain faithful to the earth means to maintain an affirmative 
relationship to the physicality of one’s body in a way that expresses the complexity of 
entanglements between bodies and forces. That we are all made of earth is a recurrent 
theme in Zarathustra’s teachings, who is a vocal critic of the advocacy of extraterrestrial 
hopes. The latter let their virtue “fly away from earthly things and beat against eternal 
walls with its wings.” Here Zarathustra concurs with thinkers such as Val Plumwood who 
perceive the ecological crisis as a crisis of culture. Dominant economic, political, 
scientific, and ethical forms of reason have misunderstood their own enabling 
conditions—the body, ecology, and nonhuman nature—“because they have written these 
down as inferior or constructed them as background in arriving at an illusory and 
hyperbolized sense of human autonomy.”
85
 What requires philosophical engagement in 
the context of anthropocentric culture is “self rather than other, the limits imposed by the 
human rather than the nature side of the ethical relationship, the ethical stance of closure 
rather than the ethical stance of openness.”
86
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cultivation of such a stance of openness: Zarathustra performs a gift-giving economy that 
draws on the earthly excess to flourish and produce creative spirals. 
Such a disposition of openness requires not merely a reversal of the hierarchy of 
human-centered values but a profound transformation of what counts as valuative 
thinking. In Zarathustra’s lecture, bestowing virtue is described as the “robber of all 
values.” It is named “the unnameable.”
87
 Giving a name to something produces an 
abstraction; it removes it from the flux of lived experience. This is a process of 
converting nameless experiences into differentiated concepts. We strip a bit of the life-
force of a thing and assume power over it by naming it. If we give it a certain name, we 
qualify it and put into a drawer, forcing it into a category that can be opposed to another 
category. Then we make a morality out of it and evaluate it as a merit. Hence, 
Zarathustra’s admonition: don’t name your virtue so that it will remain unutterable while 
leading you on the path toward the overman.
88
 This is an alternative way of valuative 
thinking, free from the Western belief in the merit of binary values such as real/apparent, 
being/becoming, life/non-life, and nature/culture. There is only one quality that one can 
assign to such unnameable virtue. The gift-giving virtue, says Zarathustra, is an “earthly” 
virtue.
89
 An ethic that remains “faithful to the earth” cannot simply be known; it must be 
lived. The earth cannot be merely conceptualized; its energies must become infused into 
being. For Zarathustra, relatedness with the earth, rather than abstract theoretical 
contemplation, becomes the crucial foundation upon which the “higher” activities of 
thinking are predicated. Thinking and acting are co-extensive. This is a relational view of 
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The centrality of lived experience to Zarathustra’s earth-based thinking highlights 
a series of resonances between his gift-giving economy and Gurensi economies of 
reciprocity. The latter also revolve around a web of lived relationships between people 
and a giving environment. They can be understood as prayer economies that interweave 
the living, the dead, and the earth into interpersonal transactions. The dead transact with 
the living as identified ancestors (yaabeduma), and not as an anonymous collectivity. The 
earth (tiƞa) participates, in turn, as personified and named localities or shrines (tingana), 
in which the ancestors come back to reside with the clan or the village. Three different 
types of earth shrines can bear the name tingane: yaaba-tia (ancestral trees); tingane 
proper; and tinkugere (land stones or land spirits). Whereas a yaaba-tia or a tingane can 




The distinctions between various earth shrines remain fluid. Some elders describe 
a process of “promotion” of shrines that merges the lifecycles of humans and trees: 
“when the father dies, he later goes to the ancestor station and becomes an ancestor, 
yaaba, and from yaaba he may go to the bush...the whole clan refer to you as the 
tingane.”
91
 Over the course of several human generations, new trees may spring up 
around the yaaba-tia, transforming it from an ancestral tree into a sacred grove (tingane). 
The older one gets, the more numerous one’s children and grandchildren, and the more 
prominent an elder becomes as a reference point for the common good and future 
generations, establishing social identity, authority and obligations.
92
 The return of the 
ancestors as the proliferating growth of nature binds the continuity of identity and 
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between natural, cultural, and supernatural. According to our modern way of thinking, 
their living elders are honored or paid respect, while dead ones are worshipped, a 
distinction that the Gurensi do not need. Offering millet beer or a fowl to the tingane is 
no more “religious” than giving it to a living elder.
93
 
The typical practice of petitioning and sacrificing to earth shrines and the 
ancestors involves giving gifts, to plead with and persuade the yaabas and natural 
agencies to provide some desired outcome. Before and after each farming season the 
tindaana (earth priest) performs sacrifices to the tingana. These seasonal sacrifices are 
known respectively as Naarega and Mdan Koya. Naarega involves an offering of the first 
pito, a local brew from early millet set aside by elders during the previous harvest season. 
The brew is given to the ancestors to thank them for their generosity and to plead for 
another propitious harvest. Sacrifices are also performed to aid the living in addressing a 
crisis or the threat of crisis:  
When you are sick and open your month and call his name, cry and say “ancestral 
gods heal me,” he will certainly heal you. When one is also in trouble like 
someone raise a knife after you to kill and you cry to the ancestral Awubugᴐ that 
help me, he will indeed help you. Now, after helping or saving you, he can ask 
you to offer a sheep or goat to him as he specifies. If the tingane does not ask for 
any animal you yourself can also decide to offer any animal for saving him as 
thanksgiving. Also…if your wife does not give birth, you can go to the tingane 




Other elders have compared the tingane to a welfare officer who looks after people’s 
well-being, warding off whatever disaster may be afflicting an individual, family or 
community:  
If the tindaana is somebody who is also for the welfare of the people, we’ll 
consult him and he will say: “you bring this because there is a likelihood of a 
drought coming, there’s likelihood of strong winds coming, so you bring me this 
so I will be able to block those things from coming.” That’s the tingane’s role. An 
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or whatnot—so the tingane will say: “you bring me this, I should be able to block 




It is the tindaana’s responsibility to find out why drought, infertility, and illness have 
occurred and to perform “the necessary sacrifices.” Like Zarathustra, the Fűrsprecher, 
the tindaana is the “mouthpiece” that communicates ancestors’ perspectives to the living. 
His duty is to consult the soothsayer and find out what the ancestors and the earth need. If 
the ancestors say they want a cow, it is the tindaana who addresses such needs and 
sacrifices the cow to the shrine.  
There are well-defined customary proceedings for libations and offerings, which 
are couched in the bodily and spatial idiom of the mutually courteous, easy-to-understand 
everyday intercourse with elders. The ancestral beings and natural agencies to which 
these offerings are addressed are expected to attend a particular earth shrine or locality. 
Prayers and petitions are never directed towards an abstract heaven or the sky. In 
sacrificing to shrines, men squat, addressing the ancestors as if face-to-face on the same 
level. The tone of address differs from ordinary speech but is similar to that of a 
customary salutation to an elder or chief when making a request. Heads are bared, voices 
are quiet, eyes are lowered, and bodily posture is deferential.
 
The petition is always a 
public and open utterance, launched as much at the company present as at the ancestral 
powers addressed.
96
 Sometimes it includes a threat to withhold a promised or demanded 
offering if the desired outcome is not granted. For instance, a tindaana may sacrifice raw 
millet flour without water. The ancestors are denied water: “If you want water you bring 
rain.”
97
 The public exposure of such agonistic relations can be understood as a way to 
coerce the ancestors into ethical responsibility to the living that equals the accountability 
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long run, death supervenes and this is interpreted as the victory of the ancestors or the 
Earth over the intractable living.”
98
 
Nonetheless, it is taken for granted that the ancestors and the earth will respond to 
petitions and sacrifices: “cry and say ‘ancestral gods heal me,’ he will certainly heal 
you.” The ancestors will become spiritually present, and even if it turns out that they have 
not granted one’s request, this would be for reasons that have remained unknown by the 
petitioner, and not because the ancestors are absent from the occasion.
99
 In effect, when a 
disaster is interpreted as a punitive or corrective intervention, the ancestors are perceived 
to have acted rightfully, not arbitrarily. This is because people’s relationship with the 
earth as reciprocating ancestors is governed by a mutuality of reciprocal obligations. 
What holds for the ancestors holds reciprocally for their living descendants. A son is 
expected to pay respect to his parental forbears, to tend to their shrines by making 
offerings and pouring libations when these are commanded, regardless of the son’s 
sympathies or aversions, and irrespective of the deceased’s character or achievements. 
The ancestors behave in the same way, regardless of what their lifetime characters may 
have been: “The ancestor who was a devoted father and conscientious provider for his 
family in his lifetime is divined to be the source of illness, misfortune, and disturbance in 
his descendants’ lives in exactly the same way as is an ancestor who was a scoundrel and 
spendthrift.”
100
 Like Zarathustra’s unnameable virtue, the economy of ever-present 
ancestral agencies involves a way of valuative thinking that is otherwise than the Western 
metaphysics of rank ordering and the merit of opposite values. Where the ancestors are 
nature, ethics can never take the form of an abstract set of moral imperatives. The good 
life can be only guaranteed by maintaining proper relations with the yaabas.
101
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This is consistent with tindaanas’ and elders’ repeated interpretations of climate 
change as ancestral retribution for the collective failures of the living to abide by this 
customary regime of mutuality of obligations. In our numerous conversations about the 
changing and unpredictable patterns of rainfall and local weather, tindaanas, chiefs, and 
elders all concurred that climate change is man-made, and not “natural”: 
With the course of religion, with the pretense of religion they will not forbid, so 
they start cutting these trees. In the end they wipe out the trees, the ancestors’ 
trees. The gods are no more there so what is to prevent or bring down the rain? So 
they are saying that there is less feelings that the ancestors are staying there 
because “We are stronger than them”…That is man-made because God has given 
us these things—the trees, everything—and then there are those who felt they are 
no good and let’s destroy them. That’s the results we are now getting. If you 
adhere to the rules of the ancestors or the rules of God, we wouldn’t be facing 
these problems. So it is not natural but it is man-made…others get firewood just 




As people continue to “wipe out the trees,” the ancestors’ abodes are being steadily 
destroyed, reversing customary relations of power and authority. Deforestation forces the 
ancestors to leave home and to withdraw their protection for the living. Climate change is 
interpreted as the product of human failure to reciprocate and hold respectful custody of 
the gifts bestowed by a generous environment: “It is God that has made those things. 
Because all of us will look out for the rain. He is giving us the rain and they are not 
seeing it.”
103
 The adversity of the ancestors is directed towards harmonizing human-
environment relations in accordance with the norms of reciprocal obligation that govern 
the intercourse between the living, the ancestors, and the earth. Like Zarathustra’s gift-
giving economy, the elders’ dispositions are predicated upon trust in abundance, which 
contrasts with modern economies’ fixation on a lust for more.
104
 The environment 
contains enough for human well-being and sustenance, both Zarathustra and the tindaana 
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earth’s abundance as a gift that itself generates wealth and increases resources: here 
economic activities start from a premise of a surplus in nature, situating human wants 
within the earth’s available means.  
This is not to say that abundance is unlimited. What the earth gives humans is 
affected by what humans give to the earth. A give-and-take relationship with the earth 
acknowledges human interdependence with natural processes. Such gift economies also 
have a built-in check on commodification: the incommensurability and non-
substitutability of “goods,”—e.g. food, pito, blood, rainfall, and soothsaying (the 
Gurensi) and teachings, sensibilities (Zarathustra)—ensures that gifts cannot be easily 
converted into tradable commodities. Resources remain plentiful as long as humans 
participate in the seasonal cycles of gift giving. They appear scarce when gifts stop 
circulating and humans begin to convert ancestral trees into firewood and farmland: “In 
those days who dared to cut the forest without permission? They cut lots of the tingana 
and then you are supposed to leave a certain area within the tingane—you don’t farm 
there. People farm the whole area. It’s all annoying to the tingane.”
105
 Another cause of 
climate change is attributed to a parallel disregard for the taboo on making noise from 
August to October, the time when the guinea corn pollination takes place. The ancestors 
associated excessive noise during harvest time with heavy winds, and more trees with 
more rain. They knew little about Western science but understood the importance of not 
driving away pollinators. Today the noise of “ghetto blasters” scares the insects away. 
Where the abundance of nature continues to reflect the moods and ecological intuitions of 
the ancestors, ample rain and pollinators testify to the mastery of the social adjustment to 
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 The punitive and erratic behavior of nature portends the sickness and 
maladaptation of a transforming social world, in which the advance of Christianity, 
modernization, and Western education collide with existing forms of authority and 
belonging:   
There are changes now…Usually, they roam in the night—the ancestors or the 
ancestors’ place. And then the tingana—they also roam in the night just to survey 
the area and to drive away evil. Now this time people pray throughout the night so 
they are unable to come out to also look and find out what may be befalling the 
community. So many churches come into the community—it drives away the 
tingane from roaming in the night. For that matter they also become annoyed and 
they can cause evil to befall the community…There are any place they sleep with 
women—under trees, on the road—it annoys the tingane. So they want to also 
punish us. That’s why droughts and whatnot are happening...The youth now, 
when you tell them this thing is forbidden they say: “Oh, why is it forbidden?” So 
they ignore them and these are the very things that will happen. Ignoring the 
taboos by the youth…These are the very things that annoy the tingana and they 
remove themselves from whatever evil may be coming to the community… There 
are some places people use foreign drinks to pour libation…but that should not be 
the case, it should be the local pito, daamolega. But people have ignored 
those…they build a church, they pour libation and probably will be using whisky 
or whatnot, the foreign drink…Since you are pouring the libation, you have to use 
the local drink to give them because they are aware of the local drink, not the 





It is this concatenation of interpretations and the elders’ ability to shift back and forth 
between the competing perspectives of the living and the dead that account for recent 
weather fluctuations in Northern Ghana. Within a short while you may be expecting a 
heavy downfall but it turns out to be a rainstorm. A village does not get rain, and yet it is 
very stormy.
108
 Sometimes whole communities, and especially the present generation of 
the youth, refuse to acknowledge the authority and jurisdiction vested in parental 
agencies, channeled through the socio-ecological relations mobilized by Gurensi 
ancestorhood. Even though the human bodies of parents perish, the authority they 
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how parents appear to their children when they exercise authority—persists within the 
earth-based jurisdiction of the tingane. Climate change is thus a contemporary reminder 
of both the transience of authority and the dangers of opposition to it.
109
 
This example decolonizes Western sociological terms. Tindaanas, chiefs, and 
elders rarely spoke in terms of binaries such as “tradition” vs. “development,” as if these 
were irreconcilable pairs of opposites. Instead, they reiterated how the ancestors would 
welcome development and modernization if the latter conformed to the invisible 
governances of the earth gods. The ancestors are aware that development usually 
involves cutting trees, digging up the earth to erect schools and hospitals, and opening 
quarries. However, in order to proceed with development, the tindaana, the chief, and the 
elders have to be consulted. If there is a problem, an earth shrine can be re-sited. A 
purification ritual will be performed, the tindaana will “cut the sod” and the development 
project can go on. This is a process of negotiation between competing interpretations 
whereby the “traditional” and mystical elements of Gurensi thought are not eradicated. 
On the contrary, animist thought is allowed to continually accommodate but also 
sometimes to adjust development and Westernization. Rather than secularization and 
“disenchantment,” a persistent re-enchantment occurs, whereby Western knowledge and 
techno-scientific developments are transformed into the matrix of mutuality of 
exchanges.  
Rather than being passive recipients of Westernization and the globalization of 
Western productive forces, the yaabas’ adversity highlights the extent to which society 
and nature together continue to exercise influence over production, distribution, and 
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that govern so-called “Third World” societies as they construct their own modernities. 
Rather than being primary, production here is revealed as one mode of reciprocal 
exchange between humans and nonhumans. In the West, production is conventionally 
conceived as primary—as in Marx and classical political economy—while exchange and 
distribution are viewed as consequences of production. In contrast, for both Zarathustra 
and the Gurensi, a wide variety of exchanges set the enabling condition of production: 
without proper relations with the earth no production is possible. The entire economy is 
best understood as a circulation system in which people, chiefs, tindaanas, and ancestors 
co-participate.
110
 Economy is refused as an autonomous domain: it is impossible to 
separate economic life from social life, ecological life, spiritual life, etc. This refusal of 
economy approximates Zarathustra’s existential self-artistry. If Zarathustra or the Gurensi 
tindaana do not act as entrepreneurs, preoccupied with ceaselessly increasing production 
to acquire profit by commercializing surplus goods, it is not because they do not know 
how to. It is because profit is not the only thing that interests them or they prefer to 
distribute surplus differently, converting it into spiritual and sensorial resources for 
addressing new crises of society.  
Finally, the conversation between Zarathustra and the earth priest reveals these 
relations of reciprocal interdependence as power relations. There is a mutuality of 
obligations between the living and the ancestors, but as Fortes observes in the case of the 
Talensi, these obligations are not equal. Authority takes the form of a debt that mortal 
humans have to pay to an ever-renewing earth as gift-giving ancestors. The living count 
on the “dead” to come up with what Thoreau called “the gross necessaries of life”: health, 
prosperity, rains, food, and the fertility of fields and women.
111
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appears asymmetrical, it is because what is offered (for example, a calabash of millet 
flour or a fowl) is more of a token of respect in comparison with what is obtained in 
return.
112
 Nietzsche’s emphasis on agon and struggle reveals such reciprocity between 
humans and nonhumans as agonistic reciprocity. Here the Nietzsche-Gurensi dialogue 
might contribute to the contemporary debate about a new ethics of intergenerational 
justice and responsibility, especially with regard to climate change. One of the key 
challenges of generating such an ethic has been the problem with establishing 
relationships of reciprocity among successive human generations. African notions of 
indebtedness to the earth through reciprocating ancestors address this problem and offer a 
way to generate obligations or debt to the future as the past. Zarathustra’s agonistic self-
overcoming and critique of existential ressentiment, in turn, offer another way of 




Zarathustra might be speaking to such debates among environmentalists when he 
says: “Those who care most today ask: ‘How are human beings to be preserved?’ But 
Zarathustra is the only one and the first one to ask: ‘How shall human being be 
overcome?’”
114
 The idea is to silence the preservation of the human species. Instead, 
Zarathustra encourages us to strive to cultivate a group of “overmen” who ward off 
resentment against the fragility of the human condition and rise above the insistence on 
externalizing collective responsibility and placing it on the otherworldly and on 
identifying culpable agents to punish every time humans suffer. Here I concur with 
William Connolly that if there is something admirable in such a rendering of the 
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into the political fabric of late-modern society.” The idea is to enlarge it as a voice among 
us as we appreciate the “intensive entanglement of everyone with everyone else.”
115
 A 
book for anyone and no one.  
As preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together by the global 
ecological crisis, Zarathustra’s overman as a distinct type cannot eliminate from its 
process of ethical self-formation some of the existing modalities of what it means to be 
“human” rendered visible by the earth priest. For Connolly, then, the overman becomes 
refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment 
and punishment, on the one hand, and gratitude for the abundance of the earth that rises 
above this tendency, on the other.
116
 The dialogue with the earth priest, I think, can be 
understood as an ethico-political strategy that shifts the center of gravity from such 
solitary figures to society. It can fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of everyday life 
by attending to the more-than-human character of the latter while harmonizing its 
inexorable struggles. The dialogue affords a break both with the spirit of Nietzsche’s 
overman and with African identifications of indebtedness with punishment in order to 
advance and sustain an intergenerational ethics of collective responsibility and climate 
justice.                  
In the next section, we will explore a possible reversal of this agon-harmony 
emphasis. We will take a look at Zarathustra’s attempts to encourage serpents, people, 
and eagles alike to weave reciprocal forbearance and presumptive generosity into their 
relations with each other. We will contrast Zarathustra’s strategies towards harmonization 
with the expertise of the Gurensi chief of medicine who is also enmeshed in a struggle of 
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as each party comes to appreciate the extent to which its interpretation and perspective is 
bound up with and animated by others’. The dialogue opens up new possibilities for 
negotiating cultural and ecological differences: it helps identify traces in the other of 
one’s distinct way of interpreting the environment upon which humans and nonhumans 
conjointly act. Together perspectivism and animism compel a politics and ethics of 
agonistic respect based on acknowledgment of human complicity in climate change, the 
need for a gift-giving ethos between people and the earth, and the ambivalent place of 
punishment in intergenerational relations.  
 




The most important task for human beings is not to search the stars to converse with 
cosmic beings but to learn to communicate with the other species that share this planet 
with us. The real communication challenge at this level of interspecies communication is 
for we humans to learn to communicate with other species on their terms, in their own 
languages, or in common terms, if there are any. 
                                                                      VAL PLUMWOOD, Environmental Culture 
 
 
On our way to visit the chief of medicine (BagenabaSɔ) we stop by a small 
“family spot”—the common name for a bar in Ghana—to buy a six-pack of Guinness. 
BagenabaSɔ does not charge for his services, the elder explains, but it is customary to 
show up with a gift, and Guinness is his drink of choice. Upon arrival at the chief’s 
compound we park our motos right next to the chief’s colossal tampugerɛ, the rubbish 
heap in front of Gurensi earthen compounds whose size indicates the wealth of a 
household. A couple of vultures walk around the tampugerɛ and scrutinize our group 
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the chief’s brand-new car, which he received as a gift from a grateful patient from the 
south of Ghana. The chief of medicine has eleven wives, all of whom have borne him 
children. People flock to his compound from all over Ghana and West Africa, soliciting 
his treatment for madness, epilepsy, blindness, stroke, and other types of illnesses. Some 
patients come from as far as Niger, as in the recent case of a man with sores all over his 
legs; he had tried to treat them for ten years without success. Others  are victims of a 
witch planting a pot of pito in their bodies that eternally demands to be filled up. Only 
few healers like BagenabaSɔ are reputed to have the powers to remove such pots.   
 BagenabaSɔ tells us that he inherited the spirits from the ancestors. The spirits 
selected him from among his father’s many children to take over custody of the family 
gods. His knowledge of herbs is also a “god-given gift,” whose healing powers are 
interdependent with the unceasing abundance and generosity of the giving environment. 
The herbs can be obtained only from a distant forest and cannot be cultivated in the 
village: “The herbs are always available all the time in the forest…if you plant them here, 
they will not thrive, they will not grow but they are there all the time.”
117
 There are 
“some sicknesses that herbs do not accept” and the chief refers such patients to the local 
hospital. For instance, he sometimes sends a patient to the hospital to get a blood 
transfusion, after which the person comes back for the rest of the treatment. Unlike many 
herbalists in Ghana, whose expertise is dismissed by medical doctors, BagenabaSɔ has a 
good working relationship with the hospital. Orthodox drugs and herbalists’ drugs often 
heal in the same way, he explains, but when it comes to getting to know the depth of a 
sickness modern medications and the lab sometimes “cannot tell” because what they are 
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                Herbs                                 Vultures watching over treatments 
 The chief of medicine is a medium, a bridge between the sick and natural 
agencies: “The spirits are like wind or water and speak to me in my mind, directing me 
what to do. I give herbs but they carry out the treatment…they are natural forces, I don’t 
see them but yet I hear when they speak.”
118
 The spirits are air, wind, water, and only the 
chief can interpret what they are saying. It is nature who treats and all treatments take 
place at a “central healing shrine,” where the sick go first for consultation. The shrine 
consists of a slender tree wrapped in numerous bloodstained ropes and an earthen mound 
covered with the bones, shells, bangles, and the feathers of sacrificed animals. According 
to the chief, the spirits instructed him to build the shrine and the tree. Once the spirits 
have diagnosed a patient, BagenabaSɔ is usually instructed to kill a fowl or perform some 
kind of sacrifice. During the sacrifice he puts a tiny rope around the neck of the animal, 
which the slaughter stains with blood. The rope is removed and hung on the tree. The 
spirits then “pick the blood” and proceed with a treatment. The tree is the medical record 
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BagenabaSɔ‘s Central Shrine and Guardian Bird 
Unlike the tingane’s economies of gift giving, this is a treacherous economy of 
replacement and exchange: “the spirits take blood because, for example, when a witch 
gets someone they take the person’s blood—just that we human beings do not see it with 
our eyes but the spirits do—this is why the spirits too take blood of the animals in 
exchange to save the person’s soul.”
119
 In such precarious environments the violence of 
malevolent agencies remains ever-present and has to be repeatedly displaced by the 
conjoint efforts of nature and the chief to keep witches at bay. Vultures feed in and fly 
over the chief’s compound, guarding and watching over whatever treatments he may be 
carrying out. Another guardian bird, a white egret, remained perched on the top of the 
tree at the central shrine for more than two hours during our interview, attentively 
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Like the chief of medicine’s cross-species healing collective, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra natural beings and forces reciprocate the receptive and dialogical stance that 
Zarathustra adopts with respect to them. Early on, Zarathustra realizes that a successful 
self-overcoming requires aides and companions, not a herd of passive followers: “I need 
living companions who follow me because they want to follow themselves—wherever I 
want. It dawned on me: let Zarathustra speak not to the people, but instead to 
companions!”
120
 Companionship implies a diversity of perspectives and subject 
positions: it involves collaborators whose centers of agency are tangled with 
Zarathustra’s agency. It doesn’t take long before his two closest companions, the snake 
and the eagle, find him: 
Thus Zarathustra had spoken to his heart when the sun stood at noon, then he 
gazed at the sky with a questioning look, for above him he heard the sharp cry of 
a bird. And behold! An eagle cut broad circles through the air, and upon it hung a 
snake, not as prey but as a friend, for the snake curled itself around the eagle’s 
neck. “It is my animals!” said Zarathustra, and his heart was delighted. “The 
proudest animal under the sun and the wisest animal under the sun – they have 
gone forth to scout. They want to determine whether Zarathustra is still alive. 
Indeed, am I still alive? I found it more dangerous among human beings than 
among animals; Zarathustra walks dangerous paths. May my animals guide 




This is a strange image: the serpent coiled around the neck of the eagle. Conventionally, 
the snake and the eagle are represented as opponents and the eagle holds the serpent in 
his claws, depicting the conflict between spirit and matter.
122
 The eagle, an animal living 
in the air, approximates spirit because it is a winged being. The snake is associated with 
the heaviness of the earth: she has no legs and cannot fly, and she can only creep on her 
belly in the dirt. Zarathustra’s new companions reverse this age-old symbolism: “upon it 
hung a snake, not as prey but as a friend.” The snake is lifted up in the air, away from her 
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such a necktie: one squeeze of his neck or one bite can bring both of them down. Rather 
than being irreconcilable opposites, spirit and matter subsist in precarious inter-




Zarathustra adopts a posture of openness and willingness to acknowledge his new 
companions as fellow agents: “I found it more dangerous among human beings than 
among animals; Zarathustra walks dangerous paths. May my animals guide me!” His 
enterprise is dangerous: by letting the animals guide him he becomes “lifted out” of his 
human-centered element into a world of dangerous confrontation of forces. If we were to 
attempt to live in an entirely spiritual medium, the body would suffer; inasmuch the body 
suffers so does the mind. One needs a great deal of wisdom to make such a journey 
safely: “May I be wiser! May I be wise from the ground up like my snake!” One needs 
the wisdom of the snake, the chthonic wisdom of the earth, which cannot be mobilized 
when one is out of touch with the hormones and tissues of one’s body.
124
 The structure of 
many snakes is designed to allow them to expand beyond their ordinary limits, which 
would otherwise be set by the beings in their surroundings that they must swallow to 
survive. Self-overcoming requires the cultivation of a snake-like ability to expand beyond 
one’s bodily limits and to discern the extent to which one species’ interpretation is 
intertwined with others’. It also means that wisdom glides slowly, generating knowledge 
that is digested “at the gut level”: “Snakes move almost noiselessly; wisdom approaches 
in the same way.”
125
 
As a personification of the chthonic force of gravity, the snake highlights 
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forces in the universe.  Zarathustra abounds in different personifications of the figure of 
gravity: devil, dwarf, buffoon, ape, camel, etc. Gravity is conventionally portrayed as a 
negative and reactive force that holds us down; it is a grave and somber mood opposed to 
lightness. As such, it keeps us at the bearing stage of the camel and denotes the foreign 
and extra weight human beings impose on themselves as they turn life into a desert: “only 
the human being is a heavy burden to himself. This is because he lugs too much that is 
foreign to him. Like a camel he kneels down and allows himself to be well burdened.”
126
 




Yet gravity is also the force that keeps us bounded to the earth, without which we 
would be disembodied. It is the enabling condition of becoming: “Where I once again 
found my old devil and arch-enemy, the spirit of gravity, and everything he created: 
compulsion, statute, necessity and consequence and purpose and will and good and evil: 
For must there not exist something over which one dances, dances away?“
128
 Regardless 
of how far Zarathustra ascends and how many new tablets he creates, there will always be 
a ground force of “old gravity” that humans can never transcend. In a world of becoming 
one day even the new values will lose their creative elasticity and will be replaced by yet 
newer ones. Self-overcoming requires that one become one’s own center of gravity while 
remaining cognizant of the meaning of the earth at the level of old gravity: “Are you a 
new strength and a new right? A first movement? A wheel rolling out of itself?”
129
 In On 
the Three Metamorphoses, the third, final metamorphosis of becoming-child is described 
as such a “first movement” and “a wheel rolling out of itself.”
130
 Creating oneself anew 
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(“rolling out of itself”) that requires regular recycling and renewal of energy and the 
destruction of the old in the process of overcoming: “You must want to burn yourself up 
in your own flame: how could you become new if you did not first become ashes!”
131
 
Self-overcoming becomes one of the principles of the ecological becoming of the world. 
This agonistic intercourse between Zarathustra and various personifications of 
gravity involve a new form of interspecies dialogue. This is a form of knowledge that 
inheres in human-nonhuman relationships and practical activities. It is a form of 
knowledge that Zarathustra shares with the Gurensi chief of medicine, whose transactions 
with spirits and guardian birds also reveal agency and intentionality. Every event or 
sickness is understood as an action, or better, as an interaction between natural forces and 
bodies. This does not mean that Zarathustra and BagenabaSɔ first personify other entities 
and then socialize with them. Both personify forces and beings as they socialize with 
them.  
At the register of philosophical thinking, this practice of personification involves 
a corollary practice of materialization of abstract categories and ideas. Animism and 
perspectivism accord a physical, often animate, material aspect to what others in the West 
may consider abstract ideas. The chief of medicine removes a pot of pito planted in one’s 
body that eternally demands to be filled up, rather than treat alcoholism. Zarathustra talks 
of a serpent that coils around the eagle’s neck, rather than of gravitation as a universal 
force of attraction between all physical matter.
132
  
Giving living dimensions to abstract ideas becomes necessary when to know 
means to personify and to relate rather than to objectify. According to Nurit Bird-David, 
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organize much of contemporary Euro-American environmentalism. The world becomes 
known as lived, from a related point of view, within the shifting horizons of related 
interpreters: 
If “cutting trees into parts” epitomizes the modernist epistemology, “talking with 
trees,” I argue, epitomizes…animistic epistemology. “Talking” is short-hand for a 
two-way responsive relatedness with a tree—rather than ‘‘speaking’’ one-way to 
it, as if it could listen and understand. “Talking with” stands for attentiveness to 
variances and invariances in behavior and response of things in states of 
relatedness and for getting to know such things as they change through the 
vicissitudes over time of the engagement with them. To “talk with a tree”—rather 
than “cut it down”—is to perceive what it does as one acts towards it, being aware 
concurrently of changes in oneself and the tree. It is expecting response and 





“Talking with” is attentiveness. “Knowledge” means the cultivation of skills of sharing 
the world with other beings and forces. It grows from and is maintaining relatedness with 
human and nonhuman others.
134
 An example would be the two-way responsive 
relatedness of elders and baobab trees: “the tree is saying that you have to perform 
sacrifices to it. ‘Give me a goat or a cow, give me a shirt or a smock.’ So you have to!”  
Is this, then, metaphorical?  Yes. But the metaphor of conversation moves us 
closer to a world of differential modes of experience than do the metaphors of blind 
causality. Nietzsche states that we indispensably find ourselves drawing upon “bold” 
metaphors: “To begin with a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. 
The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a 
complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different 
one.”
135
 Interpretation across distances always has a metaphorical dimension to it. Which 
metaphors? That is the question. Not whether. In contrast to Gurensi elders, Zarathustra 
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communicative. In “On the Adder’s Bite” Zarathustra falls asleep beneath a fig tree. An 
adder comes along and bites him in the neck. Once the serpent recognizes Zarathustra, 
she tries to flee:  
“Not so fast,” spoke Zarathustra. “You have not yet accepted my thanks! You 
waked me in time, my way is still long.” “Your way is still short,” said the adder 
sadly: “My poison kills.” Zarathustra smiled. “Since when did a dragon ever die 
of snake poison?” he said. “But take back your poison! You are not rich enough to 





At first the adder goes straight for Zarathustra’s throat, the organ of speech, reminding 
him that his teachings have devolved into monologues, rather than cross-species 
dialogues. Once Zarathustra shifts his attentiveness from his own state of suffering to the 
snake’s perspective and shows agonistic respect for her related point of view, a sense of 
mutual relatedness becomes restored.   
Together Zarathustra and the elders accentuate ‘‘we-ness’’ through a pathos of 
distance. It accommodates and negotiates differences, rather than “otherness,” which 
eclipses affinities across differences.
137
 They make it possible to imagine alliances across 
species that de-emphasize the importance of abstract and stereotypical species 
frameworks and open doors to new kinds of inter-species communicative experiences and 
ethics. This new dialogical ethics can be conceived as both intergenerational and 
interspecies, spanning several generations of custodians of the family gods, of yaaba-tiisi 
and sacred groves, and of disciples, companions, and overmen. Knowledge of the world 
is not rewritten merely as a human’s self-knowledge or generation of sensorial wealth. 
Rather, knowledge is distributed among all those who interact with humans, be it trees, 
groves, snakes, eagles, air, wind, or water. Knowledge is best understood not as a set of 
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generation but as heightened perceptual sensitivity that reveals the earth as life-
generating ancestors.
138
 The source of knowledge is not in the heads of the ancestors or in 
Zarathustra’s mind but in the giving environment they guide us through. Perhaps the 







This chapter has staged a series of encounters between a minor tradition of Euro-
American political theory and ethnography in Ghana in order to explore new forms of 
experiential exchange and interspecies ethics. Such ethics, I have argued, are not merely 
relevant for African villages. The dialogue between Nietzsche’s pan-perspectivism and 
African animism prompts us to reflect on the evolving ways in which people have 
understood and related to the earth and “natural resources” and on the ways in which the 
earth and “resources” have responded and continue to respond in the age of climate 
change. If animism and perspectivism are not only sets of beliefs but also modes of 
perception immanent to relations with earthen beings and forces, are they something that 
we do? If so, does that mean we can’t understand it unless we do it? My intuition is that 
the virtual encounter between Zarathustra and the earth priest renders more perceptible 
what we have been doing all along. The encounter troubles the anthropocentric 
presumption that humans always have to speak on behalf of nonhumans, or that the latter 
always need the former to empower them to speak. For Nietzsche and the earth priest, 
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more an issue of becoming attuned to an ongoing exchange of interpretations and 
perspectives. Nature is already speaking. Are we listening and responding appropriately? 
Together perspectivism and animism provide a cross-cultural blueprint for responding to 
ecological problems: What if we understood hurricanes as votes on corporate-driven 
energy policies? Or as the ancestors’ enunciations of radical calls to political action and 
ethical reform? Do droughts constitute the earth’s verdicts on degrading practices of 
modernization and development?    
I have sought to prioritize the everyday situations, critical events, and face-to-face 
interactions between people and the environment that form the texture of lived 
experience, and thus to pursue political thinking from the earth up. While it is certainly 
edifying for environmental political theory to enter into conversations with the Greeks or 
Nietzsche, the global ecological crisis makes it critical to learn more about the ecological 
practices of those who seem most distant and “alien” to us in the world in which we 
presently live. By sojourning among them it becomes possible to explore the value not 
merely of abstract knowledge of the other but of communication with the other, be it the 
African earth priest or the baobab tree that responds to his pleas.
140
 Here the ethnographic 
method can be understood not only as a set of interdisciplinary research techniques that 
we have to acquire but also as a “commonplace body of social skills we already possess” 
(such as the protocols of reciprocity that govern relationships with others).
141
 
Ethnography as a technique of thinking enables us to take part in a web of ongoing 
interactions between humans and nonhumans by using one’s body as others do. It is a 




                                                                                               
125 
anthropocentric habits of perception. It allows us to adopt a view from in-between, 
reducible neither to one’s own perspective nor to those of others.
142
 
Whereas ethnography enlists bodily immersion to sensitize us to the various 
interdependencies between humans and the earth, Nietzsche relies on a style of cinematic 
writing to produce textual effects that advance such earth-bound sensibilities. Nietzsche 
shifts back and forth between grammars of things/beings and forces/processes, between 
intellectual processes and bodily processes. Through the use of metaphors, parables, and 
stories Zarathustra gives corporeal fullness back to the philosophical process and 
unravels depths of human-environment intercourse that have been previously hidden 
from us. Like ethnography, cinematic writing stages encounters that disrupt familiar 
versions of worlds. Together they forge negotiations between Western and African 
thought that open new doors to experimenting with augmenting the socio-cultural register 
of human perception. They heighten our awareness of being enmeshed in a web of 
interdependencies and conversations between humans, plants, animals, minerals, and a 
reciprocating earth.  
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Chapter 4 




Landscapes must be painted with the eyes and not with the prejudices that are in 
our heads.  
                                               PABLO PICASSO, Landscape 
 
Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations.  
                                               DELEUZE AND GUATTARI, What is Philosophy? 
 
Take a lump of sugar: It has a spatial configuration. But if we approach it from that angle, 
all we will ever grasp are differences in degree between that sugar and any other thing. 
But it also has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in time that is at least 
partially revealed in the process of its dissolving, and that shows how this sugar differs in 
kind not only from other things, but first and foremost from itself. In this respect, 
Bergson’s famous formulation, “I must wait until the sugar dissolves” has a still broader 
meaning than is given to it by its context. It signifies that my own duration, such as I live 
it in the impatience of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to 
other rhythms that differ in kind from mine. Duration is always the location and the 
environment of differences in kind; it is even their totality and multiplicity.  





In chapter 3 I experimented with a conversation between Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
and the Gurensi earth priest, two profoundly ecological thinkers who show us that to 
think ecologically means to allow thinking to unfold within the concrete materiality and 
affectivity of the earth. The conversation between perspectivism and animism encourages 
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the rich texture of interspecies interactions and communication concealed by 
anthropocentric habits of human perception. The earth and all existence—human as well 
as plant, mineral, and animal—were revealed as interdependent processes and dynamic 
constellations of “becoming” propelled by continuous exchanges of gifts and 
perspectives. The chapter raised a question of technique or method: how to connect more 
sensitively with nonhuman bodies and forces? How to register more effectively the 
expressivity and responsiveness of the earth? Through what techniques can human 
experiences of natural forces be modulated, intensified, or “wasted?” How does the body 
function in the process? 
This chapter addresses these questions by staging encounters between political 
theory and earthworks, ranging from Smithson’s Spiral Jetty in Utah’s Great Salt Lake to 
the earthen houses of the Gurensi people of Ghana.
1
 It examines the potential of art to 
offer techniques that can help us to think more ecologically. The goal is to advance a set 
of micropolitical tactics that extend the limits of human subjectivities into natural 
processes, bodies, and forces. I blend textual analysis and ethnography to explore 
artistically crafted texts by Deleuze and Guattari in relation to works in the visual arts, 
sculpture, and earthen architecture, which are also designed to tap into the perceptive 
dimension of ethico-political life. Through earthworks, the earth can be perceived as a 
co-creator of art and social life rather than a “resource” or a passive material for human 
action. Such arts of existence, in turn, might sensitize our bodies to these creative powers 
and reveal our own constitution as vital materiality and earth. 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, the chapter argues that art produces new sets of 
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time, which is inhabited by multiple nonhuman worlds, sensations, and durations.
2
 
Humanity is constantly transformed through the machines it creates, and the human body 
becomes a different machine every time it encounters the work of art.
3
 As perceivers of 
art we partake in the unlivable forces of the cosmos and become earth bodies by virtue of 
the new affects and temporal relations that form. Art enframes chaos in order to 
constitute new planes and extract new affects, which then gain autonomy from its 
creators and take on a life of their own; ecophilosophy responds to these sensory 
becomings by opening up new spaces for thinking and for creating concepts.  
Perhaps this passage to the nonhuman can be best conceived in terms of the ways 
in which philosophy, art, and science work together to activate the potential of thinking to 
transform itself. According to Deleuze and Guattari, thinking is an activity of life, which 
commences only once thought confronts something other than itself. Here life may be 
best understood as a power to differ and create that cannot be reduced to what has been 
actually produced; it is also a play of intensive processes and differential relations 
between forces that form various beings, assemblages, and planes of perceptions and 
images. None of these relations is entirely determined in advance, and what is actualized 
refers only to a specific expression of that power’s potential.
4
 Life is a flow of differences 
and becoming that includes the inorganic world and ceaselessly proliferates new lines of 
flight and ever more complex forms. As part of the flux of life thinking becomes one 
mode of maximization of the virtual within life, which harbors the potential to grasp 
prehuman forces and the differences that precede it and produce it. Whereas science 
seeks to isolate the properties and functions of actual bodies and states of affairs, 
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become. To enter into philosophy, then, means to participate in the invention of a 
vocabulary-sensorium that maps a virtual realm of relations that a body is capable of. 
Ecophilosophy, in turn, may be conceived as a set of practices of thinking and sensing by 
way of concepts that “open lines of flight from an actual order of human bodies” and 
their habitual modes of perception. Ecophilosophy is an aggregate of concepts that maps 
the virtual possibilities of another system of “forces, energies, and flows that congeal into 
the more tangible materiality of animals, vegetables, minerals, wind, gravity, tides, 
sunlight.”
5
   
One key task of ecophilosophy today is to confront anthropocentrism or all-too-
human-centered ethical thinking, which lies at the root of current practices of ecological 
destruction. The wager of this chapter is that confronting anthropocentrism requires 
certain emendations of the dominant images of environmental ethics and politics.  On the 
one hand, environmental ethics should not be limited merely to obligations, duties, and 
concerns among humans and what they have at stake. While rich in insights, such images 
of ethics involve transcendental regulations that tend to inhibit thinking’s creativity as 
they invoke disembodied models of thinking and ethics that are difficult to sustain in the 
light of contemporary scientific insights. On the other hand, we also need a correlative 
notion of politics that is not limited to the inquiry of political institutions, policies, and 
the explicit pronouncements, actions, and deliberations of human participants and bodies 
(i.e., macropolitics). Such a notion of politics takes into account “the body as a site of 
biocultural dispositions and relay point for political mobilization.”
6
 It is essential to 
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attends to the myriad processes that shape our political sensibilities, dispositions, and 
identities.  
Thus, I seek to advance an eco-ethical strategy that involves micropolitical work 
on the self: a kind of experiential self-artistry that helps recraft the anthropocentric 
feelings and attitudes that have become entrenched in the self. I examine the potential of 
selected artworks to offer techniques that can help us think-sense ecologically. Here, by 
“thinking ecologically” I mean: cultivating a sensibility to discern the profound 
interconnectedness of earth’s living and non-living creatures and becoming more 
sensitized to how human bodies are entangled with and activated by an assemblage of 
other bodies and forces; perceiving the coexistence of multiple durations and styles of 
temporality; acknowledging the presence of multiple degrees of agency and creativity, 
distributed along a continuum of human, earth, and other nonhuman forces; and nurturing 
an ability to learn to live in a world of becoming and transformation.
7
 To think 
ecologically is not just to think through certain abstracted and mythic fictions but also to 
perceive and relate to other bodies more horizontally and sympathetically. I seek to show 
how each bodily encounter with the artworks identified in this chapter helps render 
thinking political in this new practical and ecological sense.   
Art can work against the tendencies of the brain to create habitual connections 
and to synthesize experiences into the human point of view; it takes these tendencies as 
its object and has the power to disrupt and rework operational images of the human as a 
habitual mode of perception and being. Confronted with the insufficiency of narratives 
and logical argument, art taps into an affective dimension of political life that cannot 
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upon us and our powers to articulate more than it is a mode of articulation. Art offers an 
indirect mode of political efficacy that has the capacity to produce potent political effects. 
The experience of modern art, in particular, is directly accessible to larger audiences due 
to its limited dependency on conceptual pre-knowledge. Art also reveals something about 
the constitution of time that may otherwise remain imperceptible during the busyness of 
everyday life; it highlights our inability to know for sure everything we can do or 
become. In other words, art functions as a mode of bodily intensification whose power 
lies not first and foremost in the meanings it solicits but in the sensations it elicits and 
intensifies. Encounters with the paintings of Bacon, the installations of Smithson and 
Serra, and African earthen architecture can be seen as a set of practices of eco-sensation 
that enable our bodies—always acting conjointly with other bodies—to transform 
themselves and to evolve through altered perception toward new ecological directions. 
The aesthetic experience of each of these works is itself less human-centered; it triggers 
sensory intensifications and side perceptions that subvert the anthropocentric regime of 
stabilized images with recomposed relations produced by the artworks themselves. Such 
moments of discontinuity and disruption of the order of perception are profoundly 
political. They modify the human-bound “partition of the sensible” and open up spaces 
for participation of the nonhuman in the activities of representation by rendering 
perceptible what had been previously imperceptible.
8
 The aesthetic experience of the 
work of art becomes a political act that enables the nonhuman to advene upon us and to 
invite further reflection on and attention to the need to recraft and enrich the internal 
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Part I articulates this notion of art as a mode of bodily intensification. I turn to 
Elizabeth Grosz, who encourages us to consider art’s profound animal lineage and its 
rootedness in the storage of earthly excess. These animal roots ensure that the possibility 
of art production and opening up to nonhuman sensations and forces is not confined to 
the human alone. Art is charged with the creation of new worlds to come and new bodies 
of people, animals, plants, and things to experience them.  
In Part II, I provide concrete examples. I examine works by Francis Bacon, 
Robert Smithson, and Richard Serra in order to experiment with new philosophical 
concepts that express the life of nonhuman time and sensation. First, I explore the ways 
in which Bacon’s paintings function as machines that produce eco-sensations and 
experiences. Rather than reproducing or inventing forms, his paintings break with 
figurative references and narratives and produce sensations that more or less directly 
impact the nervous system. They capture and make visible something of the action of 
invisible forces (time, nonorganic life, speed, flight, rhythm, isolation, deformation, and 
dissipation) on the body: not exactly by making the invisible visible, but by rendering its 
effects more vivid. Bacon’s practice of sensation takes us close to the “body without 
organs” (BwO) that lies behind and within the organism, the intensities and forces that 
drive the becoming-otherwise of the body. His canvases constitute zones of 
indiscernibility between man and animal, organic and nonorganic life.  They draw us 
toward nonhuman becomings: becoming-animal, becoming-another, becoming-flesh. 
Next, I show how Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty not only captures the effects of some of 
the forces rendered sensible by Bacon but also allows us to cultivate presumptive 
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mobilization of multiple intersecting tiers of duration (some of which are human, and 
others not) heightens sensitivity to cycles of ecological degradation and regeneration of 
ecosystems’ life. Third, as a corollary to Smithson’s discussion, I explore how the works 
of Richard Serra register or translate into terms that humans can perceive the affectivity 
of nonhumans. Serra draws attention to the capacity of mundane man-made entities to 
exceed their status as objects, to produce various effects in human and other bodies, and 
to possess a form of agency that is marked by its own histories and trajectories. 
Collectively, the thing-power of Serra’s and Smithson’s installations enables us to amend 
and stretch received notions of human agency. The act of human creativity thus becomes 
just one of many modes of the distributive agency of human-nonhuman assemblages.
9
 
However, works such as Bacon’s Painting, Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, and Serra’s 
Snake tend to be detached from everyday life in the sense that they are associated with a 
notion of “art” as an autonomous sphere of socio-cultural life that requires a special visit 
to a museum, gallery, or installation site. This is why in the last section I turn to African 
earthen architecture, which intertwines earthly processes with the everyday lifecycles of 
people and household economies. The central question of the section, then, is how 
abstract categories of political theory speak to artistic practices that cannot be readily 
identified as “art” and as such remain invisible within theory’s dominant Euro-American 
orientation. Does this orientation obscure existing practices of eco-sensation and 
important resources for contemporary environmentalism?  I complement textual analysis 
with ethnographic methods in order to render visible within the orbit of political theory a 
long tradition of earthen architecture in Africa. African practices of earth-building, repair, 
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life. These practices might provide insights into the contemporary debate about 
sustainability and its central question of what is to be sustained. By placing into 
conversation the notion of art as intensification of bodily sensation advanced by Deleuze 
and Guattari with the everyday arts of the Gurensi people of Ghana, the section aims to 
resist the tendency of political theory to defer too readily to philosophers. My immersion 
in the everyday life of Gurensi houses as living bodies and earthen “crystals of time” 
could also enrich analyses of interdependencies between human subjectivity and earthly 
forces. The act of sharing such ethnographic observations becomes a political act. It 
highlights the potential of everyday arts to modify human-centered habits of perception, 
producing opportunities to alter earth-destroying tendencies of consumption.  
In the conclusion, I tease out some ecophilosophical and political implications of 
an enhanced perception of multiple force-fields, degrees of agency, and tiers of 
nonhuman time. I emphasize the need to move back and forth between such practices, 
which are informed by a philosophy of immanent naturalism, and creative 
experimentation with familiar images of ecophilosophical thought such as those inspired 
by Kantian philosophy. I enlist the aid of Estonian biologist Uexküll whose concept of 
“Umwelten” elucidates how the world appears to each organism according to its own 
perceptions. From the viewpoint of these “subjective universes,” Uexküll may teach us 
how to intuit the degree to which we belong to others’ durations and how to learn to 
dwell respectfully in them. The cultivation of such receptivity reinforces the art practice 
of eco-sensation and ensures that during our next visit to the museum or an adobe 





                                                                                               
141 
ART IS OF THE ANIMAL: SEX, EXCESS, AND ARTISTIC BODIES 
 
Art is of the animal. According to Elizabeth Grosz, art is a consequence of the 
excess and the experiments in intensification that have characterized sexual selection on 
earth. Art is an affective assemblage that exceeds representation, transforms bodily 
organs, and creates new rhythms via a sensory overload of images, song, dance, and 
color. Art is not a window into the natural and social worlds. Rather than being a 
celebrated instance of the evolution of human ingenuity, art is grounded in the 
superfluousness of nature and its power to render the sensory abundant:
10
 
Every morning the Scenopoetes dentirostris, a bird of the Australian rain forests, 
cuts leaves, makes them fall to the ground, and turns them over so that the paler, 
internal side contrasts with the earth. In this way it constructs a stage for itself like 
a ready-made; and directly above, on a creeper or a branch, while fluffing out the 
feathers beneath its beak to reveal their yellow roots, it sings a complex song 
made up from its own notes and, at intervals, those of other birds it imitates: it is a 
complete artist. This is not synesthesia in the flesh but blocs of sensations in the 




The bird’s courtship and dance take evolutionary developments beyond mere survival 
into creative expression. Such excessive detours of sexual selection render visible a 
common imperative shared by art and nature: useless production for the sake of 
production itself, for the sake of profusion and differentiation.
12
 Grosz bases her 
reflections on Darwin’s distinction between natural and sexual selection. She argues that 
art and music emerged primarily through sexual selection and that if they have survived it 
is precisely because they serve the purposes of intensification and pleasure: “Art is 
connected to sexual energies and impulses, to a common impulse for more.”
13
 Grosz’s 
hedonistic conception of art allows us to abandon the anthropocentric bias of the human 
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theatrical struggle of the ruffed grouse, and the spectacular coloring of deep ocean fish 
are three examples of the body as a spectacle (“a performance of the body at its most 
splendid and appealing”) and the ubiquitous production of art in nature.
14
 Art comes from 
the excess of the body’s productive capacities; art is that which is exceeds need and 
cannot be directly defined through the useful. Even though at times Grosz implies that 
animals are artistic (musical) but do not produce art (music), I prefer to read her as saying 
that many bodies have the capacity to perform art and possess the impulse to intensify 
experience. For instance, new human rituals and practices may emerge from such 
willingness to grant birds the capacity to produce music. Rather than going to hear a 
symphony or see an opera, next time the lover of music may venture into the Redwood 
National Forest to attend a performance by the Golden-crowned Kinglet or the Stellar’s 
Jay. 
How does art link the unlivable forces of the cosmos to the forces of “artistic” 
bodies through which sexual selection operates? How does the artwork form a plane of 
composition so that the material can become expressive and pass into sensation? 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, art and nature form their own circuits of 
indiscernibility (“we no longer know what is art and what nature”) where life transforms 
itself and through which all becomings pass.
15
 All art isolates percepts and affects, 
wrested from the perceptions and affections through which our bodies are organized. The 
two aspects of sensation, affects and percepts, constitute two nonhuman forces that the 
human must tap to summon up the unlivable forces of the cosmos in the aid of self-
transformation. Matter must be lived not as it already is for us but in its capacity to 
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is most attenuated without being nullified: perhaps we can understand matter in art as 
matter at its most dilated…and where becoming is most directly in force.”
16
 Only then do 
we sense how it also exceeds our capacities. Matter becomes expressive once it is 
liberated from its extension through our regularized experience and has released its 
virtual potential. Each artist works with a given material made up of energetic traits and 
singularities and recomposes its incongruent elements in such ways that the work of art 
can capture these singularities. Art enables us to perceive the world as the effect of the 
forces of the earth and the forces of vibrant materiality that we cannot live; it offers us the 
possibility of touching and glimpsing into that which is there to be felt and perceived.
17
 
Affects cross the threshold between the human and nonhuman, forming virtual conditions 
of possibility for the former to transcend itself: 
Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts – 
including the town – are nonhuman landscapes of nature. Not a “minute of the 
world passes,” says Cezanne, that we will preserve if we do not “become that 
minute.” We are not in the world, we become with the world; we become by 
contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We become universes. 




Affects are man’s becoming-another, becoming-nonhuman. Affects are passages from the 
sensibility of being to modalities of sensation. Man turns himself into an artwork and by 
means of this self-transformation becomes a compound being of sensations, which are 
not merely to be read or interpreted but intensified into different sensations.
19
 For 
Deleuze and Guattari, sensation is a form of excitation that preserves and contracts the 
vibrations that compose it so that these materials can become expressive and generate 
cerebral movements and corporeal effects.
20
 This is how art transforms past possibilities 
and materials into new qualities and resources for the future. Sensation, as a monument of 
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potential of the body to become otherwise.  It is an “incorporeal threshold of emergence, 
an unpredictable and uncontainable overspilling of forces that exist hitherto only beyond 
and before the plane of composition, on its other side, that of chaos.”
21
 It attunes the body 
to the resonance of the universe as these contracted vibratory waves heighten the 









For many art lovers, Francis Bacon’s complex experiments with pictorial space 
are indisputably brilliant. His brilliance lies in the strange engagements his paintings 
demand of us, so that, as he declared, the “paint comes across directly onto the nervous 
system.”
23
 Yet, this engagement can be too spine chilling and uncanny to embrace fully, 
for his works are filled with contorted bodies, crucifixions, screams of horror, monsters, 
coupled beastly figures, and running flesh. Positive sympathies with nature are unlikely 
to emerge from the encounter between the body and his canvases, saturated as they are 
with the violence of such spectacles. But there is still something about the way he “paints 
sensations” that may activate circuits of geoaffects that draw us into nonhuman 
becomings. What if his paintings function as “bodies without organs” that enable us too 
to partake more poignantly in the vitality of our own germinality? Is it possible that these 
paintings harness a plurality of invisible forces and zones of indetermination between 
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My goal is to extract a set of ecophilosophical concepts from the sensible 
aggregates produced by Bacon’s paintings, to present Bacon as a colorist of becomings 
who captures on canvas the affective encounters of bodies with nonhuman forces that are 
not immediately perceptible to us. According to Deleuze, all art has a rhythmic variation. 
The coexistent systolic and diastolic movements of rhythm that traverse Bacon’s 
paintings are composed through the interaction of three pictorial elements that, in 
Deleuze’s view, are key to the reception of his works: the Figure, the contour, and the 
color field (as a material structure). The Figure refers to a recumbent, coupled over, or 
seated human body that is frequently isolated inside a contour by being placed on a bed, 
on a chair, or in a ring, a circle, a cube, or a parallelepiped. The body is thus subjected to 
a plurality of forces that deform and contort it: the lust of copulation; the drowsy advance 
of sleep; the urge to vomit, defecate, cry, or scream; the violence of a hiccup.
24
 It is here 
that the contour changes as “it turns into the half-sphere of the washbasin or umbrella, the 
thickness of the mirror, acting as a deformer; the Figure is contracted or dilated in order 
to pass through a hole or into the mirror.” The contour acts like a membrane, a threshold 
that assures the double exchange and communication between the Figure and the color 
field (material structure): “The Figure is not simply the isolated body, but also the 
deformed body that escapes from itself…the body must return to the material structure 
and dissipate into it, thereby passing through or into these prostheses-instruments, which 
constitute passages and states that are real, physical, and effective, and which are 
sensations and not imaginings.”
25
 Each of Bacon’s Figures sustains a precise sensation as 
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Every Figure is already a “coagulated sensation” and implicates within itself an intensive 
composition of differential relations.
26
   
According to Deleuze, the most elementary form of sensation created by Bacon’s 
paintings is vibration, which is formed by the fundamental rhythms of systolic 
compression of the color field and diastolic deformation of the Figure. Even this most 
elementary form is composite: its vibration is attained through a complex 
experimentation with color. Color “is discovered as the differential relation upon which 
everything else depends,” an “invisible pulsation that is more nervous than cerebral”; 
vibration refers to pure, i.e., non-subjective, relations between colors.
27
 Hence flows of 
polychromatic colors commonly dominated by blue and red, the colors of meat, tend to 
compose the flesh of Bacon’s Figures and provide him with the simplest formula of 
“coloring sensation.” (Figure at a Washbasin 1976) Yet, rather than simply isolated and 
deformed figures, Bacon often paints coupled or entangled bodies that are sleeping, 
copulating, or interacting as they enter into complex patterns of resonance. Resonance is 
the form of sensation that puts together multiple sensations and vibrations to produce a 
new Figure or composite body. The pictorial encounter of Bacon’s bodies leads to the 
formation of a dissonant duet, a new ontological unit, that exceeds its constitutive 
elements and affirms the force of time as becoming (center panel of Triptych 1970). With 
the triptych, the vibrations and patterns of resonance are drawn into a forced movement 
towards distention and disengagement from the specific figures and bodies. Rhythm 
acquires an autonomous being and “becomes Figure, according to its own separated 
directions, the active, the passive, and the attendant.”
28
 As the figures are set apart by the 
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becomes the Figure itself. This rhythmic Figure is composed through the interplay of the 
active local rhythms of ascent and amplification, passive rhythms of descent and 
elimination, and “attendant” rhythms that remain constant as the measure of the 
variations of intensity of the other two.
29
 Thus the order of sensation of the triptych 
consists in the distribution of these three fundamental rhythms. Its panels are brought into 
relation by the separating and unifying forces of naked light and uniform color that form 
a luminous plane within which “the Figures look like trapeze artists whose milieu is no 




The three modalities of sensation coexist in Bacon’s paintings, which function as 
machines that produce effects of vibration, resonance, and forced movement. These 
effects are always mixed and in variation: the vibrations of the diastole-systole that 
capture “forces of isolation, deformation and dissipation” enter into complex interactions 
with the forces of coupling, harnessed by the resonant configuration of bodies, that 
integrate these forces of isolation, deformation, and dissipation. Both flows enter into 
new compositions with the forced movement of the triptych that operates with forces of 
separation and division, which, in turn, integrate coupling as a phenomenon.
31
 These 
invisible forces of systole and diastole, color and light, bring to life the “beings of 
sensation” that inhabit Bacon’s paintings. They render sensible another force, the force of 
time: “There is the force of changing time, through the allotropic variation of 
bodies…which involves deformation; and then there is the force of eternal time, the 
eternity of time, through the uniting-separating that reigns in the triptychs, a pure light.”
32
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intersecting durational rhythms of eternal time and time as becoming with the intensive 
forces that traverse and compose bodies and affect their interactions with other bodies.  
The logic of sensation that Deleuze finds in Bacon is not that of the lived body but 
of the “body without organs.” The “lived body” is too assimilated to its intersubjective 
context to suffice for Deleuze or Bacon. The viewer is implicated in this logic qua the 
“body without organs.” Bacon’s canvas becomes a destructured multiplicity of bodies, 
forces, and intensities revealing an affective dimension of becoming, in which the 
organizing distinctions between man and animal, body and world, are troubled and only 
vectors of matter-energy and circuits of geo-affect are sensed.
33
 Bacon’s portraits abound 
in spasmodic deformations and bestial transformations of the human body. The 
recognizable traits of the human face frequently assume indeterminate shapes and mutant 
lines of flight. Animal traits now emerge from human forms: sometimes the face is 
swallowed by a bestial mouth open as wide as possible in a scream (Study After 
Vélazquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X or Head VI); sometimes the human head is 
replaced by a quivering bird of prey whose wingspan spirals down the scrubbed area 
(Triptych 1976); sometimes a man’s shadow gains a bat-shaped existence (Triptych May-
June 1973). Many of these themes of animalization of the Figure are brought together in 
Painting (1946), which presents a seated man in a dark formal suit under a half-spherical 
umbrella in a butcher shop. The cow carcasses suspended in a cruciform behind him 
bring to light the reality of meat as crucified victim: “Of course, we are meat, we are 
potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher shop I always think it’s surprising that I wasn’t 
there instead of the animal.”
34
 All that can be seen of the man’s head is its lower jaw, 
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grimace of the facial fragment threatens to swallow it at the same time as the Figure uses 
the diastolic pull of the umbrella as a nozzle through which the rest of the body wants to 
pass. The body becomes animal, flesh or meat. Here meat acquires the colors of live 
flesh: 
Bacon thus pursues a very peculiar project as a portrait painter: to dismantle the 
face to rediscover the head or make it emerge from beneath the face. The 
deformations which the body undergoes are also the animal traits of the head. 
This has nothing to do with a correspondence between animal forms and facial 
forms…In place of formal correspondences, what Bacon’s painting constitutes is 
a zone of indiscernibility or undecidability between man and animal. Man 
becomes animal…It is never a combination of forms, but rather the common fact: 
the common fact of man and animal. Bacon pushes his to the point where even his 
most isolated Figure is already a coupled Figure; man is coupled with his animal 
in a latent bullfight. This objective zone of indiscernibility is the entire body, but 
the body insofar as it is flesh or meat. Of course, the body has bones as well, but 
bones are only its spatial structure. A distinction is often made between flesh and 
bone, and even between things related to them. The body is revealed only when it 
ceases to be supported by the bones, when the flesh ceases to cover the bones, 
when the two exist for each other, but each on its own terms: the bone as the 
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In Painting (1946) what achieves this pictorial tension between flesh and bone is meat, 
the common fact of man and animal that assumes the incipient traits of the head. “Every 
man who suffers is a piece of meat…a beast, the beast that suffers is a man;” animals 
become part of humanity at the same time as humanity becomes cattle headed for the 
slaughterhouse.
36
 This mutually transformative process of disorganization of the animal 
and “butcherization” of the human calls into question the sharpness of the divide that 
privileges the human over the nonhuman by inducing a passage of sensation between 
species boundaries. Through Bacon’s intensification of the relation between the Figure 
and color the agony and slaughter of a cow is retained as a zone of exchange between 
man and animal, in which an element of each passes into the other.  
Bacon’s ability to induce becoming-animal in the bodies of his viewers depends 
upon his pictorial experimentation with bodies on canvas. In the process of becoming, 
Bacon’s bodies are defined by fleshy movements and speeds; by the active, passive, and 
attendant rhythms traversing the canvas; by the capacities of colors and forms to affect 
the conventional form of a cow or a human, to be affected by forces of systole and 
diastole, and to enter new figural compositions. Bacon’s Figures have multiple levels, 
thresholds, and modes of affectivity. One hardly knows what composes the Figures or 
their capacities. Faces turn bestial. Cheeks become chops; torsos, knots of flesh and 
nerve. According to Deleuze, the Figure of flesh is an intensive body of sensation, a body 
without organs, which “is opposed less to organs that to the organization of organs we 
call an organism.”
37
 Whereas the organism refers to a specific organization of 
determinate organs, the body without organs, as a limit notion, is defined by the 
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provisional organs of sensation are formed when a wave of the non-anthropocentric 
element of desire meets the forces acting on the body: “When the wave encounters 
external forces at a particular level, a sensation appears. An organ will be determined by 
this encounter, but it is a provisional organ that endures only as long as the passage of the 
wave and the action of the force, and which will be displaced in order to be posited 
elsewhere.”
38
 Every sensation involves a difference of level and what is a mouth at one 
level becomes an anus at another level, or at the same level upon the encounter with 
different set of forces. Bacon’s toothy grimace or scream that swallows the face, the bird 
of prey that replaces the head or nose that turns into pig’s snout (Self-Portrait 1973) all 
constitute provisional organs and loci of sensation on the body without organs.
39
 So the 
body without organs is “finally defined by the temporary and provisional presence of 
determinate organs” with indeterminate functions.
40
  
The aesthetic experience of this indeterminacy of relations between sensory 
organs and the act of perception solicits a suggestive awareness of both the migratory 
flows of sensory feeling and the work of the brain below the level of intellectual 
awareness to a certain coherence of the body image under new conditions of migration. 
The compositional dimension of brain/body activities is modified through the 
infraconscious perception of a body that does not look or function exactly like a familiar 
human body, a perception that may draw us into the quest to become something more 
than we usually are.
41
 Thus ecophilosophy gains from engaging the potentia of Bacon’s 
paintings as they loosen the power of anthropocentrism over the body and dissolve 
“anthropos” into the intensive, material forces that structure it. Each time we encounter 
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through us. Such conjunctions can produce more empathetic sociabilities. What seems to 
be at stake for Bacon as a painter of becoming is less a matter of the body trying to 
remain fluid than of forging multiple intersections between the human as conventionally 
composed and that which both exceeds it and occupies it. Is it possible to think of 
Bacon’s body of work as an ecosystem, a new collective and heterogeneous body that has 
built-in mechanisms to transcend absorption into an all-too-anthropocentric order of 
representation? 
Of course, one could object to the proposed reading of Bacon on several grounds: 
Is there no travelling through a cultural meaning-frame involved when one sees a Bacon 
canvas? How does one ensure that encounters with Bacon’s work produce their greatest 
pro-ecological effects? Why would Bacon’s work produce empathy and not revulsion? 
Don’t we need a settled subject from which to absorb these experiences? All of these 
objections have validity, and in the conclusion of the chapter I emphasize the need to 
complement the arts of eco-sensation with other macropolitical experiments and arts of 
the self that will nurture ecological dispositions. Such complementary practices may 
make all the difference when it comes to which of these sensibilities prevail.  However, 
what is of immediate concern here is that Bacon’s key aim—to direct the conveyance of 
sensation—is linked to a new understanding of art as a form of territorialization that 
produces conditions of possibility for new deterritorializations. Sensation as the action of 
forces upon the body needs to find contained expression within a canvas-territory to have 
its greatest impact. The figural (i.e., the becoming of Bacon’s Figures) constitutes one 
such territory, produced by a modulation of color that does violence to the figurative and 
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“scrambled their proto-formations using a chance-based technique, like randomly 
smearing or splattering the paint.”
42
 Deleuze calls this coloring technique the diagram: 
“The diagram is thus the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines and 
zones, linestrokes and color-patches.”
43
 Deleuze’s claim to direct conveyance does not 
mean that art does not require previous forms and clichés but rather that it operates 
simultaneously on several registers. Art proceeds less through the manipulation of 
signifying material than through accessing the plane of intensities beneath it. The 
invisible worlds of Bacon’s painting always emerge from within the visible: “one starts 
with a figurative form, a diagram intervenes and scrambles it, and a form of a completely 
different nature emerges from the diagram, which is called the Figure.”
44
 The diagram 
brings chaos into the figurative in order to propel new order out of chaos.  
The human in Bacon is thus understood as a habitual mode of perceiving and 
being (i.e., a mode of figuration or representation). The goal is not to break radically with 
the human but to stretch and deform it in order to release and sense invisible forces that 
act upon the body and constitute it as such. In the process, one becomes aware of the 
expressiveness of the material and a certain degree of agency of color that is not simply 
reducible to Bacon’s. I seek to draw attention to the altered habit of perception that is 
enacted by the clash between the image of bodies viewers bring to the museum and the 
weird forms Bacon paints. Bacon’s work accentuates the dim perception we sometimes 
have of something alien, wild, and protean within ourselves. Such disrupting experiences 
and waves of bodily micro-shocks are rendered more available for experience and 
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gaze from the form of the artwork to the nature of the encounters with other bodies and 
the new experiences of becoming-intense it brings about.   
 




It took 292 truck-hours, two large dump trucks, a tractor, a front loader, and 625 
man-hours to construct Robert Smithson's monumental earthwork Spiral Jetty (1970), 
located on the Great Salt Lake in Utah.
45
 Using black basalt rocks and earth from the site, 
the artist created a coil 1,500 feet long and 15 feet wide that stretched out counter-
clockwise into the translucent red water: 
Basalt and earth were scooped from the beach at the beginning of the jetty: the 
trucks backed up to the outline of the spiral and dumped the material. The form of 
the work was influenced by the site, which had once been used to mine oil; the 
spiral shape of the jetty was derived from the local topography as well as relating 
to a mythic whirlpool at the centre of the lake. The spiral also reflects the circular 
formation of the salt crystals that coat the rocks. Smithson was initially attracted 
to the site because of the red colourations of the salt lake. The work was changed 
by its environment, reflecting Smithson’s fascination with entropy, the inevitable 





The experience of the entropic event of Smithson’s earthwork seems to be governed by a 
Baconian practice of duration-sensation. Like Bacon’s paintings, the periodically re-
emerging jetty enables us to perceive the effects of nonhuman forces of time and the 
earth that run through life and connect the organic with the nonorganic life of materiality 
itself. As basalt and earth were scooped to isolate and bound the coil to the contours of 
the old industrial site, Smithson demarcated a territory, a frame, a growingly discernible 
object (“Framing is the means by which objects are delimited, qualities unleashed and art 
made possible”). He made visible systolic forces of isolation.
47
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contracts the salt crystals, basalt, earth, and water into the spiral frame, defines the first 
movement from the lake to the jetty. But there is already a diastole that opposes the first 
movement. It outlines a series of deformations, flowing from the human impact of 
industrial development, mining, and rapid urbanization to the sediment deformation 
caused by Smithson’s artistic intervention and the powerful lake forces that keep pressing 
his work to the earth. The spiral slowly uncoils into the elements that compose it and 
merges with chaos. Thus the second movement is the diastolic deformation that dissipates 
the earthwork back into the complex material system of the lake from which it was 
extracted. Smithson’s work itself does not exist in a stable form; it is in continual 
transformation and variation. The jetty is the production of earth-sensations as the 
expression of forces of isolation, deformation, and dissipation. 
The systolic and diastolic movements of rhythm harnessed by Smithson’s 
earthwork may also be definable as the coexistence of multiple tiers of human and 
nonhuman durations. On the one hand, the jetty, whose spiral shape defies linear time, 
extracts and monumentalizes a particular set of human duration-sensations. There is the 
time of 625 man-hours to construct the earthwork and the time it takes for our bodies to 
experience it. On the other hand, these human durations are co-mobilized and enter into 
complex conjunctions with a range of nonhuman, inorganic temporalities. We have seen 
that with regard to the processes of ongoing relations that organize the site a certain form 
of geological duration is at play. There is the time of the day, the time of the weather, and 
the changing cycles of the sun and the moon, all of which are indispensable for the 
experience of the jetty. As the jetty is slowly merging with forces of the earth it is 
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dissipation, a diastole of time, in which the past is coextensive with the present and the 
future. These rhythms of temporal variation of the earthwork sometimes intersect with a 
solar duration made visible by its periodic re-emergences as a white salt crystal art 
installation, shaped by prolonged droughts in Utah.
48
 Finally, by “collaborating with 
entropy” and “using the environmental catastrophe to compose new life,” Smithson 
allows us to sense the force of time as becoming, replete with the earth’s life force and its 
power of regeneration in a universe that is temporally open to a certain degree.
49
 Thus, 
the Spiral Jetty functions as a form of geophilosophy that allows us to reflect on our 
temporal relation to the world. When we look at this world, this gigantic BwO, we can 
sense the powerful nonorganic flows of life that move across and compose the body of 
the earth. In so sensing, we approach earth-bodies that open up towards the unlivable and 
intensive forces of the earth. What is more, Smithson’s art may nurture heightened 
sensitivity to cycles of ecological degradation and the regeneration of ecosystems’ life in 
conjunction with the need to rethink the problematic of human agency. As the boundaries 
between nature and artifice are dissolved in the experience of the sensation-durations of 
nonorganic life, it becomes clear that natural and cultural processes both share agency in 
shaping the earthwork and are both capable of producing art and intensifying sensations. 
Agency and creativity are now co-articulated and distributed among a multiplicity of 
human and nonhuman participants: “creative change in the world sometimes arrives 
through inter-agental concatenations that exceed the previous reach of either party. We 
participate in creation, more than being masterful agents of it, partly because it surges 
through us as well as from us and partly because the confluences of forces from which it 
emerges often exceed the reach of any single party.”
50
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that is, a world in which human and nonhuman forces all possess some degree of 
agency—emerges from an encounter with Smithson’s earthwork.  This notion highlights 
the capacity of specific human-nonhuman configurations or assemblages to produce 
effects that cannot be traced back entirely either to the will of human micro-agents or to 
the affective power of their nonhuman co-participants.  
 
THE MATTER OF TIME: RHIZOMATIC ENCOUNTERS WITH VITAL 
MATERIALITY 
 
Over the past forty years the site-specific sculptures of Richard Serra have 
emerged as some of the most successful attempts to register the affectivity and vitality of 
materiality, by which I mean the power of material assemblages to express vitalities in 
ways that become available to us. Serra, a former steelworker, creates sculptures of lead 
and steel of such vast proportions that they may take up entire warehouses. In 1969, Serra 
created One-Ton Prop (House of Cards), a simple cube composed of four rough lead 
slabs propped precariously against each other by their own weight like a flimsy house of 
cards. Ever since, Serra’s works have enabled us to move beyond our habitual space-time 
coordinates. Serra’s monumental installation The Matter of Time in the Guggenheim 
Museum Bilbao deserves special attention. The eight sculptures are made of gigantic 
plates of towering weatherproof steel, bent and curved, leaning in and out, which carve 
very private spaces that allow one to walk into, through, and around each individual piece 
as well as into and through the space engendered by the installation as a whole.
51
 The 
scale, scope, height, and weight of the installation are all of unprecedented proportions:  
The lightest piece weighs 44 tons and the heaviest is 276 tons. They are all more 
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the sculptures are not fixed to the floor, but are rather in balance… In these and 
most of his pieces, Richard Serra has used weathering steel, a type of steel used in 
the construction of bridges and buildings. When left outdoors its color slowly 
changes from gray to orange, and after seven or eight years transforms to dark 





This temporal variation of color is one manifestation of the uncanny capacity of Serra’s 
torqued ellipses, spirals, and toruses to shift from their status as mere objects to 
formations that produce tangible transformations. They situate us in a unique material 
environment in which weight becomes light and airy as the enormous mass of the steel 
plates is converted into floating pieces by virtue of being folded in certain ways. The 
formal linkage of all the works in the installation encourages the viewer to become 
sensitive to the forces of thing-power emanating from the sculptural field as a self-
sustaining ecosystem of steel: “The sculptures are not objects in space…They impart 
form to the entire space; they shape the space through axes, trajectories, and passages 
between their solids and voids…Diverse equilibriums coexist. Simultaneity matters, not 
hierarchies.”
53
 The eight sculptures collectively generate a conversation as each visitor 
finds herself inevitably drawn into them. In fact, the installation is organized in such a 
way that upon entering the room the viewer simultaneously enters the sculptural space. 
There are multiple entrances and exits. There is no single path to follow or predetermined 
succession of views. Without knowing where he or she is going, each viewer is 
encouraged to explore different voids and passages. Thus The Matter of Time enables a 
rhizomatic encounter with vital materiality that is intensified by the rhythm of each 
viewer’s movement. Each time someone walks inside the corridor formed by the two 
Torqued Ellipses, separated from one another by a gap of two meters, “the walls 
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plates fold until they reach an extreme tension and they form a skin that wraps the 
elliptical space. This is a shape that didn’t exist previously, neither in architecture or 




The Torqued Ellipses and the Spirals are both entangled in continuous movement 
and absorb the viewer in their movement. The movement is produced by a spin over on 
their own axis, which makes each torqued shape turn upwards from its base without 
changing its radius.
55
 Each time one’s body moves, the spirals and ellipses move too. 
According to Serra, “you get involved with what effect the work has physically on your 
body as you walk. So, time and movement became really crucial to how I deal with what 
I deal with, not only sight and boundary, but how one walks through a piece and what 
one feels and registers in terms of one’s own body in relation to another body.”
56
 Serra’s 
plates move in such a way that they produce powerful effects and sensations that, in turn, 
inspire the viewer’s body to seek new encounters and make adjustments for the 
alterations it suffers. The often claustrophobic and sometimes threatening sensations of 
precarious balance and imminent threat pass into feelings of release upon exiting the 
passage. The dizzyingly fragmented physical and visual experiences of dislocation flow 
into and modify the direct, interactive experiences with the coherent language of the 
sculptures. These are movements of territorialization and deterritorialization, animated by 
the series of encounters between the affective bodies of the viewer and the material 
structure. There is an unlimited range of individual experiences, but they all heighten our 
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The Matter of Time, 2005. Installation of seven sculptures, weatherproof steel. 
Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa © 2014 Richard Serra/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New 
York. 
 
One also becomes aware of the multiple linkages between this vitalist logic of the 
installation and a multi-layered quality of temporality. The duration of the experience of 
the largest ellipse is different in kind from the temporal experience of walking into and 
through the Snake. There is also the time of precarious balance that involves “the 
fragments of the physical and visual memory that remain to re–combine.”
57
 As these 
memories melt back into perception, one begins to discern a new image of time that 
comprises a diversity of durations:  
The perceptual or aesthetic, emotional, or psychological time of the sculptural 
experience is quite different from real time. It is nonnarrative, discontinuous, 
fragmented, decentered, disorienting. The perceptual fragmentation, the 
multiplicity of views, the discontinuity in the process of viewing contribute to the 
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Serra’s art not only constitutes a radical break with figurative references and cultivates 
attentiveness to the vitality of matter, but also produces a set of unique duration-
sensations that can be activated only through our bodily encounters with this vitality. His 
art aims to create new relationships by giving new life to old industrial materials in a 
creative act that shuts the door on practical utility and diminishes instrumentality. We 
begin to nurture presumptive generosity to other styles of temporalities and to experience 
the relationship between people-materialities and thing-materialities in a more rhizomatic 
way. I see Serra’s art as a step towards a more ecological sensibility, but we have to keep 
in mind that no two people share the same walk through the torqued ellipses. And the 
question remains: If Serra successfully alerts us to thing-power, does registering the 
effects of thing-power always remain solely a human act? 
 
ARCHITECTURES OF BECOMING: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AN AFRICAN 
COMPOUND 
 
The placement of Smithson’s and Serra’s artworks away from everyday life--in an 
installation site or a museum where they can be appreciated for their value as aesthetic 
objects—reveals a limit to the political and ecological effectiveness of such artworks. In 
the words of Deleuze, “the people are missing.”
59
 This is why I turn next to African 
earthen architecture, which offers a window into the interdependencies between earthly 
processes and the everyday lifecycles of large groups of people. Can the duration-
sensations enabled by Smithson’s Spiral Jetty be experienced once the rocks and the 
earth re-emerge as houses in a Gurensi village, and not merely “land art” in the deserted 
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and maintenance approximate the awareness of the vitality of matter heightened by 
Serra’s torqued ellipses? How do the lifecycles of earthen houses interact with the 
lifecycles of their inhabitants? Do such interactions generate a bodily understanding of 
the earthwork as an actant? I blend ethnography and political theory to address these 
questions. I suggest that it is both the experience of living in an earthen house and 
belonging to the community that built it that are responsible for inducing earth-bound 
sensibilities. African practices of earth building, repair, and maintenance merge art with 
the social and the ecological. They suspend clear-cut demarcations between art and non-
art, between human and nonhuman, between life and matter.  
Until very recently the existence of an African architecture—with the notable 
exception of Egypt—was not considered worthy of recognition in the Western art world. 
This refusal reflects a generally prevalent attitude that monumentality and permanence 
are prerequisites to architectural definition. When the Europeans didn’t encounter 
familiar monumental structures that could endure in time and space, they presumed that 
architecture as such did not exist. According to Labelle Prussin, this image of African 
architecture was reinforced by the museum-piece-collecting, archaeological mania that 
accompanied increasing rates of African colonization: “In an architecture composed 
primarily of vegetal or earthen materials, as was the case in Africa, only wooden 
elements were removable: carved wooden columns, plaques in wood or metal, decorative 
roof pinnacles, doors, doorposts, doorframes, and locks, all architectural components, 
were removed from their contextual surroundings and reclassified as sculpture.”
60
 It was 
more fitting to reclassify African architecture as museum-bound sculpture than to admit 
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processes of renewal that mark specific localities of ancestral dwelling.
61
 Permanence as 
a traditional canon of architectural quality is troubled by the dynamic rhythms and 
lifecycles of earthen houses: their embeddedness in an ever-shifting web of socio-
ecological relations exposes them as living bodies that originate, become social, and then 
grow old and wither away.
62
   
Ethnography enables us to highlight such vernacular architectures of becoming 
that remain largely invisible within Euro-American orientations. My immersion in the 
earthen compounds (yɛa) of the Gurensi people of Ghana provides one such example. 
The yire is a physical structure sculpted out of earth and water, weaving a “rhizome” of 
rooms, walls, ancestral shrines, open spaces, and courtyards. In Gurene, the term yire 
refers to: 1) house, dwelling, building; and 2) household or family, either nuclear or 
extended.
63
 The architecture of each Gurensi compound may thus be viewed as a 
sociogram and embodiment of the family that builds and inhabits it. Internal family 
changes are almost immediately translated into physical reorganizations of the house: 
“there is no building that is just standing without people…There is a lot of extension. 
They usually start with a small house, then when the children grow up, others also have 
other children and they begin to extend the house.”
64
 A compound without occupants is 
considered “lifeless” and will be eventually abandoned to “crumble back to the earth.”
65
 
Nonpermanent building materials are particularly well suited to accommodate the 
changing relationships of the domestic cycle of family life.  
The building process is a long and cooperative effort by the living, the ancestors, 
and the earth. The construction of a new compound involves not only the immediate 
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“Everyone is involved. The community then comes, whoever hears that this man is 
putting up a building. They all come around to help, to support.”
66
 Water is brought by 
the women; the mortar is made by the men. Although they seem to be fragile 
compositions of soil, water, straw, and dung, orchestrated by communal labor, these 
architectures have endured for centuries. Heavy rains and strong winds regularly destroy 
parts of the rooms and the roofs or crack the compounds’ walls. They have to be renewed 






Construction of a room in an earthen compound 
 
The building material is the earth itself, in which the ancestors reside and from 
which the ancestors came: “The intimacy with and dependence upon the Earth…are 
expressed in the way each compound seems to rise out of the ground, as if it were simply 
a vertical extension of the Earth itself.”
68
 The vertical axis connects the domain of the 
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is the abode of the ancestors, whose blessings have to be secured before plans for new 
construction can proceed. In some areas of the Upper East Region the tindaana (earth 
custodian) has to “cut the sod and clear the area,” i.e., uproot some grass with a hoe “so 
that the land will also know,” before house building starts.
69
 In the Bongo area, for 
instance, the denya’aƞa, the flat-roofed female room that serves as a mortuary of the 
landlord, is always the first room to be built. Once it is completed, the building process 
has to be postponed for a day so that the house builder can consult the soothsayer and 
inform the ancestors about his plans to resettle: “before you start any traditional home, 
first of all you have to survey the place, go in the night, midnight, sit there, if the weather 
is very cold it means that it is a good place, if the weather is very hot, it means that there 
are evil spirits in the place.”
70
 The earthen locality has to agree to accept her new dweller 
and establish affective bonds with his extended family. Each new compound is a complex 
negotiation of new and existing relationships between humans and the earth. It is an 
environmental assemblage formed by conjoint geo-affects and compounds of sensations.  
The next day, the building process resumes and the foundation for the zɔƞo (the 
animal room) is built. This is the only room that requires the performance of a rite: the 
builders put stalks of millet and excrements of fowls in the room, representing the pivotal 
household activities of farming and animal rearing. The rite constitutes a plea for good 
harvest yields and for protection of the house animals. The zɔƞo is also a key zone of 
transition and change: when the head of the house dies, his clothes are placed on its 
thatched roof. If his wife dies, the widower has to spend a night in the zɔƞo. The animal 
room mediates the interplay between life and death; it connects the compound to seasonal 
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After the construction of the zɔƞo, the builders proceed with the rest of the 
compound. Behind the main entrance is the cattle kraal (nagedene). Big cylindrical 
granaries (baarɛ) where the household’s produce is stored are scattered around the kraal. 
Little distinguishes the rooms “where the animals stay” from those that house human 
occupants. According to Prussin, this is an architectural testimony “to the care, 
protection, and value accorded to livestock.”
71
 Animal rearing, a group of house builders 
once explained to me, shapes the marked regularity of spacing between neighboring 




The house of a Gurensi chief. On the right side of the entrance are the ancestral 
shrines. 
 
The front yard (zanyɔrɛ) is the public space and reception area of each 
compound.
73
 The head of the household sits there under a shed or an old ancestral tree, 
and is joined by other elders, playing children, and elderly women who greet visitors and 
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by the ancestors. It contains the ancestral shrines, circular or conical earthen platforms 
that are usually located just outside the entrance. The earthen mound itself constitutes the 
abode of the ancestral spirit and it often includes a hole that allows the spirit to pass in 
and out; the actual shrine is either a stone or a bangle (such as a bracelet or a ring) placed 
on the mound’s top and covered by pot shards or pieces of calabash.
74
 A descendant is 
expected to feed and pay respect to his deceased father, grandfather, or grandmother 
through regular libation and sacrifice. Death does not end one’s belonging to the 
compound. The deceased play an active role in the life of the house, ensuring abundant 
harvests, children, and protection from illnesses and droughts. 
The earthen compound is a monument to duration: it simultaneously 
accommodates the house’s dead occupants and embodies the forces of time as 
transformation and becoming over which the living have only limited control. Time is no 
longer determined by linear movement: it is what Deleuze calls “out of joint.”
75
 The 
compound forms a Deleuzean time-crystal, in which the past is contemporaneous with 
the present: “Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it 
splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the 
other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see 
in the crystal...We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological 
time, Chronos and not Chronos.”
76
 Time is exposed to be a multiplicity. It inscribes the 
body of the house with the marks of successive deaths and deliveries, punctuating 
transitions between multiple generations and the vitality of the compound itself. 
Together, the mortuary of the founding ancestors, the ancestral shrines by the entrance, 
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personal items of the deceased head of the house on the rooftop of the zɔƞo, and the pots 
of the women who once occupied the rooms allow us to sense a fork of time, a parting of 
durations.
77
 This is a form of intuition that moves us beyond the actual into the realm of 




We can now discern a subaltern time-crystal, which forges a dialogue between 
two concurrent presents, one traditional and one modern.
79
 In chapter 5 I will discuss 
earthen architecture as a “minor” art form in Northern Ghana. Today the round rooms 
considered typical in some regions of Northern Ghana are slowly being supplanted by 
rectangular rooms, exposing the influence of the urban areas in the rapidly modernizing 
south where many young people migrate in search of employment. Zinc continues to 
replace grass for roofing; cement has become a common addition to the mortar mix of 
soil, water, straw, and dung. One can see earthen walls of compounds covered by cell 
phone numbers or Vodafone advertisements, thatched roofs secured with car tires, and 
earthen shrines sheltered by aluminum sheets.    
Lastly, African earthen architecture can be understood not only as a time-crystal 
but also as an affective assemblage that enables us to meditate on the notion of human 
agency. It draws attention to the agency that the house-builders shared with the agency of 
the forces of time, Harmattan winds, erosion, and the artistry of the rainy and dry seasons 
that remold the house each year in concert. The Gurensi compound allows us to reflect on 
some of the ideas of distributive agency and multiple actants involved in the process of 
art production articulated also by Smithson’s Spiral Jetty. However, African architecture 
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Smithson’s. Smithson’s vast geological scale of sensory production always involves an 
acute durational awareness of multiple modes and degrees of agency, many of which 
flow from powerful impersonal forces and processes. The gigantic BwO of the jetty 
breaks up some of the tendencies toward organic harmony of the living bodies of African 
compounds. In contrast, the sensory immersion within the lifecycles of earthen 
compounds intertwines “nature’s” agencies with the agencies of specific ancestors, 
families, and clan genealogies. It heightens perspectivism and animism, which I explored 
in chapter 3 as existential dispositions that may open doors of perception to worlds 
gathered within a web of personalized relationships between humans and nonhumans. In 
such worlds no single perspective exhausts the abundance of reality. Perspectivism is 
expressed in the architectural design of ancestral shrines, in the rites performed in the 
zɔƞo, and in the compound’s distance from neighboring compounds. Unlike Smithson’s 
jetty, which enables us to register the affectivity of powerful nonorganic forces and 
durations of the earth, the compound is a sensory condensation of a plurality of 
perspectives and agencies that reveal tiƞa as a simultaneously social, natural, and 
personal force. Together the jetty and the house prompt us to perceive earthworks not as 
objects or commodities but as a web of relationships between humans, other beings, and 
the earth. These relationships are mutually transformative relations of interdependence.  
 
EMBARKING ON JOURNEYS TO UMWELTEN OTHER THAN OUR OWN 
 
The practice of eco-sensation reveals not only that each human lifeworld—
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nonhuman durations, inferior and superior to us. Rather than locating all other durations 
within our own (e.g., the ancestral tree, swarm of cicadas, or the granite rock perceived as 
extended objects within our world), this practice enables us to tap into an open virtual 
whole of multiple durations (the ancestral tree, swarm of cicadas, and the granite rock as 
processes that sense different vibrations, resonances, and waves of light, heat, and 
moisture that form other worlds). According to Claire Colebrook, the thought of different 
durations can have profound implications for politics. Just like the example of the 
neglected ecological potentials of African earthen architecture, Colebrook turns to 
aboriginal politics in Australia to prompt us to re-experience other ways of life not as 
earlier or more “primitive” versions of our own but as different styles of temporality or 
duration.
80
 For instance, land disputes between Australian Aborigines and the 
government can be understood as disputes about durations. For the former, identity is 
constituted through a spiritual affiliation with a sacred earth and history. It is not a history 
of documents or legal archive but a “dreaming” or body of myths concerning human and 
animal bodies: “on the one hand, a time and a people whose memory is given through a 
virtually present collective memory and land, and on the other hand a time of European 
culture measured by a ‘man’ who remains the same regardless of locale and for whom 
land and culture are external items of property…philosophy only begins to think when it 
encounters these other durations.”
81
 Here Aboriginal “dreaming” resonates with African 
oral histories of the relationship between people and the land. We will see in chapter 5 
that the contemporary contestations over political authority and agency in Northern 
Ghana also entail a series of disputes over competing human and nonhuman durations. 




                                                                                               
171 
European periodization of world history and political development, linked to notions of 
linear progress, evolution of universal reason, etc., that has historically served to 
rationalize practices such as colonization, conquest, and neoliberal development. Now we 
can begin to acknowledge the coexistence of multiple modernities and temporalities that 
enable us to recognize the Other (human or nonhuman) as the Other without subsuming it 
into the order of the Same or the Human.  
In this respect, we also become better equipped to apprehend how our 
manipulation of the environment brings us up against other unfoldings of time, 
fluctuations and mutations that alter the speeds of nonhuman durations within our 
lifetime. Recent examples include glaciers melting at more than double speed; bird and 
swine flu outbreaks, spreading out from domesticated poultry and pigs; millennia-long 
accumulation of fossil fuels and their exhaustion over a few centuries of industrial 
practices; clear-cut logging of old growth redwood forests, many of which were seedlings 
before the birth of Christ, and so on. These examples raise the question of how to nurture 
a capacity to intuit durations beyond those of immediate concern and appropriation. How 
do we recognize and learn to dwell in the durations of others not present to us? Can we 
cultivate presumptive generosity towards other styles of duration? To what degree do we 
belong to others’ durations? Where does one form of life begin or end, and what about 
the environment?  
Such questions were anticipated by Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll, whose 
research attempted to rethink the world as infinite animal environments (Umwelten) in 
order to gain better insight into what it means to be an animal. Influenced by Kant’s 
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irreducible world of experience and that “all reality is subjective appearance.”
82
 Animals 
are subjects and there are as many worlds as subjects, interwoven in a “web of life that 
extends in all directions uniting both living and nonliving things into a cohesive 
design.”
83
 Each organism constructs its own Umwelt through the interpretive work of 
signs that are important to it, while at the same time, creating signs for others.
84
 From this 
perspective, the task of biology is to discern these “subjective universes” and elucidate 
how the world appears to each organism according to its own perceptions and actions.
85
  
Uexküll uses the metaphor of a soap bubble encircling every living being within a 
defined parameter, beyond which certain things are no longer meaningful and significant 
to it. In Onto-Theologies Brett Buchanan recounts a range of examples drawn from 
Uexküll’s empirical research on the bubble-like Umwelts of animals. Among them, the 
life of the tick stands out: 
Nearly everything in the external world that surrounds the tick has no significance 
to it. The moon, weather, birds, noises, leaves, shadows, and so forth do not 
matter to the tick. They may belong to the Umwelt of other organisms that live in 
the midst of the tick, but they do not carry any meaning for the tick itself…What 
does matter to the tick, however, is the sensory perception of heat and sweat from 
a warm-blooded animal, on which the female tick feeds, lays its eggs, and 
dies…Uexküll recounts how ticks will position themselves in a hanging position 
on the tip of a tree branch in the anticipation of a mammal passing beneath the 
branch…After mating, the blind and deaf tick is first drawn upward by the 
photoreceptivity of her skin. While the tick hangs on a branch, very little affects 
it. The tick does not feed itself, shelter itself, or engage in any other activities. It 
simply waits. And, remarkably, ticks have been noted to hang motionless for up to 
eighteen years at a time until a precise environmental cue eventually triggers it 
from its rest. This span of time encompasses nearly the entire life span of the tick, 
and it does so until the tick senses a specific odor emanating from the butyric acid 
(sweat) of a mammal…the tick releases itself from the branch in order to fall onto 
the hair of the moving mammal…Once the tick has bored itself in, it sucks the 
mammal’s blood until the warm blood reaches the tick’s stomach, at which time a 
biological response is activated, and the sperm cells that a male has already 
deposited and are waiting in the female are released to fertilize the awaiting eggs. 
This reproductive action will not occur if the foregoing sequence of events does 
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Many ticks never make it through the full cycle, and those who do, die soon after. Yet 
this observation does not diminish the importance of the tick’s Umwelt for Uexküll, 
which appears to him as a living play of signs and interpretations. The mammal (the 
“meaning-carrier”) elicits certain “signs” that become significant within the phenomenal 
world of the tick (the “meaning-receiver”) as they are actively “interpreted” by the tick—
a meaningful relationship is formed.
87
 Moreover, the odor of mammalian sweat that 
triggers the tick’s release from the branch may be of little or no significance to other 
organisms. Instead, the mammal may be perceived in multiple other ways: “Perhaps the 
mammal is a dog out for a walk in the woods. Just as the mammal belongs within the 
Umwelt of the tick, the mammal may equally belong to my own Umwelt, albeit with a 
different significance. And while the dog may not notice the tick, it may notice a squirrel 
to chase or a twig to play with.”
88
 Thus, it becomes evident that the various animal 
worlds and durations intersect with one another, extending the notion of Umwelt beyond 
the soap bubble. Uexküll deploys a musical reference to describe how each organism 
enters into relationships with different aspects of its environment: “We see here [in pairs] 
the first comprehensive musical laws of nature. All living beings have their origin in a 
duet...The harmony of performances is most clearly visible in the colonies of ants and 
honeybees. Here we have completely independent individuals that keep up the life of the 
colony through the harmony of the individual performances”
89
 Each living being is 
always already other than itself and composes a “symphony underscored by rhythms and 
melodies reaching outward for greater accompaniment.”
90
 Within this plane of nature as a 
musical score, the mammal emits tones, rhythms, and chiming vibrations that 
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The music of tick-mammal life brings us back to the multiple force fields and tiers 
of nonhuman time revealed by the practice of eco-sensation. The encounter and 
temporary overlap of two very different styles of duration leads to the formation of a new 
duet, of a new ontological unit, that exceeds its constitutive elements and affirms the 
force of time as becoming. Out of the tick-mammal composite emerges a new tick, ready 
to serve its eighteen years on the branch. Just like the spider, which has adopted certain 
tunes from the fly’s symphony and constructs its web with a view towards the fly’s 
arrival, the tick demonstrates an “embodied ‘anticipatory power’ for the ‘aboutness’” of 
its own body and immediate environment.
91
 Each animal in question becomes another 
through its various encounters and compositional relations. Perhaps, this corporeal 
understanding of otherness refers to a different mode of nonhuman and bodily time 
(“anticipation-time”) not entirely reducible to intentionality and semiotic interpretation. 
Finally, it seems pertinent to ask: Do these connections concern “individuals” or “beings” 
per se? Uexküll’s Umwelten involve whole organisms (and molar entities) as much as the 
complex interplay of inorganic forces such as passive and active affects, temperatures, 
and speeds and slownesses within each individuated soap bubble. The connections are 
not necessarily between a tick and a mammal, a spider and a fly, but might be between an 
olfactory organ and a compound of odor-temperature, a net and a line of flight, one 
rhythmic wave with another.
92
 The tick and the spider are compounds of sensations, 
activated by arrivals of the mammal and the fly.   
Art can capture these flows of affects and connections and enable us to perceive 
durations and Umwelts not already in tune with our own rhythms. Redwood artwork in 
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Smithson’s Spiral Jetty and Serra’s Torqued Ellipses have already monumentalized the 
earth’s diverse geography and infinite color intensities. The BBC series Blue Planet: Seas 
of Life and Planet Earth, Werner Herzog’s and Peter Raymont’s films continue to trace 
rare movements of the world and the impossible territories and intimate durations of 
some of the planet’s wildest and most elusive creatures. We move from the perception of 
a redwood cone falling from a tree, actualized into the tick’s release from a branch, to the 
farmed soil across which a mammal runs, and to the river, into which it leaps to play as it 
disturbs the river’s inhabitants. Then, we travel from the sheets of geological time to the 
cycles of seasons and ocean tides and immerse into the incessant flow of becoming of the 
world, whose altered ecologies call for a new generation of artists to come.  
The proposed art practice of eco-sensation encourages us to gain practical and 
bodily insights into the multiple ways in which anthropocentric attitudes and feelings 
become sedimented into different layers of the body/brain network, to incorporate that 
knowledge into future ecological thought and action, and to experiment with body/brain 
interventions that may stretch and distend human-centered patterns of thought, feeling, 
and judgment.
93
 Each encounter with earthworks triggers side perceptions at odds with 
the dominant drifts of perception and interpretation; it reworks the body’s implicit self-
image in its ever-ready tendency to fall back into a narrow humanism. 
Of course, neither the arguments nor the illustrations in this chapter prove the 
truth of this practice. I doubt that such a definitive proof will emerge, and as such the 
practice of eco-sensation is profoundly contestable. Thus it is crucial to emphasize the 
need to complement these experiments with a range of other macropolitical experiments 




                                                                                               
176 
such as interim visualization, meditation, yoga, nature walks and hiking, biking, multi-
media strategies, or practices of feeling with others (human and nonhuman), may enhance 
the efficacy of these art interventions. Nonetheless, as we move back and forth between 
micro- and macropolitics, between experimentation, observation, and reflection, among 
creative readings of science and analytical and critical philosophy, we develop better 
strategies to interrupt the flow of all-too human-centered thought and to open windows to 
creative experimentation.     
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Chapter 5 
How Land Speaks: Orature and Ecological Change 
 
     
 
 
WHEN THE HUNTER AND THE WARRIOR MET THE LAND 
 
The chief’s skin-bearer guided us to the tindaana’s house. The chief himself 
would not dare walk past the junior high school, explained the skin-bearer. The school 
was the cut-off line for maintaining a safe distance from the tindaana’s house: “When 
you see the house then that should be the end of your life.”
1
 In the past, when there were 
no other houses to shelter the tindaana’s house from view, each time the chief traveled to 
the district capital one of his companions had to use a fan to cover his face, to prevent 
him from looking in that direction. Recently, the chief was unable to attend the opening 
of the community library because of its proximity to the tindaana’s house.  
Once we veered off the main road we took our shoes off, observing the ancestral 
taboo not to approach or enter the tindaana’s compound wearing footwear. After an 
exchange of greetings, we sat under an old tamarind tree—the founding tree of the 
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agitatedly around. The tindaana not only felt very comfortable with our audio recorder 
but also requested we tape the whole conversation in order to make sure that we wouldn’t 
“forget what I say.” By the time the recorder was on, the tindaana’s wives, children, and 
elders had joined in, listening attentively to what he had to say. We were about to become 
immersed in the world of orature, the fusion of art forms and the means by which 
African oral traditions of political thought advance competing images of power, 
authority, and collectivity. The tindaana proceeded to tell us the town’s founding story: 
It was first settled by the Busansis – the whole area. The ancestor was a hunter 
and came and met the land here. That was his first settled place and that is the tree 
that stands here, the ancestor tree...When he at first arrived the Busansis drove 
him away…He was travelling, then he got to a riverside. There he met some two 
young children and asked them to give him water. One of them ran away but one 
of them stayed back…The child brought him to the Nayiri. He got to some place 
and wanted to settle. There are some people who are driving him away and these 
are the Busansis. And the chief said that he should sleep for that night. That he 
would...help him in the country where he wants to settle…Then the next day he 
invited all his sons. The child who stayed back and gave him the water – that was 
the one. Then the hunter took that boy. The father asked, the chief asked – “but 
this young boy who is very small, how is going to help you, defend you back in 
Zua?” [The hunter replied] that he is the one who saved him by giving him the 
water at the riverside so he wants the small boy. And he came with that small boy. 
And the father suggested that when they get back to Zua they should tie some 
grasses on all the trees that are found within the Busansi area. And when they 
arrived they intimidated the clan and the Busansis took off. And when they finally 
settled he sent the small boy back to the chief and said that this place is now 
multiplying. He is the owner of the land but should give them somebody – a chief 
– to administer the place. Since he is the landowner, he cannot be the chief so he 
should give the chieftaincy to the small boy…Then the chief asked the hunter –
their founder – what should be the name of the child. The name is Akulegene – 
“he met him by the riverside.” And that is why now you have the chief under 
Nayiri, he is from the small boy’s family…And the tindaana is the 
landowner…When anyone dies the tindaana goes to make some soil cutting 
before a grave is dug or before he is buried. That’s his role. Any tingane, most of 
the tingana – he sacrifices to them. Any stray animal – whether it is a cow, a 
donkey or a stray animal – any animal that is not known, is found and brought to 
him. Anybody who wants to resettle – he has to go and cut the soil before the 
house is put up. They have to clear the area before anything can be done…The 
whole of this clan – if there is a problem, it’s first settled here. If it is too much to 
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A few days after the defeat of the Busansi the new occupants of the land decided 
to perform sacrifices for their triumph over the enemy. In preparation, they piled some 
stones. When they were all gathered to pour the libation a python (zankaƞa) crawled out 
of the stone pile and returned back in. Struck by fear, Abantaƞa, the hunter, led a 
delegation to learn about the appearance and the disappearance of the snake. The 
delegation was informed that the python (zankaƞa) was the spirit of their great-
grandfather who had come in that form to live with them. The area in which the snake 
was residing became an earth shrine (tingane) known as Azankaƞa. The name was later 
“corrupted to Zua” by white men who could not pronounce it properly.  
According to the tindaana, the most important thing that we had to learn about the 
town was the story of how his ancestor had come to settle in Zua—a story that 
emphasized the tindaana’s contemporary role as a custodian of Azua and the land. The 
chief presented us with a competing version of the same events: 
I want to begin by giving the story of how my ancestors started from Zua. Zua 
was started by our great ancestor Akulegene and Abantaƞa. They first came to 
occupy this place and the first occupants were the Busansis. So the history is that 
we are all descendants of Akulegene who happened to be the first chief and then 
the son of the king of Mamprugu. So we are all descendants of the Mamprugu 
kingdom… Akulegene came at a time when Azua already existed. He got to 
identify Azua – that is where they came and sat to strategize. They came and they 
cut the grass and tied it to the trees and set fire. That scared the first occupants and 
they ran away and left the place and they took over. While they were strategizing 
they saw a big python that crawled out from the cave, from the Azua, and moved 
into the rocks just behind that place where they sat. When they succeeded in 
driving the first occupants away they went back and reported to the King of 
Mamprugu and he decided to enskin his son, who was known as Akulegene, and 
then asked: “what is going to be the name of the place?” And Abantaƞa who was 
the hunter, who led Akulegene to come and take over the first occupants, said that 
while they were strategizing they saw a very big python that crawled out of the 
cave and did not harm them. So the python in Mampruli is called “zankaƞa.” It 
means the name of this place was originally supposed to be called “zankaƞa” but 
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Initially, the chief’s story sounded confusingly similar to me. The nuances, however, 
were of great significance to its different interlocutors, and people went to great lengths 
to ensure that I got the “right” version. The chief’s account of the settlement history 
accentuated the leadership of the young Mamprusi warrior, rather than that of the hunter, 
and the chain of events that led to the formation of the chieftaincy, rather than of the 
tindaana-ship. Such variations bolstered the chief’s contemporary position as “the 
custodian of the land,” claiming responsibility for the day-to-day administration of his 
jurisdictional area: “The tindaana is the one responsible for the sacrifices to the gods 
because the chief himself does not perform the sacrifices. The chief has to delegate the 
tindaana to do that…the tindaana performs that one. But he comes to me. When I want 
to perform the sacrifices, I’ll call him, he’ll come here, and I will be giving him whatever 
I have to do to go out and perform and he will now go out and perform.”
4
  
       
                          Azua earth god (tingane)                                  African rock python             
Today Azua is reputed for assisting people with commercial enterprises, 
procreation, and war, and for bringing rain during droughts. The ascension rites of each 
newly-enskinned chief take place at the tingane. Azua, an elder explained to me once, 
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python (zankaƞa) is treated with fear and veneration by the members of the royal clan 
(Nabisi) who taboo the harming, killing, or eating of all pythons. They swear oaths in the 
name of the snake during arguments in court when trying to establish the veracity of 
statements. The tindaana’s clan (Tindaama) observes a series of taboos regarding the 
crocodile. A few days after their founding father was buried a crocodile came forth. The 
crocodile was identified as their great-grandfather who had come in that form to visit 
them. Like the Nabisi, the Tindaama swear oaths to the crocodile when the truth of a 
court statement is in doubt.
5
 
The longer I listened to such stories the more I was struck by the wealth of 
proliferating narratives and competing versions advanced by different chiefs, tindaanas, 
and elders. Yet all these stories shared something in common: a courageous hunter-
ancestor ventured into the bush in search of a new home, encountering various 
collectivities made up of the land, bush spirits, wild animals, or/and other people, some of 
whom were ill-disposed and antagonistic, and others collaborative and affable. What are 
such stories about? Are they chronicles of how rural African societies have historically 
secured, contested, and negotiated access to land as a set of “resources?” Are the stories 
themselves partly generated by what the land—as gift-giving ancestors—had to say about 
her encounters with hunters and warriors? Are founding stories parables that teach young 
people how to relate to other beings and the environment? And how does our 
understanding of what “political power” is shift once we take into account the 
transforming relations of power between the chieftaincy and the tindaana-ship? How do 
such stories work to shape political sensibilities, attachments, and identities? Can they be 
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power and collectivity? How is the power of words deployed? How are publics formed in 
Northern Ghana, and who counts as a participant in such publics? Elders? Pythons? The 
ancestors?  
Carola Lentz has noted that such narratives of “first-comer” encounters serve as a 
kind of oral land registry which “legitimate[s] the origin of property rights and 
construct[s] a link between the founding ancestors and the storyteller (and his group) 
through which the rights established by first possession have been transmitted to the 
current proprietors.”
6
 In Northern Ghana, the question of who owns the land is 
inextricably connected to the issue of “who came first.” Since colonialism, the nation-
state has asserted its authority as the ultimate guarantor of land tenure and property 
rights, either by constructing land as a national domain or by providing legal frameworks 
that define the extent to which “customary” law and the land tenure systems that predated 
it will be recognized. However, many African governments have not commanded the 
resources to effectively enforce such national land legislation. Only 5% of all West 
African land is titled, i.e. owned and registered under formal, state-controlled cadastral 
systems.
7
 The rest is held under a multiplicity of customary claims and land tenure 
interests often enshrined in the kind of narratives that the tindaana and the chief told us. 
Such oral land registries can be constantly refashioned, and reveal property as a complex 
form of social persuasion and negotiation among a variety of stakeholders. 
There are limits, however, to relying exclusively on categories such as “property,” 
“claims,” “resources,” “competition,” and “ownership” to comprehend these proliferating 
and competing origin stories. The cultural organization of Western disbelief and its 
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eludes the grasp of Euro-American political theory and the environmentalisms that sprout 
from it. If the social scientist does not believe that the python is a deceased human but 
does believe that the Gurensi believe that it is, then she is left with the problem of how to 
theorize such “beliefs.”
8
 Within a theoretical framework imported from the West and 
built upon Western concepts of human-nature interactions, the diversity of people’s lived 
encounters with a personified, non-appropriable, and life-generating land (tiƞa) recede 
behind anthropocentric vocabularies of “land management.” Western beliefs about the 
land as an inert, passive, and inanimate context for human action, on the other hand, are 
never on the examining table. What if we took seriously the possibility that what we call 
animist or anthropomorphic “projections” are themselves formed by the influence of 
nonhumans? What if the personification of land, animals, and plants was already a 
conjoint more-than-human act?    
In chapter 2 I argued that an alternative way to understand the relationship 
between people and tiƞa is in terms of spiritual or ritual enclosures—ways of 
apprehending the land without possessing it as enclosed commons. In many parts of 
Northern Ghana it is the dead—the ancestors and the earth gods—who are recognized as 
the actual “owners” of the land. Tindaanas (earth priests) and Yizuukεεma (clan elders), 
and sometimes Nabas (chiefs), are land trustees in the sense that they are responsible for 
addressing the spiritual needs of the land and for holding custody of the ancestral shrine 
containing the community spirits. But it is the “skin,” the shrine itself that serves as the 
repository of ownership of the land and not the person of the tindaana or the chief. The 
latter ensures the continuity of gift exchange, knitting a web of socio-ecological 
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circulate and create enclosures. Azua’s pile of stones entails a particular form of ancestral 
ordering and enclosing of the land at the same time as the landowners themselves remain 
enclosed in the womb of the tiƞa: “everything comes from the ground. Our crops, the 
deceased are buried there, everything is contained in the tiƞa.”
9
  
Such a shift of focus, from a mechanistic understanding of land to an expressive 
one reveals the Zua founding story as a technology of political persuasion with an 
ecological cast, and not merely a contested oral registry of the origin of property or 
reluctant admission of a land grab. The story iterates a form of social contract and 
political pact with nature (and with the spiritual realm), forged through the direct, 
unmediated intercourse between the hunter, the warrior, the land, and its various animal 
inhabitants. But from within a perspective that divides the world into human subjects and 
object-nature, this locating of village identity and property in the ancestors’ encounters 
with nature is likely to be seen as a shrewd strategy to remove such encounters from the 
volatility and historicity of human politics.
10
 Correspondingly, Western representations of 
the realm of politics (chieftaincy) and the realm of ritual (tindaana-ship) as two distinct 
spheres of social action obscure how the postcolonial state and chieftaincy have 
appropriated indigenous forms of political authority that had been part of the prerogatives 
of tindaanas and elders.
11
 My goal is to offer an alternative to treatments of African 
indigenous perspectives as “supernatural beliefs” and “ritual,” reviewing them instead as 
modalities of political thought that count the land, the living, and the dead as co-
participants in a polity.   
This chapter will also draw political theory and ethnography into an engagement 
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counter the tendency to treat the oral traditions of African thought as an inferior stage in a 
linear evolution towards modern literature and writing. Zirimu defined orature as “the use 
of utterance as an aesthetic means of expression” characterized by the fusion of all art 
forms.
12
 In the next two sections I put Gurensi orature into dialogue with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea of “minor literature,” which refers to a way of appropriating language as a 
“collective utterance” to call forth new identities and sensitivities, which in some senses 
are already there, albeit masked by dominant habits of representation (“major” 
literature). Minor literature does not occur “apart from” a major literature but, on the 
contrary, operates from within, making dominant anthropocentric models of language 
“stutter.” Likewise, orature sounds and makes perceptible what has not or cannot be 
heard or perceived otherwise: how land speaks. By sensitizing us to the expressivity of 
the land, pythons, crocodiles, and baobab trees, orature too affects a “stutter” in the 
majoritarian orientations of Euro-American environmental political theory. It gives voice 
to the “subjugated” knowledges and earthen languages of African people that trouble the 
dual colonization of the aural-oral by the literary and of nonhumans by humans.  
Put together, the concepts of orature and minor literature can strengthen our 
appreciation of a set of already existing African and marginalized Euro-American 
ecological knowledges and practices, though my focus in this chapter is on the former.  
As a result, what counts as agency, knowledge, and authority begins to shift. 1) Agency: 
speaking to the ancestors becomes a way of registering the land’s expressivity and 
nature’s powers to act in tandem with humans, rather than metaphoric “projections” of 
human society into nature; 2) Knowledge: becomes a heightened perceptual sensitivity 
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rather than a set of claims “passed down” from generation to generation; 3) Authority: 
becomes a composite more-than-human domain made up of competing sovereignties of 
earth (tindaana-ship) and state (chieftaincy), rather than an exclusively human set of 
governance designs and practices.        
 
SPEAKING WITH THE ANCESTORS: ORATURE, PERFORMANCE, CEREMONY 
 
When I was born, my umbilical cord was cut. Then it was buried in the soil. A tree was 
planted on the spot. The tree of my life has more meanings to it, figurative and 
metaphorical. Planting a tree with my umbilical cord also involved the act of implanting 
ideas of conservation in me. Respect for nature. The organic link between me and a tree 
requires me to have that special respect. In many African societies, even in Sri Lanka I 
learn, you cannot cut a tree without first speaking to it, or its ancestors, asking for 
permission. You must have a good reason!...The umbilical cord is not only a link between 
mother and child, it is also a link with those of the nation who for time immemorial lay 
underground; whose spirit nourishes us in our struggles for survival, beauty and 
heightened living. My sculptures in organic materials are a celebration of this fact. I 
collect branches, roots, stems, leaves of different shapes, grains and sizes. I leave them 
lying about for months, sometimes years, to re-establish a relationship with them. I do not 
try to ‘tame’ or ‘alter’ the wood or nature. I work with it, to heighten the hidden forms 
and messages. It is a partnership. 
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 When a Gurensi child is born the foundation of the granary is chiseled and the 
child’s umbilical cord is placed in a shea nut shell, stored at the base of the granary. The 
granary contains the record of the children in the house and it is taboo to destroy it. It is 
an earthen record of the ancestral potency of the land revealed both in abundant harvests 
and the fertility of households. Like the tree planted with Ntuli’s umbilical cord that 
intertwines the ancestors with human and nonhuman nature, the granary connects the 
newborn to the earthen compound and to the fertility of the earth as reciprocating 
ancestors. Orature renders perceptible such more-than-human “partnerships” and 
interdependencies. It draws together ecology, art, ritual, and politics, making it difficult 
to demarcate one “sphere” from the others. In what follows, I turn first to Pitika Ntuli and 
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o to explore how the concept of orature has been theorized in African 
arts and literature. Next I put Ntuli and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o into dialogue with Gurensi 
and Boosi orature to highlight a set of performances that draws upon such 
interdependencies between humans, animals, and the earth.     
 Zirimu’s concept of orature—an oral system of aesthetics and a mode of political 
thinking that does not draw its validity from the literary—was developed in the eighties 
by the pan-African, London-based performance collective African Dawn. Bringing 
together performing artists from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Grenada, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Senegal, African Dawn enlisted the concept of orature to theorize the integration of 
different art forms by the Black arts movement in Britain:  
A common point of departure for many Black artists is the defiance of formal 
artistic boundaries, specialization and the fragmentation of social experience. 
There is a conscious articulation of diverse and disparate elements of creativity, 
often organized in new exciting spaces. Many black artists work in various media 
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consciousness, a reflection of African and Asian attitudes to creativity, is called 
orature.
13
   
 
In that passage Kwesi Owusu, one of the members of African Dawn, is expanding upon 
the insights about orature of the South African sculptor and poet Pitika Ntuli. Ntuli had 
moved to Britain from Swaziland, his adopted country, where “the fusion of art forms, to 
be a poet, painter, sculptor, musician, actor, all in one, can be just a matter of course. 
Ceremonies, rituals, fuse all art forms to allow for a cross fertilization within the same 
setting and time.”
14
 But in Britain he found himself living in a state of permanent 
disconnectedness, in different “hermetically sealed” compartments simultaneously.
15
 He 
began to use his environment both physically and metaphorically to render visible hidden 
connections and to animate “modern” objects and phenomena: 
I salvage weapons of war against ugliness. I attempt to humanize objects, exhaust 
pipes, gearboxes, saucepans; curses, insults, appreciation, grey clouds, 
monotonous terraces, odd patches of colour in parks, human touch, frustration and 
hopes…my raw materials. Orature is more than the fusion of all art forms. It is the 
conception and reality of a total view of life. It is the capsule of feeling, thinking, 
imagination, taste and hearing. It is the flow of a creative spirit…Orature is the 
universe of expression and appreciation and fusion of both within one individual, 





The integrative nature of orature elides the formal boundaries between the written and the 
oral, between human speech or voice and art-objects’ expression. Orature as an art form 
positions African artists in exile as cross-cultural envoys who connect with centers of 
inspiration and creativity in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean without relinquishing their 
claims to authority within Britain.
17
 Orature also enables Ntuli to perform a series of 
reciprocal relationships with nature concealed by the compartmentalization of Western 
industrial society: “I do not try to ‘tame’ or ‘alter’ the wood or nature. I work with it, to 
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dialogue with each piece of wood that he carves, rather than “tame” it, making 
perceptible and available to his international audience the conservationist sensibilities 
nurtured in the womb of his African mother-environment. 
 In Globalectics Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o concurs with Ntuli that the fusion of art forms 
in the African traditional practice of orature presumes and cultivates such ecological 
sensibilities:  
Humans are definitely of nature. In that sense they are not different from animals 
and plants that all depend on the same mother-environment of earth, air, water 
and sun. Orature assumes this. Hence in the narratives of orature, humans, birds, 
animals and plants interact freely, often change into each others’ forms, and share 
language…This web of connections reflects the language of nature; the various 
aspects of nature are in active communications within themselves, for instance, 
the rain circle of water, vapor, clouds, rain, rivers, lakes, and seas, the subject of 
poetry and song…Everywhere one looks in nature is a web of connections, even 




For Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, the ecological understanding of nature begins with its 
personification. Orature gives expression to the “language of nature” by proliferating 
stories of the various connections and interdependencies between humans and nature.
19
 
The encounter between the hunter, the warrior, and the python in Zua is a case in point. 
Another commonly told Gurensi story recounts why the crocodile is tabooed amongst the 
Tindaama clans. One version of the story accentuates how humans and crocodiles change 
into each others’ forms: “their old men turned into crocodiles when they die.”
20
 
According to another version, the two species share a long history of mutual respect, 
cooperation, and cohabitation. The great-grandfather of these clans set on foot to a 
neighboring village and came to a river that had burst its banks and flooded the 
surrounding areas. He was able to cross the river with the help of a crocodile. Since then, 
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seize the animal and throw it back into the water. If the crocodile was killed, they would 
ensure that he was buried and that all funeral customary rites were performed as if he 
were a human being. Some of the Tindaama clans carve images of the crocodile on the 
walls of their compounds as a form of protection against malicious spirits and 
witchcraft.
21
 Likewise, the ancestor of a tindaama clan in Zoko was a hunter who “got 
lost in the forest and the monkey directed him.”
22
 Other clans in Zua identify with the 
dog: “Their ancestor was blind. The dog came and licked his eyes and he was able to see 
again. These people have a taboo – to kill and eat dog.”
23
 
 In chapter 3 I argued that such alliances across species can be understood as  
forms of experiential environmentalism, in which humans receive ethical and practical 
cues from a reciprocating environment. Orature makes visible ecological relations as 
profoundly communicative and dialogical, de-emphasizing the importance of abstract 
species frameworks in favor of lived experiences and ethics of coexistence. Such ethics 
of cultivation becomes realizable to its fullest dimension in performance. It is 
performance—so central to the aural-oral thought of African and non-African people, 
though not so readily obvious a feature of Western philosophy—that makes orature 
(whether a riddle, a proverb, a story, a poem, a song, a sculpture, or a painting) 
ecologically efficacious.
24
 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o writes,  
The key in all these elements of orature is their interpenetration. Central to them, 
is performance….Performance involves the performer and audience, and in 
orature, the performer and audience interact. Anywhere from the fireside, village 
square, and market place to the shrine can serve as the performance space and 
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The conditions of performance are themselves inseparable from the very system of oral 
aesthetics that they help perpetually generate. These conditions are changing all the time 
and no two performances can ever be the same.
26
 
 There is first of all the performance space, which is entangled with a variety of 
nonhuman bodies and processes. This could be an open village square, a hut, a 
compound, or an earth shrine, where interactions literally unfurl within the dynamic 
materiality of the earth. These spaces tend to be circular; all-uniting but also 
corresponding to the appearance of the sun and the moon. Then, there is the audience-
performer relationship, which involves the participation of the audience, and especially of 
the elders, as critics, listeners, and performers, blurring the distinctions between creative 
production and consumption.
27
 Third, there is the movement of bodies: orature is not only 
inscribed in the postures and motions of bodies but also in the sounds through which 
bodies speak.
28
 Most of all, performance nurtures relatedness and togetherness between 
people and the environment. The simple act of entering a common space for a sacrifice to 
the land gods or of enacting a taboo upon an encounter with a crocodile in the bush might 
make people feel de facto more interdependent with their environment. It might effect 
relatedness by the mere fact of taking place, and by maintaining an ongoing set of 
relationships with the ancestors on a person-to-person basis about matters of mutual 
concern and common interest.  
Take for example Mdan Koya (literally: “I just farmed the previous year”), the 
annual ceremony at the beginning of the dry season to give thanks to the ancestors for 
granting people’s plea for rain and good harvest yield. The tindaana consults the 
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day of the ceremony, the elders bring fowls and calabashes of early millet or guinea corn 
to the tindaana. Then they gather at the community tinkugere or tingane and sit on the 
ground. The tindaana takes a calabash (bagere wula) of water stirred with the flour 
received from each clan elder. He squats before the tinkugere or tingane to pour libation 
on the stone that contains the land spirits. The libation is followed by the sacrifice of the 
animals whose blood he pours on the stone while chanting: “You have given us food 
according to our wish, now we come to give you a present of animals, birds, pito, and 
guinea corn water (zom koom).” In Gurene the chants often consist of “To e la fo zom 
paa yinne, la fo belem” (“Take this up to god and beg…”).
29
 The tingane is petitioned to 
intervene and supplicate the withdrawn high or sky god (Yinɛ) on behalf of the 
community for their pleas for rain, fertility, and prosperity.  
The withdrawal of the sky god, in Amy Niang’s view, triggers a self-consciously 
political process through the transfer of the sacred attributes of the sky to the earthly 
tingane and ancestors. This transfer of authority has made nature more receptive to the 
vicissitudes of human earthly existence. Sacred groves may be now experienced as sites 
where humans bargain with the ancestors and with the land. In the grove, “the domain of 
power is an open circle subject to multiple interpretations and the injection of novel ideas 
and ideals.”
30
 The personification of landscapes endows them with the capacities to 
question and tamper with the work of the high god. It gives them latitude to shape 
creation in ways that may be beneficial or harmful to humans. And the tindaana (earth 
priest) is the mouthpiece of such ancestral needs and designs, voicing the enunciations of 
an ever-changing environment and the constant undulations of nature into culture and 
vice versa.
31
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We will later see that to think of tindaanas as “earth priests” is a mistranslation, 
not least because of the complex socio-political role and expectations attached to the 
office. Another such cultural import is “sacrifice” or “ritual,” when used to refer to 
ceremonial reverence for the ancestors even when African idioms and marks of 
recognition to living and dead elders do not warrant dividing the former from the latter in 
terms of this-worldly “ceremony” and other-worldly “ritual.” Equally, the 
“personification” of nature can only accurately mean what the Gurensi and the Boosi, and 
not we as social scientists, understand by “being a person”: namely, someone with whom 
one could talk things over.
32
 The elders who spoke to the ancestors at the tingane insisted 
that their interlocutors were capable of responding willingly to requests and pleas, 
regardless of whether their bodies were presently human, animal, plant, or mineral. My 
queries regarding who or what the ancestors were, their shape, size, age, degree of 
“humanness,” or the language they spoke seemed to be of little significance to the 
identities of the yaabas. People were not interested in what the ancestors had to say about 
themselves or who/what exactly made it rain but rather in what the living and the dead 
could do together for the community when it needed rains and good crop yields. The 
intercourse with the ancestors was intended not to further clarify the characters of those 
involved but to foster immediate action and to cope with the concrete situation that the 
earth gods were called to assist with.
33
 
Michael Singleton makes a similar set of observations with regard to the ways in 
which the WaBungu of Tanzania speak to the ancestors. The aim is interaction and 
performance, not disquisition: “Western culture, having opted since classical times for 
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Our primordial question is ‘with what am I dealing?’ only subsequently do we ask what 
can it do for me or me for it. On the other hand, where the audible rather than the visual 
predominates, people listen to rather than look at things.”
34
 Likewise, when the Gurensi 
tindaana supplicates the tingane, the latter’s “whatness” is irrelevant since what to do 
seems to be the whole point of the interaction: “Now that I have given you those 
blessings, you also have to reward me…give me a smock to wear.”
35
 What we have here 
is a web of personalized relationships between human and natural bodies and forces 
talking things over, and what they have to say is neither a veiled mental message nor the 
expression of preformed identities. Rather than having a world of fixed relations and 
identities, which orature would then have to organize and name—expressing organized 
sets of what already exists—orature produces the ever-present possibility of the creation 
and renewal of relationships between people and the land. Drawing from the “spontaneity 
and liberty of communication inherent in oral transmission—openness to sounds, sights, 
rhythms, tones, in life and the environment”—could lead to a mindset “characterized by 




ORATURE AND MINOR LITERATURE 
 
Orature begins with a relation or an encounter, rather than with separate beings in 
need of a relationship. This prompts us to explore not what orature is so much as the 
more-than-human forces or powers that orature reveals and enunciates. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, such a modality of language, which treats expression not as picture of the world 
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excellence. “Minor literature” is a performance, a subversive form of cultural production 
from within a dominant culture or model, a kind of “becoming a stranger” in one’s own 
language. Deleuze and Guattari give the example of Kafka’s and Beckett’s writings. Such 
literatures are always invested in becomings and they make strange the hegemonic 
signifying regimes:  
This is not a situation of bilingualism or multilingualism…this is not how great 
authors proceed, even though Kafka is a Czech writing in German, and Beckett an 
Irishman (often) writing in French, and so on….What they do, rather, is invent a 
minor use of the major language within which they express themselves entirely; 
they minorize this language, much as in music, where the minor mode refers to 
dynamic combinations in perpetual disequilibrium. They are great writers by 
virtue of this minoritization: they make the language take flight, they send it 
racing along a witch’s line, ceaselessly placing it in a state of disequilibrium, 
making it bifurcate and vary in each of its terms, following an incessant 
modulation…a great writer is always like a foreigner in the language in which he 
expresses himself, even if this is his native tongue…He is a foreigner in his own 
language: he does not mix another language with his own language, he carves out 
a nonpreexistent foreign language within his own language. He makes the 
language itself scream, stutter, stammer, or murmur.
37
   
 
Minor literature affects a “stutter,” turning a major language against itself. It produces a 
movement within the major, using the same elements but in a different manner. It is best 
understood as always in process, as always becoming and generating new forms of 
expression through the manipulation of those that are already place.
38
 What makes Kafka 
such a great writer, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not that he expressed the unrepresented 
spirit of the Czech people, but that he wrote without recourse to the standard and unified 
image of “the people.” His writing is peopled not by beings with stable identities but by a 
multiplicity of voices of what is not given yet, of a “people to come.”
39
 This is where 
language is not identified merely with meaning or message but comes closer to the 
quality of noise, music, or sonorous style: “What interests Kafka is a pure and intense 
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musical sound, a cry that escapes signification, composition, song, words—a sonority 
that ruptures in order to break away from a chain that is still all too signifying. In sound, 
intensity alone matters.”
40
 Just as the expression of the immanent plane of ancestral 
powers is made possible by performance in orature, minor literature renders sonorous 
forces that cannot be perceived otherwise. It constructs assemblages of metamorphosis 
and gives voice to minorities—a becoming-animal, a becoming-ancestor, a becoming-
woman—that cannot speak or articulate themselves as such.
41
 
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, there are three key characteristics of minor 
literature that enable its revolutionary and subversive potential: “the deterritorialization of 
language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective 
assemblage of enunciation…minor no longer designates specific literatures but the 
revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or 
established) literature.”
42
 I will explore each of these three characteristics in relation to 
Gurensi and Boosi orature insofar as orature might affect a kind of stuttering of the 
dominant Euro-American orientations of environmental political theory. 
 
The Deterritorialization of the Book and the Gallery Space  
 The first characteristic of minor literature, for Deleuze and Guattari, is that in it 
“language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization. In this sense, Kafka 
marks the impasse that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague and turns their 
literature into something impossible—the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility 
of writing in German, the impossibility of writing otherwise.”
43
 Like Kafka’s use of 
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strange and minor uses of Euro-American environmental political theory. If writing itself, 
as the key cultural institution of colonialism and the postcolonial state, requires the 
Gurensi country and land to become readable like a book, orature ensures the continuous 
illegibility of vernacular landscapes and forms of authority. It refuses to admit of 
hierarchies of paper and print over memory and voice, of the world of writing and 
literacy over the world of sensory and lived experience. For Owusu, Ntuli, and their 
collaborators at African Dawn, orature was “salvaged” as a “weapon” against the ghetto 
and the margin, assuming a dynamic interplay between margins and centers so that one 
comes to wonder which was the center and which the margin.
44
  
 The conversation between orature and minor literature might put environmental 
political theory’s relationship with alterity in a new light. As minor literature 
deterritorializes the major, it advances new collaborations and collectivities. Here orature 
might join forces with what Deleuze and Guattari call philosophy, a practice of concept-
invention that involves resistance to the present as it multiplies concepts that summon 
forth “a new earth, a new people.”
45
 In tandem with philosophy’s more abstract 
deterritorializations, African orature provides resistance to the present forms of imagined 
communities and prototypical subjectivities of Euro-American environmental political 
theory. For example, it reveals the living, the unborn, and the dead (or pythons, baobab 
trees, and crocodiles) as members of such collectivities. Together, orature and minor 
literature can extract from the habitual modes of environmental thought the elements of a 
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And yet, these missing people in a sense are already here, though their presence is 
obscured by the habitual structure of perception and majoritarian productions of 
subjectivity.
 47
 Put simply, to call forth “a new people, a new earth” requires both 
promoting new social identities and ecological practices and turning to the vibrant 
multiplicity of those already under way. It renders perceptible to theorists existing 
practices of sustainability such as the Hawaiian ahupua'a, the kattudel fisheries in Sri 
Lanka, the kebun-talun systems in West Java, or the hubche of the Yucatec Maya in 
Mexico. The goal is to become more sensitive to permeabilities and crossings that trouble 
the “Eurocentric” center as a center. Orature makes it clear that some traditions of 
political thinking make an appearance only when they are told.
48
 Story-telling, oral 
literatures, songs and proverbs—the prevailing regimes of many indigenous exegetes—
have to be negotiated with academic demands for writing and systematization.  
The dialogue between orature and minor literature affords an opportunity to 
decenter sensory hierarchies, and specifically environmental political theory’s 
commitment to textual and visual forms. We can now interrogate Eurocentrism not only 
as an intellectual habit but also as a habit of perception. The truth of vision in Western, 
literate traditions has been often privileged over the evidence of sound, taste, touch, and 
smell. Once traditions of political thought are no longer prefigured visually, as objects 
and texts, it becomes possible to think of interplays of voices, utterances, odors, and 
sounds. Much has been written, in criticism and praise, about the researcher’s gaze. What 
of the researcher’s ear?
49
 “Tete ka asom ene Kakyere”; “ancient things remain in the ear,” 
says the Akan proverb.
50
 Reconfiguring the theorist’s senses can help her garner new 
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extant notions of what counts as labor in an eco-economy, just as the Golib dance may 
reframe questions of what constitutes political resistance.    
 In chapter 4 I explored the works of Francis Bacon, Robert Smithson, and Richard 
Serra as modes of bodily intensification of sensations that enable a reworking of 
anthropocentric habits of perception. Orature highlights some of the “major” tendencies 
of this art. It accentuates the extent to which works such as Smithson’s Spiral Jetty tend 
to be detached from everyday life and are all too often designed to be consumed as land 
art. Because orature does not derive its legitimacy from an international art market, it can 
function as a general “becoming minor” in environmental art: it involves itself in 
deterritorializing—stuttering—the global language of contemporary art production in its 
use of the vernacular and specifically non-artistic materials.
51
 It produces a movement 
back and forth between, on the one hand, the canvas and the gallery floor in London and, 
on the other, the calabash and the village square in the African savanna.  
This movement positions orature at the edge of capital’s globalization. It affects a 
“stutter” in the commodity form of artistic production: “Creative stuttering is what makes 
language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes a language a rhizome instead 
of a tree, what puts language in a perpetual disequilibrium.”
52
 Like all minor languages, 
orature is a many-sided rhizome in which no one entrance is more privileged than 
another: each performance or recounting of a story is a new creation that proliferates new 
techniques and nurtures a willingness to experiment with new forms. By refusing to 
privilege any one particular rendition, orature not only challenges the commodification of 
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history, authority, and belonging. As such it becomes profoundly political. This brings us 
to the second characteristic of Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of minor literature. 
 
“Everything is Political:” Ecological Sovereignty and the “Minor” Order of the 
Earth  
The second characteristic of minor literature, say Deleuze and Guattari, is that it is 
always political: “its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect 
immediately to politics.”
53
 That orature is immediately political becomes evident from 
the founding story of Zua. The story, along with other pivotal narratives and rituals that 
define the formation of Gurensi political authority, troubles understandings of politics as 
an exclusively human domain. It acknowledges the constitutive influences of nonhuman 
forces in political contestations over collective conditions and identities and reveals a set 
of socio-ecological limits imposed on political power. Such more-than-human forms of 
authority and power complicate the view that the political function of competing 
narratives of “first-comers” in Ghana can be identified chiefly with claims of 
autochthony, entitling or excluding certain groups of people from access to land.
54
 
 According to Amy Niang in her analysis of rituals as political references in 
Moogo, such stories present political power as a composite made of components lodged 
in different offices and orders of sovereignty. Orature reproduces the way this 
multiplicity lives on beyond the life of any one incumbent, be it a chief, tindaana or clan 
elder. Niang identifies a widespread model of political legitimacy in West African 
societies that differentiates between the “people of power” associated with the 
state/power/war and the “people of the earth” associated with belief/rituals/agriculture. 
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host of elders that have a privileged connection to the land mediate communication with 
ancestors and spirits through rituals, and thus become indispensable for the legitimation 
of royal and state power. What we have here may be conceived as manifestations of 
competing sovereignties that sublimate their conflicts rather than clash in violent ways.
 55
  
This model of distribution of political authority is also visible in the Upper East 
Region of Ghana, where competing “first-comer” narratives such as the story of the 
hunter and the warrior negotiate a tenuous balance of power between the chieftaincy and 
the tindaana-ship. Such stories gather and multiply around earthen shrines and powerful 
features of the land, where successful pleas and supplications are reported, or contact is 
sought.  It may be that orature simultaneously legitimates and wards off the development 
of centralizing power in society: it iterates the division and correspondences between a 
minor “earth order” that was never formalized and the power nomenclature of the 
chieftaincy. The ascendance of the Mamprusi warrior from a young boy at the riverside 
to a newly enskinned Gurensi and Boosi chief subjects political power to the ritual 
procedures of tiƞa.
56
 Each version of the Zua founding story is a rememorialization of the 
social contract forged through the constitutive encounter between the warrior and the 
hunter, between “power” and the “earth.” By highlighting the mystical appearance of the 
python at Azua and the enduring relationship of kinship between the royal clans and the 
snake, the chieftaincy inscribes migration narratives into a land that welcomes the 
wanderers and in the process transforms them into history. Royal power here is derived 
from an ancient power that it supplanted by re-appropriating its essence; in other words, 
in acknowledging it by its very negation.
57
 This realigning of sovereign orders lies in the 
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histories of the chieftaincy in Zua seems to be contingent upon such rewritings, 
negotiations, and reconstructions.  
Chiefs have to establish and renew the terms of their alliance with the tindaanas 
and the basis of their legitimacy through various rites and rituals. Such rituals activate the 
necessary ancestral resources of political legitimacy while appropriating political agency 
and power from the tindaama clans through sacrificial practice and ritual reordering. In 
Zua every new chief is carried to the tindaana’s house where he is made to sit on a sacred 
stone kept in one of the byre (animal room) of the tindaana.  During the ritual at the 
tindaana’s house the stone is covered with a slimy, okra-like substance known as 
“buunto/salum.”  The chief is then stripped naked and two people, a man and a woman, 
hold the chief by his armpits and then thrust him on the sacred stone. If he slips off his 
chances of survival are very slim and he will not live long “on the skin.” If, on the other 
hand, he stays on the stone without slipping off or falling off he will reign for a long 
period. The ritual is followed by a ceremony, in which the tindaana performs sacrifices to 
Azua for the chief’s long life and wealth.
58
        
Is it possible that the ritual re-enacts both the overlap and the distinction between 
state and earth, between a hierarchical system and decentralized autonomy? The Naba 
acquires sovereignty and the means to rule in the hands of the Tindaana through a 
“confirmation” ritual that seems to “free” him from the constraints of the tindaana’s 
control.
59
 This is, conceivably, a legitimizing process without which the chief has no real 
control over the administrative basis of his rule. It transposes centralized power onto the 
ritual sphere while revealing the profound limits and dependence of the human order of 
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connected to the tindaana-ship. Political authority becomes a trial between contesting 
sovereignties, always subjected to the vicissitudes of the invisible governances of the 
land gods and the ancestors. In the process, both the chief and the people that he 
“administrates” may be understood as political subjects of the earth (tiƞa) first, and 
citizens in a quasi-centralized political formation second. 
Perhaps, the public display of royal vulnerability by the future chief may also be 
conceived as the condition set by tindaanas and the ancestors for agreeing to relinquish 
some of their powers. Like the cut-off line near the tindaana’s compound that the chief 
would never dare to cross, such rituals reveal the profound socio-ecological limits 
imposed upon political power as well as the contingencies of the royal office in 
Gurensiland. Even the triumphant return to the royal compound does not erase the 
permanent state of submissiveness of a naked ruler, who remains at the mercy of the 




Orature as Collective Enunciation of the Living and the Dead  
Finally, minor literature is always collective: “in it everything takes on a 
collective value” and has a collaborative status.
61
 It is less the expression of an individual 
subject than it is the articulation of what Deleuze and Guattari call a “collective 
assemblage:” “There isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages of enunciation, 
and literature expresses these acts insofar as they’re not imposed from without and 
insofar as they exist only as diabolical powers to come or revolutionary forces to be 
constructed.”
62
 It shifts voice away from the speaking subject to a collective, pre-
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writer who becomes a stutterer in language. He makes the language as such stutter: an 
affective and intensive language, and no longer an affectation of the one who speaks.”
63
  
Literature, for Deleuze and Guattari, has its own singular and collective power of 
affect, one quite distinct from the visual arts discussed in the previous chapter. What is 
expressed in minor literature is not a specific message or speaker, but a plane of powers 
that allows for an enunciating that is not reducible to a subject of enunciation. There isn’t 
a present world and then a representing language, as is told by the myth of representation 
wherein humans bring a passive earth or “nature” into language.
 64
 Rather than treating 
language as a vehicle for the transmission of messages among pre-formed speakers, 
minor literature makes perceptible the creative and intensive events and forces that 
produces speakers, only some of which are human. 
 However, Deleuze and Guattari provide few specific examples of such collective 
assemblages and enunciations. Here Gurensi orature—understood as a series of 
performances and events that produce more-than-human identities, speakers, or 
alliances—enriches Deleuze and Guattari’s exploration of the collective value of minor 
literature. In African orature a collectivity might form as an act of story-telling or a 
village square performance. My observations of how people ordinarily narrated events 
and stories suggest that they quite happily accepted interventions, digressions, and stories 
within stories without losing the main narrative thread.
65
 During my discussions of 
“tradition” in Zua and elsewhere, the chief, the tindaana or the household head would 
summon elders to support and correct him, one of whom may do most of the story-
telling. Almost always there were also a number of young men and children in 
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elsewhere, especially when a speaker faltered or encountered a moment of hesitation or if 
it became necessary to resolve an inconsistency. Even within the same household, two 
versions of a story were rarely identical.
66
 On occasion the tindaana poured libation to 
the community land spirits. During one of my visits to a tindaana’s family there was a 
long discussion about recording the interview. Recording was usually not a problem but 
the tindaana’s son kept insisting that a fowl be sacrificed—“otherwise the voice would 
not come.”  
 
At the Chief’s Palace 
A conjoint enunciation of the living and the dead emerges through speaking, 
chanting, or singing. On such occasions I saw how bits and pieces of tradition were being 
shaped and reshaped into a narrative appropriate for the here and the now. Orature does 
not aim to express what is, as though it had a set of relations and identities to repeat or 
reproduce. It seems to produce a Gurensi and Boosi identity that is always provisional, 
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transforms what it means to be “Gurensi” or “Boosi.” A minor literature does not become 
major when it collects enough examples. On the contrary, the more renderings and 
versions there are out there, the more identities are added. If orature can be identified as 
“traditional” it is not because it furnishes an authentic representation of some origin. It is 
because it seems to produce what Deleuze and Guattari call a “territory,” in which being 
Gurensi or Boosi is conceived as process of becoming and negotiation between the living 
and the dead, incorporating images from without through its own modality of work.
67
  
The orature regarding the beginning of the Boosi at Azua does not rely on the 
python or the pile of stones to symbolize “who they are.” It is only in actually gathering 
around the tingane or interacting with the python that people become “Boosi.” The 
investments and interactions between people and the environment produce a collective 
assemblage.
68
 This assemblage is a “territorial” investment insofar as it connects the 
social body of the village to the earthen bodies of the ancestors—not an underlying 
essence, which the investment then represents. Major literature repeats forms of the past 
and subjugates itself to a preexisting identity that all those forms express.
69
 Orature and 
minor literature, on the other hand, produce possibilities for new speakers and 
collaborations. And only some of these speakers are human or alive.             
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This dissertation has attempted to rethink and rework aspects of Euro-American 
environmental thought through ethnographic encounters with selected African ecological 
practices and knowledges. What happens when environmental political theory travels 
across cultural boundaries? What can these travels tell us about the practice of theorizing 
itself—its limits, its shifting horizons, and its relations to lived experience? The name 
“theory” comes from the Greek theoria, defined as to “see the world” or to be a 
“spectator.” Yet, like Kant, the preeminent thinker of universalism who never left 
Königsberg, theory’s travels do not always entail actual departures from familiar 
categories and institutions. Farah Godrej has shown, for example, how the Eurocentric 
habits of political theory emerged and became consolidated, in part, through imperial 
travel: the insights and influences of non-Europe were disavowed in order to reinforce 
Europe’s own sense of exceptionalism.
1
 Such practices of power in the production of 
political theory often become renewed when scholars and environmentalists export 
majoritarian Euro-American notions of the environment to understand unfamiliar modes 
of ecological thought.  
The global environmental movement has raised a series of pressing questions 
about the relationship between cultural priorities, sustainability, land use practices, and 
social identities. In the US and Europe many of these questions have emerged from 
below, from grassroots movements and concerns. However, when these ideas and 
practices travel to new contexts such as Northern Ghana they often appear as coming 
from above. By combining a minor tradition of political theory with ethnographic 
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that inspires co-learning. When theorists are called upon to be part-ethnographers, non-
Western traditions can be approached not as objects of analysis or “case studies,” but as 
worlds of intellectual production. 
A primary concern of the project has been to highlight the unequal status of 
different modes of knowledge production concerning the relationship between human 
subjectivities and a variety of non-human modes of being. Such inequalities profoundly 
affect the ways in which the global environmental crisis has come to be understood and 
addressed. Here I again concur with Godrej that the West/Non-West division remains 
pertinent insofar as it reveals how knowledge production and transmission continue to be 
plagued by radical power disparities. My aim is to question the Eurocentric tendencies of 
environmental political theory, understood as a posture towards knowledge that locates 
subjectivity and the agency to know in the West, while treating other ways of life and 
other modalities of political thought (e.g. African orature) as objects to be studied.
2
 The 
idea is not merely to advance the case for taking seriously indigenous ecological thought. 
I also seek to attest to neglected potentials and lived practices of environmentalism that 
characterize the collective conditions of multitudes—East and West, North and South—
in the Anthropocene.     
Thus I aim to reposition political theory with respect to its intellectual “resources” 
and “objects” of study. The engagement between the Gurensi earth priest and Friedrich 
Nietzsche, I argue, can be conceived as an exchange between partners that remains as 
relevant to the practice of political theory as is the engagement between the Confucian 
tradition and Western liberalism. By reducing the gap between theory and everyday 
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transform practices of transcultural learning and exchange. They might enrich our 
thinking about the relationship between political theory and alterity. Once alterity is no 
longer encountered as “an object,” exchange and co-learning can occur. “Informants” 
become co-authors and co-producers. As theory’s debts to plural production and textual 
collaboration become more apparent, one begins to wonder whether the challenge to 
Western notions of subjectivity also entails a shift towards new modes of textual 
production that are in practice authored by more than one person in more than one place. 
Such models of transcultural learning and borrowing apply both to research and 
teaching. It becomes essential to include the works and oral histories of African writers 
and elders in our pedagogical portfolios, rather than rely on the written work of Western 
academics alone, as is still common practice in many political theory and international 
studies courses. My hope is that by exploring voices commonly excluded from the 
classroom, political discourse, and intellectual study, both scholars and students will be 
encouraged to think more deeply about their own political, social, and economic positions 
and to seek understanding across historical and geographical distance. 
_________________________ 
As already suggested, one of the main structural impediments to addressing 
contemporary ecological problems remains the unsustainable infrastructure of global 
consumption and the social production of human wants. This infrastructure is intertwined 
with structures of anthropocentric perception that organize much of the liberal consensus 
of environmental political theory. This includes perceptions of human bodies as 
autonomous rights-bearers and self-enclosed biological entities that can be variously 
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pliable material context for human designs and practices. If a theorist comes to a new 
tradition of thought as a learner/imitator rather than an expert, and if she tries on various 
positionalities and identities, she may come both to acknowledge and to deepen the ways 
in which her subjectivity is neither “attached solely to one tradition, nor entirely an 
outsider to any.”
3
 This capacity to inhabit multiple positionalities—theorist, 
ethnographer, Westerner, middle-class political activist, environmentalist—may decenter 
such Eurocentric perceptions of the human, placing them in a series of transformative 
relationships to previously neglected traditions of ecological thought.  
For instance, chapter 3 has tried to bring certain elements of African animism to 
move and illuminate Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Such artistry helps to foster a style of 
thinking and sensing that makes more perceptible an ongoing web of more-than-human 
interactions and communication. In the process of shifting back and forth between 
different perspectives and identities, the experience of what it means to be human may 
also shift. A self-possessed individual may become alert to the dividual circulating in it 
that is composite, permeable, and constituted by perspectives and interpretations that 
originate outside or below the self.
4
 Thoreau’s hoeing beans not only affords temporary 
suspension of subject-object relationships in favor of a kindredship of more-than-human 
economy-makers, but also works upon the tacit practices of perception that help to 
organize selves. Zarathustra’s cultivation of gift-giving virtue enables him to assume the 
perspective of the sun, which is always turned outwards and reaching out to the other. It 
allows him to amplify “the inflow,” to digest it and to allow the outflow to be richer. The 
earth priest’s libation and supplication to the tingane (earth gods) transforms him into a 
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the human body is experienced as a lively constellation of layered communities and vital 
earthen materials dependent for its richness upon larger assemblages of humans and 
nonhumans. Mind and body become extended into socio-ecological networks that include 
not only the earth, plants, animals, and minerals but also tools, machines, and cultural 
artifacts.   
This is not to suggest that all environmental political theorists should conduct 
fieldwork or employ the ethnographic method. Or that all environmentalists should travel 
to a village in Africa or the Amazon to solicit the expertise of an earth priest or a shaman. 
Some of us may decide instead to engage in experimental artistic work—what I have 
called practices of eco-sensation—that recrafts and stretches anthropocentric habits of 
perception and judgment. The matter- and landscape installations of Richard Serra and 
Robert Smithson, or the paintings of Francis Bacon may also produce pro-ecological 
effects on many human bodies in this respect. They might elicit and intensify sensations 
that enhance our awareness of the various interdependencies between human 
subjectivities and earthly forces and processes. Such tactics of self-artistry may prime us 
to experiment with some of the other role performances that constitute us as political, 
social, and ecological beings. 
Here what I have in mind is a variety of micro-experimentation practices that 
work on several socio-cultural registers at once, informed by William Connolly’s idea of 
“role experimentation.” Connolly enlists this idea to augment the organized hierarchy of 
roles that connects individuals, constituencies, and institutions in the matrix of 
contemporary neoliberalism:  
large-scale cultural investments in a set of role expectations tend to express and 
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can both make a difference on their own and help to set preconditions for 
constituency participation in more robust political movements…Role 
experimentation can disrupt and redirect the flow of authority, habit, institutional 
regularity, and future projection. In can encourage others to look more closely at 
their own performances in this or that domain. Such experiments can also set the 




According to Connolly, a series of minor role experiments might accumulate into 
pronounced changes in institutional designs and practices, forging new connections 
across multiple constituencies engaging in similar experiments. In the domain of 
ecopolitics, such experiments include: active support of farm-to-table restaurants, the 
slow food movement, and stores that offer food based upon sustainable processes; buying 
a hybrid and joining a car-sharing urban collective; pressing neighborhood associations 
and workplaces to switch to solar panels and install them themselves; withdrawing from 
aggressive investments that presuppose unsustainable growth patterns or/and undermine 
the collective future; joining repair clubs to cut back on waste and increase the longevity 
of appliances, furniture, and vehicles; altering personal patterns of film and artistic 
exhibits attended to stretch one’s habitual powers of perception and to challenge 
unconscious American assumptions about world entitlement, etc.
6
   
 As such experiments accumulate, they may not only become more refined and 
entrenched but also might encourage us to reach out to larger constituencies, which are 
not exclusively human. We may now become more alert to our roles as citizens in biotic 
communities where animals, plants, and mountains also are granted ethical consideration 
and rights, and where biodiversity preservation is nurtured and prioritized. Or, rather, we 
may begin to re-experience ourselves as earth-bound bodies in an eco-economy, in which 
crocodiles, baobab trees, and ponds are also enmeshed in a web of role performances as 
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may provide us with a sense of wealth, enrichment, and belonging that exceeds the 
rewards and incentives provided by neoliberal markets, as they did for Thoreau, 
Zarathustra, and the African elder. Role experimentation within and across pluralist 
assemblages is revealed as a two-way street. As parents, colleagues, lovers, friends, and 
teachers, we begin to educate others, at home and in the classroom, about the value of 
combining philosophy with the lived experience of biodiversity and interconnectedness. 
As students, sons and daughters, learners/imitators, and ecological citizens in a more-
than-human polity we begin to listen more attentively to the messages of the world and to 
what the earth, the ancestors, the animals, and the plants require from us. 
_________________________ 
A truly sustainable economy thus calls into question the boundary between the 
human and nonhuman world and the unspoken assumption that nonhumans have no 
agency and do not produce socio-economic effects. This anthropocentric bias is 
expressed in the ideas that nature is a set of “economic resources,” that matter is pliable, 
and that only the human has agency of any kind. An emphasis on more-than-human 
assemblages allows us to see the intra-actions between the porous bodies that compose 
the economy and the ways in which the economy is continuously generated and 
regenerated through these encounters. Such collections of communities are complex 
assemblages and communities of communities, of which humans are a part and on which 
human survival depends.  
According to J.K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink, these communities 
constitute a new “econo-sociality” that allows us “to trace how attending to the needs of 








 Human needs are intertwined with the needs of animals, plants, soils, and 
water sources; concerns about the exploitative interdependence between producers and 
non-producers are linked to a concern for the unaccounted-for exploitation of the 
nonhuman world.
8
 From this ecological perspective, an eco-economy emerges as a 
“space of negotiated interdependence rather than a growth machine.”
9
 Divisions between 
consumption and production, between the productive and reproductive domain, become 
more fluid.  
The project is to re-think economy and politics as crucial dimensions of ethical 
self-formation. The economization of life with all its implications (cultural, social, 
ecological, and political) is subjecting its participants to invisible and hidden processes of 
normalization and systems of control. Drawing on Connolly’s reflections on role 
experimentation, the task of political resistance is no longer merely a question of taking 
power and institutional capture but also of making power, of augmenting deeply 
entrenched role performances and habits of perception. Here Connolly agrees with 
Foucault that the objective is “not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are” and 
to redefine our relationship to the present: “We have to promote new forms of identity 
through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries.”
10
 Contemporary environmentalism, then, can be understood as a search for 
resonating modes of counterpower in the present. It becomes a process of finding creative 
ways to redistribute our lives across multiple arrangements of human and thing-power 
and to shatter the normalizing effects of neoliberal capitalism.    
In this respect, the mutuality of the encounters between Western and African 
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the search for such alternatives. The conversations between Thoreau, Nietzsche, and the 
earth priest may highlight complex tissues of practices of living with the land that are 
continually being adapted to changing political and ecological circumstances. They might 
help us register the affectivity and productivity of the land in its relations with humans. 
As I have suggested, in the Gurensi tiƞa there is no room for binary distinctions such as 
nature/culture, domesticated/wild, and subject/object. Tiƞa is a complex assemblage of 
force-fields of spiritual, ecological, and political power, distributed along a continuum of 
interactions between tindaanas, chiefs, clan elders, spirits and earth gods. Unlike a 
resource frontier that implies an inert landscape ready to be dismembered by competing 
human claims, landscapes like tiƞa are particularly active: they “are simultaneously 
natural and social, and they shift and turn in the interplay of human and nonhuman 
practices.”
11
 If property in Ghana is best understood as a social process of negotiated 
interdependence, the land plays a vital part in such negotiations.
12
 
Here the exchange between Zarathustra and the earth priest in Chapter 3 becomes 
particularly instructive: it brings to light a web of existing human-environment 
interactions as relations of agonistic co-operation, and not competition. Chapter 5, in turn, 
exposes the political function of such agonism by examining Gurensi earth shrines 
(tingana) as sites of political contestation between competing forms of sovereignty and 
authority. It shows that sacred groves can be understood as microcosms of two 
complementary forces of state and earth, which refer to an imported hierarchical system 
of chieftaincy and a decentralized regime of ecological sovereignty associated with the 
earth custody. Such transcultural revisions of economy and politics figure social identities 
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through the conjoint action of human and more-than-human participants. They enable us 
to reclaim economy and politics as sites of everyday ethical practices, enacting new body-
economies and new econo-socialities at the core of which is the negotiation of 
interdependence. Localities such as Northern Ghana that are commonly defined in terms 
of deficiency now can be re-experienced as sites of surplus possibility where alternative 
pathways to shaping political economy are continually opening up.
13
  
My goal has been to discuss under-recognized aspects of global environmentalism 
and to perceive change as a socio-ecological process that starts horizontally, flowing out 
of and into the earth and back into the human body. Such change involves the recovery of 
a freedom to participate in the ecological regeneration of the earth, as we are mobilized to 
act through intra-actions with other bodies of seeds, animals, mountains, and water. Such 
a notion of freedom exceeds the entrepreneurial freedom of the liberal individual to 
compete in a marketplace. It aims instead to contribute to the struggle for a better life of 
the whole biotic community through macropolitical and micropolitical experiments. 
Macropolitical refers to organized and institutional forms of participation, mobilizing 
vernacular and eco-egalitarian ways of interaction and leadership. Micropolitical refers to 
techniques of existence that refashion political sensibilities, role performances, and 
constituency subjectivities in the direction of interconnectedness, reciprocity, receptivity, 
redistribution, and community. Our identities are inevitably laden with power relations 
and bound to more-than-human assemblages. The current “successes” of this world, 
including our formation as ecological and political beings, bind us to the dominant 
imaginaries of capitalist order. The critical task becomes to cultivate nonconformist 
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relation is based on the affirmation of the fecundity and diversity of earthly existence. To 
avoid submission to the authority of consumption-crazed and human-centered thinking 
means to deliberately and overtly fail to reproduce a model of this authority within 
oneself or to allow it define our connections to the larger communities of animals, plants, 
minerals, and the earth.  
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